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Abstract
Transcendental contractualism is an attempt to explain the objectivity of reasons 
against wronging.
Chapter one discusses Scanlon's Contractualism and Utilitarianism. I 
argue that Scanlon fails to establish the motivational and normative basis for right 
and wrong. In chapter two I explain Scanlon's revised account of motivation and 
defend it from Humean and anti-Humean alternatives. In chapter three I discuss 
the normativity of what we owe to each other. I use the structure of Williams’s 
distinction between internal and external reasons. I describe the varieties of 
intemalism and extemalism about normative reasons, and describe Scanlon as a 
weak externalist who is also committed to the objectivity of normative reasons. I 
argue that the combination of weak extemalism and objectivity regarding the 
nature of normative reasons is problematic. In chapter four I endorse the general 
approach of the buck-passing argument, but criticise Scanlon's version. I develop 
an augmented buck-passing argument that is brought to bear in chapter five. I 
employ the augmented buck-passing argument to refute the charges of circularity 
and redundancy. In the second part of this chapter I describe the problems of 
normative scepticism, and explain that Scanlon cannot establish the objectivity 
and a priori nature of the reasons against wronging. In chapter six, I turn to the 
transcendental arguments of Strawson's Individuals, and argue that when 
combined with Scanlon's account of the nature of intentional action and the 
structure of right and wrong, they can refute the scepticism of the amoralist, and 
those who challenge the priority of what we owe to each other. I argue that the 
transcendental argument for practical personhood is able to show that original
2
moral properties of contractualism are necessary, universal, and a priori. I 
conclude that the argument for transcendental contractualism is able to provide for 
the objectivity of normative reasons, and their necessary connection to motivation.
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Introduction
My thesis is intended as a response to the problem of scepticism about the 
normativity of right and wrong in Scanlon's contractualism. Transcendental 
contractualism is a shorthand for the combination of arguments I draw together 
from Scanlon and Peter Strawson; it is an attempt to explain the objectivity of 
reasons against wronging.
My thesis is concerned with Scanlon's What We Owe to Each Other. I 
begin with an examination of Scanlon's earlier Contractualism and Utilitarianism, 
as this sets the context for the discussion of later chapters. The problems that 
issued from this original article were directly responsible for many of the 
revisions presented in his later book. I am concerned to identify one key question 
in Scanlon's contractualism: the normativity of right and wrong. One of the basic 
arguments of my thesis is that Scanlon does not satisfactorily establish that what 
we owe to each other is objective, and necessarily ascribable to all. Whilst the 
content and extent of the arguments vary widely between the original presentation 
and the later book, the same basic problem remains.
However, the persistence of my criticism should not distract from my 
endorsement of Scanlon's account of the nature of right and wrong, and much else. 
I am convinced, as I hope to explain, that much of what we find in What We Owe 
to Each Other should be accepted. And so I have the dual intention, in my 
discussion, of explaining the presence and origin of the problem of the 
normativity of contractualism whilst describing, defending, and sympathetically 
revising the key doctrines regarding the nature of right and wrong. My intention
9
is to specify the origin of the problem of the normativity of contractualism, and to 
suggest how we can address this problem. The nature of the problem, I argue, is 
that Scanlon is unable to provide an account of the necessity, universality, and 
objectivity of what we owe to each other. In order to address this problem, we 
need to look beyond Scanlon's contractualism, and towards transcendental 
arguments derived from Strawson's Individuals. These transcendental arguments 
can explain the universality and necessity of the concept of a person. This is an 
argument for the objectivity of persons as mutual ascribers of self-consciousness. 
The transcendental argument for the mutual ascription of self-consciousness is 
important to refute the normative sceptic who, I argue, does not ascribe the 
properties of personhood universally or a priori. Strawson argues that to ascribe 
personhood to oneself is, necessarily, to ascribe it to other persons. The amoralist 
is not, we conclude, exceptional or exempt.
Whilst I hope to present a convincing account of what I have described as 
transcendental contractualism, I have a broader aim, which I hope will become 
clear in the course of the discussion. I am concerned that the general ambition of 
constructivist theories such as Scanlon's are unable to account for the possibility 
of objectivity in moral and political theory because of a reluctance to engage in 
metaphysics. I turn to Strawson's Individuals as an example of descriptive 
metaphysics that should not offend against constructivist sensibilities. My 
broader aim then is to promote the promise and compatibility of transcendental 
arguments and constructivism. Transcendental contractualism, as I will present it, 
is one possible version, but it seems to me that there is much scope for the pursuit 
of other transcendental constructivisms.
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I shall briefly summarise the contents of my thesis. Chapter one begins 
with a discussion of Scanlon's Contractualism and Utilitarianism. I argue that 
Scanlon intends to show that morality is more than a special taste or preference, 
but that he in fact fails to establish that the motivational and normative basis for 
right and wrong is anything other than contingent. Chapter two begins the 
discussion of What We Owe To Each Other. I explain Scanlon's revised account 
of motivation. We discuss Humean and anti-Humean views of the constitution of 
motivation, and I compare Scanlon's account to varieties of each. I conclude that 
Scanlon's understanding of motivation withstands criticisms from both sides of the 
Humean divide, and presents a convincing and compelling understanding of 
intentional action. In chapter three I begin our discussion of the normativity of 
what we owe to each other. I use the structure of Williams’s distinction between 
internal and external reasons. I describe the varieties of internalism and 
extemalism about normative reasons, and describe Scanlon as a weak externalist 
who is also committed to the objectivity of normative reasons. I present 
Scanlon’s arguments against internalist conceptions of normative reasons, and 
amplify some of his arguments with reference to the work of Jonathan Dancy. I 
conclude chapter three by arguing that there is a structural problem in the 
combination of weak extemalism and objectivity regarding the nature of 
normative reasons. Weak extemalism takes the view that reasons may exist 
independently of subject’s motivations, whereas the commitment to objectivity 
asserts that the reasons are normative for all persons. The combination of weak 
extemalism and objectivism seems to allow for the possibility of a person 
claiming exemption from objective reasons because they do not possess the
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appropriate motivation. I ask if there is a way to combine weak internalism with 
objectivism, and therefore avoid this problem. This question informs the 
discussion of subsequent chapters. In chapter four I examine Scanlon's account of 
value. This is an important stage in his discussion, as it sets out the relationship 
between right and good. The buck-passing argument is presented as a response to 
the open question problem. When analysing the relationship between objects and 
their goodness, we are faced with the possibility, when stating that ‘the beach is 
pleasant’, of being asked, ‘but is it good?’ This question has an open feel. In 
response to this problem, Scanlon suggests the buck-passing move, where the 
good is not described as an independent property in itself, but rather as the higher 
order property of objects that have some particular substantive value. The ‘buck’ 
of the good is passed onto the particular substantive properties. I endorse the 
general approach of the buck-passing argument, but suggest that it is problematic 
as it stands. I develop an augmented buck-passing argument that draws on 
arguments from Jonathan Dancy and Jay Wallace. On my augmented buck- 
passing argument, both the right and the good must be regarded as higher order 
formal properties: the property of being of value, or of having a reason. I use this 
augmented buck-passing argument to respond to critics of the buck-passing view 
in general. The augmented buck-passing argument is brought to bear in a central 
discussion of chapter five. This chapter is concerned with the content and scope 
of what we owe to each other, and I employ the augmented buck-passing 
argument of chapter four to refute the charges of circularity and redundancy. 
However, in the second part of this chapter, I emphasise how Scanlon has not 
escaped the problems that we encountered in chapter one. I describe the problems
12
of normative scepticism, and explain that Scanlon cannot explain the objectivity 
and a priori nature of the reasons against wronging. I discuss Susan Mendus’s 
arguments against Scanlon’s account of the relationship between partial and 
impartial reasons. I agree with Mendus’s criticisms, but offer some qualifications 
of her alternative account. The explanation of the objectivity and the a priori 
nature of the reasons against wronging is the topic of chapter six. In this chapter I 
turn to the transcendental arguments of Strawson's Individuals, and argue that 
when combined with Scanlon's account of the nature of intentional action and the 
structure of right and wrong, they can refute the scepticism of the amoralist, and 
those who challenge the priority of what we owe to each other. I present 
Strawson’s arguments, and discuss the validity of transcendental arguments. I 
argue that Strawson’s self-directed transcendental arguments can respond to the 
classic objection made by Stroud and others, namely that transcendental 
arguments only provide contingent, and not objective, validity. I argue that the 
transcendental argument for practical personhood is able to show that original 
moral properties of contractualism are necessary, universal, and a priori. They are, 
in other words, objective. I am particularly interested in Strawson’s argument for 
the necessary mutual ascription of self-consciousness to persons. This, it seems to 
me, provides a promising route to refute the sceptical amoralist. I conclude by 
returning to the discussion of internal and external reasons. I suggest that the 
argument for transcendental contractualism is able to provide for the objectivity of 
normative reasons, and their necessary connection to motivation. This argument 
draws together many of the stands of thesis.
13
Before these strands are woven together in the arguments for 
transcendental contractualism, we begin with Scanlon’s initial account in 
Contractualism and Utilitarianism.
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Chapter One
CONTRACTUALISM AND UTILITARIANISM
Introduction
In Contractualism and Utilitarianism, Scanlon presents his version of 
contractualism as part of a wider discussion of contractualism in Rawls and 
Harsanyi. Although this work is one chapter in a collection of essays, it had a 
remarkable influence on the discussion of contractualism in moral and political 
philosophy. Not only did it provide a rich source of debate and analysis, it also 
presented problems that Scanlon addressed explicitly in his later book. It is 
important, therefore, to begin with a discussion of Scanlon's original presentation 
of contractualism: for its lucidity, but perhaps more importantly to identify 
difficulties that will feature throughout our later discussions.
In section one, I will set out the aims of Scanlon's contractualism. As we 
will find throughout our discussion, Scanlon takes the ordinary experience of 
moral life very seriously, and hopes to present a theory that is consistent with our 
deeply held intuitions about the subject matter and status of moral judgment. This 
theory is, of course, intended to clarify and illuminate our ordinary moral 
experience, but we will see that Scanlon is very attentive to what he calls the 
phenomenology of moral life. We will see that Scanlon identifies two threats to 
the description of morality that he wants to provide. These are doubts about the 
priority and importance of right and wrong. Although somewhat different in 
nature, these two doubts challenge the normativity of moral reasons. After setting
15
out the contents of Scanlon's contractualism as presented in this original article in 
section two, I will argue that Scanlon is unable to account for the importance and 
priority of contractualism in the term he hopes. This prepares the ground for the 
much more detailed arguments and revisions in the later What We Owe to Each 
Other.
1. The Importance and Priority o f Contractualism
For most of us, moral failure is perhaps the most serious failure of all. We may 
judge that someone has terrible taste in music, or is an intellectual nincompoop, 
and regard both these as serious failings. But to say that someone has acted 
wrongly, or is a morally bad person, is to make a judgment of a different order. It 
seems as though morality belongs in a special category in our lives. Scanlon takes 
this ordinary experience of the special nature of morality at face value, and 
regards its explanation as one of the central questions to be addressed by his 
contractualism.
A satisfactory moral philosophy will not leave concern with 
morality as a simple special preference, like a fetish or a special 
taste, which some people just happen to have. It must make it 
understandable why moral reasons are ones that people can take 
seriously, and why they strike those who are moved by them as 
reasons of a special stringency and inescapability.1
The ‘special stringency and inescapability’ of moral reasons is derived 
from the importance and priority of morality in our lives. Why do we regard 
morality as especially important in our relationships with others? One simple 
answer is that the morality of right and wrong concerns how we treat others, and
1 T. M. Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Bernard Williams and 
Amartya Sen, (Cambridge University Press, 1982), 106
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how we ourselves are treated. We can of course have moral concern for the non­
human world. Many people regard their relationship with the environment or 
with animals as having a moral dimension. But Scanlon’s sole concern is with 
our relationships with other people. And in those relationships, the morality of 
right and wrong affects our standing with others in a way that other concerns do 
not. Our tastes in art or pleasure are, for the most part, relations between the 
object and ourselves: relations of enjoyment or stimulation, faith or solace. Such 
differences may affect the texture and quality of our relationships with others, but 
we can sustain relationships even if we value different things. ‘The effects of a 
failure to be moved by considerations of right and wrong are not, however, 
confined in this way. This failure makes a more fundamental difference because 
what is in question is not a shared appreciation of some external value but rather 
the person’s attitude toward us.’2 We may encounter someone who shares our 
taste in food, music, and literature, but who does not have a place for moral values 
in their lives. They might recognise the existence of the institution of morality, 
but not relate towards us with any notion of our moral standing. If this person is 
gentle, sensitive, faithful, and wise, we might enjoy their company. They need 
not be vicious and heinous; they need not be immoral. But according to Scanlon, 
the role of morality is so central in our relationship with others, that there would 
be a fundamental breach in our relationship. We might call this person the 
amoralist. So morality is especially important because our identity as persons is 
fundamentally important to how we regard others and ourselves. Our relationship 
with others is affected in a more profound way if someone fails morally rather
2 ibid., 159
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than in any other way, and it is affected irreparably if a person is an amoralist. 
Can contractualism meet the challenge of the amoralist?
Perhaps we can rebut the amoralist, and show that they cannot escape the 
claims of morality. But we could also meet a person who accepts the value of 
morality, but disagrees that it should take priority over other values automatically. 
Again, this might not mean that they treat people badly. But they might regard 
the values of friendship, neighbourliness, parenthood, or citizenship as of greater 
priority in their relationship with others. They might reject the priority of the 
value of the morality of right and wrong, where people are valued first and 
foremost as persons as such and in their particular identities only secondly. The 
particular values of friendship, shared religious faith, or common racial identity 
might be of greatest priority to them. Such people might agree that everyone 
stands subject to the limits of morality, but they might deny that the value of the 
morality of right and wrong should take priority in each and every instance. As a 
consequence, the kinds of reasons that they would accept in justification of their 
actions would be constituted by the particular values that apply to the case at hand. 
Put more abstractly, the standards of normative justification would be constituted 
by the nature and kinds of values they prioritize. But Scanlon would disagree 
with someone who didn’t prioritize the value of right and wrong.
Scanlon's challenge is to refute the amoralist, and persuade everyone else 
that the value of right and wrong should take priority over other values that might 
provide normative reasons in justification. He considers it a central task of his 
contractualism to .explain both the priority that the part of morality it describes
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claims over other values and the special importance we attach to being moved by 
it...’3
2. Contractualism and Utilitarianism
Scanlon’s initial account of the morality of right and wrong was presented as a 
descendant of Rawls’s argument in A Theory o f Justice. One of the important 
features of Rawls’s contractualism for Scanlon was that it offered an alternative to 
the utilitarian account of moral motivation and moral reasoning. Rawls’s 
proposed foundation of moral motivation was a commitment to the value of the 
equal moral standing of persons in themselves. The conception of moral 
reasoning offered in place of aggregation was reasonableness. These two features 
taken together seemed to offer the prospect of a non-utilitarian moral theory that 
was not based on queer metaphysics, perhaps like intuitionism, nor on formal 
rationality, like Kant.
Following Rawls, Scanlon characterized the commitment to the value of 
persons in terms of a shared motivation to be in agreement with others on just and 
fair terms. The notion of agreement has of course featured prominently in many 
very different kinds of moral theories. These different kinds of moral 
contractualism are often differentiated by how they characterise the motives and 
values of the people involved in the agreement. Famously, Hobbes thought that 
we were driven to seek agreement because there were no inherent limitations on 
the values we hold or the means we choose to pursue them, and such 
permissiveness on our means and ends created a fear for our lives that drove us to 
seek mutual assurance on prudential grounds. Rawls’s notion of agreement draws
3 ibid., 187
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from a quite different tradition, where it is held that people regard themselves and
others as of integral value in virtue of their personhood. Agreement, at least in
part, is a metaphor for the moral respect for others as persons.
The contrast might be put as follows. On one view, concern with 
protection is fundamental, and general agreement becomes 
relevant as a means or a necessary condition for securing this 
protection. On the other, contractualist view, the desire for 
protection is an important factor determining the content of 
morality because it determines what can reasonably be agreed to.
But the idea of general agreement does not arise as a means of 
securing protection. It is, in a more fundamental sense, what 
morality is about.4
However, Scanlon hoped that his version of contractualism would provide 
a more simple and direct basis upon which to derive non-utilitarian moral 
requirements than that given by Rawls. Rawls seemed to be arguing that in order 
to derive authoritative moral principles (of justice in his case), a person’s complex 
motivational commitments needed to be mediated through the procedure of the 
original position and the veil of ignorance. This procedure was designed to be fair 
to all persons by filtering out any partial, unreliable, or selfish interests. On one 
reading, Rawls is here trying to present accurately the complex, and perhaps 
contradictory, interests of reasonable people, and isolate those interests upon 
which it is most appropriate to build an account of justice. The authority of the 
principles is therefore derived from the fact that they would have been chosen by 
a self-interested person, with an effective sense of justice, through a procedure 
designed to prevent the person choosing principles that would be partial or unfair. 
It is worth mentioning that, for all the discussion of Rawls’s Kantianism, this is a
4 ibid., 128
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fundamentally un-Kantian position. The basis of morality is not our rationality, 
and the principles of justice are not categorical or derived from formal features or 
capacities of reason. For Rawls, and perhaps for all contractualists, a moral agent 
is constituted by their ability and motivation to act reasonably, according to their 
commitment to the value of the equal moral standing of persons. Reasonableness 
involves a judgment about the considerations that count in favour or against a 
moral principle. This is a substantive moral judgment about substantive moral 
principles and values. It is not a methodical application of a formal rule derived 
from an account of our rationality. Contractualism is concerned with reasons and 
reasonableness, and not reason and rationality.
Although Scanlon shared Rawls’s commitment to the notion of agreement 
on moral terms, he criticised Rawls’s characterization of the agreement. Scanlon 
recognised that the authority and priority of the principles of justice did not derive 
from their construction in the original position behind the veil of ignorance. The 
authority of these moral principles was derived from the basic commitment a 
person has to the value of the equal moral standing of persons in themselves. The 
complicated machinery of Rawls’s argument could be substituted with the basic 
and direct commitment to fairness (now characterised more generally as rightness). 
This commitment provides the grounds for the priority and authority of the moral 
requirements of right and wrong. In the process of justifying the principles to 
another person, the strongest argument you could present is that these are the 
principles that they indeed want, as evinced by their commitment to the value of 
the equal moral standing of persons. The procedure might clarify this to them, but 
it would not in itself provide another reason. It merely serves to clarify the
21
original reason that is derived from their fundamental commitment to the value of 
the equal moral standing of persons.
So far we have been speaking in terms of a fundamental commitment to 
the value of the equal moral standing of persons. But what, more precisely, is the 
nature of this commitment? In what way are we committed to this value?
For Scanlon, our commitment is our desire. Scanlon claims that we are 
not only moved by selfish desires to promote our own self-interest whenever we 
can do so with little risk. Nor are we so driven by a fear of others’ ruthless pursuit 
of their own interest, that benevolent feelings are consumed by a desire for 
protection. Scanlon is certainly not claiming that our desires and interests are 
entirely altruistic, only that the importance and priority of morality is bom from a 
compelling desire to be in a relationship of respect with others. He argues that 
people have a basic desire to seek agreement with others similarly motivated on 
terms no one could reasonably reject. We will see later on that Scanlon is 
somewhat unclear about the origin of this desire, but he claims very clearly that 
we have good grounds to regard it as a common feature of peoples’ constitution. 
The cultural and familial norms of respect for persons, and the importance of 
reasonable justifiability as a standard of conduct, provide deep foundations for 
such a desire.
In fact it seems to me that the desire to be able to justify one’s 
actions (and institutions) on grounds one takes to be acceptable is 
quite strong in most people. People are willing to go to 
considerable lengths, involving quite heavy sacrifices, in order to 
avoid admitting the unjustifiability of their actions and 
institutions. The notorious insufficiency of moral motivation as a 
way of getting people to do the right thing is not due to simple
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weakness of the underlying motive, but rather to the fact that it is 
easily deflected by self-interest and self-deception.5
We provide a home for many different desires and interests, some of
which can conflict. The presence of a conflict between our moral desire and
perhaps some very self-interested desire does not invalidate the importance or
even the existence of the moral standards. It is the case that some of our most
deeply held, truly desired, values are often not at the forefront of our mind and
actions. Our desire to live a long and healthy life might be seldom heeded. But
the immediate absence, or perceived absence, of such a desire does not exempt us
from the claims of morality. Scanlon’s concern is to identify a specific desire for
the value of morality, and to argue that whilst it is not indefeasible, it is the origin
of the priority and importance of right and wrong.
What must an adequate philosophical theory of morality say about 
moral motivation? It need not, I think, show that the moral truth 
gives anyone who knows it a reason to act which appeals to that 
person’s present desires or to the advancement of his or her own 
interests. I find it entirely intelligible that moral requirement 
might correctly apply to a person even though that person had no 
reason of either of these kinds for complying with it.6
Scanlon's argument for the importance and priority of morality rests on his 
view that we desire a certain moral state of affairs. We can distinguish two broad 
features of this argument: the motivation and the normative thesis. In 
Contractualism and Utilitarianism, Scanlon does not spend much time discussing 
the details of his argument for the motivation thesis or the normative thesis. 
However, it is clear from his later discussion in What We Owe To Each Other that
5 ibid., 117
6 ibid., 105
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Scanlon had in mind what he later came to call the standard desire model. I will 
describe Scanlon's deployment of this argument in Contractualism and 
Utilitarianism.
3. The Importance and Priority o f Our Desire to be Moral
a) The Question o f the Priority o f Morality
Does Scanlon's contractualism provide ‘...a particularly plausible account of 
moral motivation’?7 Has Scanlon shown that contractualism as a moral theory can 
‘.. .explain both the priority that the part of morality it describes claims over other 
values and the special importance we attach to being moved by it...’?8 I will 
suggest that as presented in Contractualism and Utilitarianism, it cannot. We will 
look first at the question of priority, and then at importance.
Scanlon intends his moral theory to explain why the value of the equal 
moral standing of persons would take priority over other values. For Scanlon, the 
motivational origin of our commitment to right and wrong is located in the desire 
to value others, and be ourselves valued, as persons of equal moral standing. We 
pointed out that Scanlon recognised that this would be one amongst a range of 
other desires, and that it would frequently not take priority amongst other 
competing desires and interests. He acknowledged that this desire is easily 
deflected. There does not seem to be anything integral to this desire that would 
make us give it priority over other competing desires. It does not seem to be 
constituted by a special strength or intensity if it is so easily defeasible. If it did in 
fact have a special intensity or power, this would make it different from other 
desires, and would need to be accounted for. No such claim is made, nor
7 ibid., 104
8 ibid., 187
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argument given. If the requirements of being a great artist, excellent scholar, or a 
loving parent take priority over moral requirements in a person’s relations with 
others, Scanlon seems to have no argument to say why this is mistaken or wrong. 
The argument for the mere existence of this desire is not an argument for its 
priority.
b) Importance and the Amoralist
We have seen that the desire to reach agreement with others on reasonable terms 
might not necessarily take greater priority over other values. Even though 
Scanlon's account leaves the priority of morality questionable, the problem itself 
assumes the presence of such a desire in the first place. Scanlon also says that the 
morality of right and wrong affects our relationships with others in a more 
significant way than other commitments we may have. What happens to the 
importance of morality in our relations with others if the desire is lacking?
For a person to able to act morally, they must have the required desire. 
Scanlon seems to accept that a substantive desire to value morality is required to 
motivate agents. But he does not explain why an agent would have a desire to 
value morality at all. Scanlon could take the view that the moral desire follows 
from certain natural desires shared by all humans. But this is a difficult argument 
to make, and is missing in his account. There is more reason to think that Scanlon 
regards the presence of the desire as a matter of socialization. But if the desire is 
the product of our ‘moral education’, what can we say to those who have not had 
this desire promoted in their education? This cannot be a moral failing, because 
the scope of morality is defined by the presence of the desire in the first place. 
Scanlon has no argument about human nature, or the human good that would
25
allow him to claim that such a lack is a moral or even natural deficiency; it is
merely an empirical absence on his account, much like someone who has no care
for music or sport. It seems as though a concern with right and wrong is reduced
to a special preference or taste. On this account, a person could well recognise the
existence of moral claims for others, even treat it with respect and admiration, but
they would relate to moral claims as a respectful atheist to a great religion. They
may recognise the importance of morality to others, but have no desire, and
therefore no motivation, to act morally. Just as the absence of a motivation to be
faithful marks one aspect of atheism, the absence of a motivation to be moral
marks one aspect of amoralism. It might be a matter of fact that there are people
amongst us who have no such motivation to be moral. They are in the moral
world but not of the moral world. If this is something that a moral theorist accepts
then they have to abandon any hopes of a human morality. Morality becomes a
club or a union whose rules only apply to its members. But whilst we can accept
that not everyone wants to join clubs or be in a union, Scanlon’s original intention
is not to describe morality in such a limited way. Scanlon clearly does not want to
accept the possibility of amoralism.
If we had no desire to be able to justify our actions to others on 
grounds they could reasonably accept, the hope of gaining... 
protection would give us reason to try to instil this desire in others, 
perhaps through mass hypnosis or conditioning, even if this also 
meant acquiring it ourselves. But given that we have this desire 
already, our concern with morality is less instrumental.9
But if we don’t have this desire already, the importance and priority of 
morality seems to either rest on our need for protection, or on our special interest
9 ibid., 128
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in being in a certain kind of relationship with others. This is precisely the 
opposite of what Scanlon had originally intended his contractualism to establish.
Conclusion
In this chapter we have examined Scanlon's original presentation of his 
contractualism. Scanlon's intention is to provide an account of the normative 
content of right and wrong, but also of the normativity of right and wrong. For 
Scanlon, the normativity of contractualism consists in its priority over other 
values, and in its scope over all persons who are guided by the goal of living 
alongside others on terms which cannot be reasonably rejected. We have seen, 
however, that Scanlon's is unable to show that morality must have this status in 
our lives.
In his later work Scanlon in fact says ‘[t]o say that people have reasons not 
to mistreat others, or reasons to provide for their own future interests, only if 
doing so promotes the fulfillment of their present desires has seemed to many 
people to make the requirements of morality and prudence “escapable” in a way 
that they clearly are not.’10 Unfortunately, it is still far from clear how the moral 
claims of contractualism are inescapable.
10 Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other, (London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998), 
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Chapter Two
DESIRES AND MOTIVATION
Introduction
In Contractualism and Utilitarianism Scanlon argues that a commitment to a 
contractualist understanding of right and wrong is derived from a desire to live 
with others on terms that could not be reasonably rejected. We argued that in the 
absence of an argument to the contrary, the presence of this desire is contingent. 
Therefore, the normativity of the reasons and the motivation to be moral is 
contingent. On this view, reasons against wronging apply only to those motivated 
by this desire. Morality seems relegated to a special taste or fetish.
Contractualism was meant to prevent this. In his introduction to What We Owe to 
Each Other Scanlon concedes that this was ‘...a particularly serious fault.’1 In 
this chapter we will examine Scanlon’s attempt to remedy this fault.
According to Scanlon's contractualism, justification provides the 
motivational basis and the normative content of what we owe to each other. This 
means that the goal of living on terms that are justifiable to others is sufficient to 
motivate people to act on moral reasons, and that the content of principles of right 
and wrong is justified in terms of this ideal. We will, in the course of the 
following chapters, examine the nature of Scanlon's claim that justification 
provides the normativity, in content and authority, of moral reasons. In this 
chapter though, we will concentrate on Scanlon's reconsideration of motivation. I
1 T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, (London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1998), 7
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will begin by setting out the difference between motivating and normative reasons. 
Whilst we should not understand this as a distinction between two types of 
reasons, it is helpful to describe two kinds of questions we can ask of someone’s 
actions: on what grounds did they act?; was their action justified? The question of 
motivation relates to the understanding of the constitution of intentional action. 
This question is much discussed in terms of a debate between Humean and anti- 
Humean conceptions of motivation. I will set out the difference between these 
views, in order to locate and analyse Scanlon's particular arguments regarding 
motivation. I will then examine Scanlon's argument for the constitution of 
motivation in terms of reasons as considerations. Scanlon's argument is a kind of 
anti-Humeanism. I will discuss challenges to Scanlon's anti-Humeanism from 
various Humean and alternative anti-Humean perspectives. I will argue strongly
V
in favour of Scanlon's account of motivation, and show ways in which Scanlon is 
able to respond to the various alternatives and their criticisms. With a clearer idea 
of the constitution of motivation, we can begin to examine the grounds and scope 
of the normative reasons of right and wrong.
1. Motivating and Justifying Reasons
a) Beliefs and Desires
Intentional action can be understood from the perspective of a person’s 
motivations or their justifications. The motivational perspective explains the 
reasons a person had for performing their action; the justificatory perspective 
addresses the question of whether there were in fact good reasons for their action. 
Let us take the example of Richard’s act of smelling roses. Richard’s motivation 
may be explained by his enjoyment of the fragrance of fresh roses. However,
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Richard’s enjoyment of the fragrance of fresh roses may not be sufficient to 
justify his action. If the roses were silk and not real, we may say that Richard was 
not justified in smelling the roses. The explanation of intentional action is 
normally taken to include an account of both motivation and justification. We can 
therefore discuss intentional action in terms of motivating and justificatory 
reasons.
It should be noted that justificatory reasons are sometimes described as 
normative reasons. For instance Jonathan Dancy, Derek Parfit, and Scanlon 
generally use the phrase normative reasons instead of justificatory reasons.2 
However, I will retain the term justificatory reasons on two grounds. Firstly, the 
motivating/justificatory reasons distinction that I am introducing does not exactly 
map the distinction between normative and operative reasons that Scanlon uses. 
To use the term normative reasons to refer to two somewhat different notions may 
prove unhelpful. Secondly, the normativity of justificatory reasons is one of the 
issues that we will be examining. Consequently, I believe the term justificatory 
reason is, for our purposes, clearer.
The constitution and role of motivating and justificatory reasons is 
disputed hotly. In this chapter we will focus solely on the nature of motivating 
reasons, and the role of desires in their constitution.
The view that motivation necessarily includes desires is often described as 
Humean.3 On a standard reading of the Humean model of motivating reasons, 
intentional action is constituted by the combination of belief and desire. The two
see Jonathan Dancy, Practical Reality, (Oxford University Press, 2000), 1; Derek Parfit, ‘Reasons and 
Motivation’, Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian Society,(Supplementary Volume), 71 (1997), 98-130; and 
Scanlon, What We Owe, 18-19.
3 I leave aside the question of whether this is what Hume said. Dancy notes ‘There is a classic position in the 
theory of motivation that is known as Humeanism, despite the fact that it bears little resemblance to the views 
of its supposed progenitor, David Hume.’ Jonathan Dancy, Practical Reality, 10
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are required because they perform different roles that can produce intentional 
action only in unison. Desires are regarded as integrally motive. They are 
oriented towards the world as we would like it to be, and express an attraction or 
repulsion that is often experienced viscerally. A desire appears to include the 
necessary physical and mechanical dimensions of an act. The integral propulsive 
qualities of desire connect the aims of the subject with a subject’s powers of 
action. Desire at once includes the notion of a goal, and the kinetic power to 
achieve that goal. Thus, the energy that moves us to act is the familiar and 
intelligible phenomenon of a desire: we would all attest to the empirical reality of 
urges, impulses, feelings, and repulsions. The existence of desires as just 
described seems obvious, their perception evident, and their power to move 
indubitable. But the energy of desire needs administration and organization. The 
cognitive powers of belief are required to present an understanding of the present 
state of affairs, and also to find the means to produce the state of affairs sought by 
desire.
For an intentional action to take place, its agent must have a 
suitable combination of beliefs and desires, there must be 
something that the agent wants, an aim or goal which the proposed 
action subserves in some way.. .Further, the agent must have 
suitable beliefs to the effect that the action is likely to subserve 
that goal.4
Typically, Humeanism perceives an asymmetry between desire and belief. 
The animating power of desire is seen as the force that enables a person to move 
from inertia to action, and therefore integral to an account of intentional action, 
rather than a simple intention. Different Humeans present different views of the
4 Dancy, Practical Reality, 10-11
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composition of belief and desire. In Donald Davidson’s influential discussion,
desire and belief are described broadly.
Whenever someone does something for a reason, therefore, he can 
be characterized as (a) having some sort of pro attitude toward 
actions of a certain kind, and (b) believing (or knowing, 
perceiving, noticing, remembering) that his action is of that kind.
Under (a) are to be included desires, wantings, urges, promptings, 
and a great variety of moral views, aesthetic principles, economic 
prejudices, social conventions, and public and private goals and 
values in so far as these can be interpreted as attitudes of an agent 
directed toward actions of a certain kind.5
Humeans can therefore allow for a wide variety of phenomena to fulfil the 
roles of belief and desire, whilst maintaining that they are required in combination.
b) Humeanism and Meta-Ethics
Humeanism features within the broader contemporary meta-ethical debate. This 
debate is normally described in terms of a disagreement between realists and anti­
realists, cognitivists and non-cognitivists, and Humeans and anti-Humeans. 
Broadly speaking, realism and anti-realism disagree about whether there are such 
things as moral facts, and moral objects underlying these facts. A realist may 
argue that there are such phenomena as moral objects, although these objects 
could be described as conditions of our rationality rather than immaterial objects 
such as the Good. Cognitivists and non-cognitivists argue about the nature and 
effect of our judgment of moral phenomena. A recognisably cognitivist view may 
argue that our judgments can be truth-apt (capable of being, or being akin to, 
judgments with truth values), whilst a non-cognitivist may argue that our moral
5 Donald Davidson, ‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’ in Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), 4
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judgments are more akin to expressions of our dispositions or preferences. 
Humeans, as just described, argue that motivation necessarily includes desires or 
pro-attitudes, whereas anti-Humeans suggest that motivation can be explained 
solely in terms of our cognitive judgments, such as beliefs. Put in these terms, we 
can see how a motivational Humean may typically take a non-cognitivist view of 
moral judgment. A non-cognitivist view of moral judgment as the expression of 
our dispositions as pro-attitudes would seem to fit happily with a Humean 
commitment to desires as essential to motivation. However, as is perhaps to be 
expected, different philosophers present many various permutations of these 
views, and we should not expect all anti-realists to be non-cognitivists and 
Humeans. We will refer to these meta-ethical distinctions throughout our 
discussion. For our present purposes, I wish to leave aside the question of realism 
and anti-realism, and concentrate on the problem of Humeanism and anti- 
Humeanism in motivation, and its relation to cognitivism and non-cognitivism.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Scanlon merely employs rather than
examines the notion of desires in Contractualism and Utilitarianism. However, it
is reasonable to assume that he had some kind of Humean picture of motivation in
mind. In recognition of the serious fault that this caused to his contractualism,
Scanlon was prompted to undertake
...a deeper examination of reasons and rationality, which led to 
the conclusion that my initial assumption about reasons and 
desires got things almost exactly backward. Desire is not a clearer 
notion in terms of which the idea of having a reason might be 
understood; rather, the notion of a desire, in order to play the 
explanatory and justificatory roles commonly assigned to it, needs
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to be understood in terms of the idea of taking something to be a 
reason.6
Scanlon makes a move from a Humean to an anti-Humean view of 
motivation. And in so doing he develops a novel cognitivism.
2, Scanlon rs Reasons as Considerations
a) Primitive Reasons
We might describe a Humean view of motivating reasons as a compound notion: 
it consists in the combination of a belief and desire. The subsidiary notions of 
belief and desire together constitute a motivating reason for intentional action. 
Scanlon, however, now offers an entirely different account of a motivating reason. 
A reason should not be understood as a compound synthetic notion, composed of 
two distinct phenomena: desire and belief. It should instead be understood as a 
single, irreducible notion. A reason is a consideration that counts in favour of 
something. The relation of ‘counting in favour o f  is the single constituent of the 
notion of a reason. This relation cannot be understood in simpler more basic 
terms such as belief and desire. Its simplicity is indissoluble, analytic, and 
primitive. It is in this sense, the sense that a reason consists solely in the relation 
of counting in favour of something, that Scanlon takes ‘...the idea of a reason as 
primitive.’7 For Scanlon, having a motivation is simply having a reason as a 
consideration that counts in favour of something.
The object of a reason is a judgment-sensitive attitude. A judgment- 
sensitive attitude is an attitude that is an appropriate subject of evaluation, 
revision, and justification. We may not have arrived at these attitudes consciously
6 Scanlon, What We Owe, 8-9
7 ibid., 17
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or reflectively, but we are still responsible for them. They are subject to our more
or less conscious affirmation, and are capable of alteration upon reflection. They
include a wide range of intentional phenomena, such as beliefs, aspirations,
dispositions, and comportments.
These are attitudes that an ideally rational person would come to 
have whenever that person judged there to be sufficient reasons 
for them and that would, in an ideally rational person, 
“extinguish” when that person judged them not to be supported by 
reasons of the appropriate kind. Hunger is obviously not a 
judgment-sensitive attitude; but belief is, and so are fear, anger, 
admiration, respect, and other evaluative attitudes such as the view 
that fame is worth seeking.8
A reason is primitive in the sense that it is composed of a single notion, a 
consideration that counts in favour of something. The object of a reason, that is, 
the thing that a reason counts in favour of, is a judgment-sensitive attitude. These 
judgment-sensitive attitudes may include beliefs, but they are not constituted by 
beliefs singly. For Scanlon, to deny that our actions are connected to such 
judgment-sensitive attitudes ‘...one would need to regard all one’s actions as 
things that merely happen, and to abstain from taking at face value any thought 
about what could be said for or against performing them.’9
b) Reasons and Rationality
We have seen that judgment-sensitive attitudes are in part characterised by their 
association with our powers of reasoning. They are attitudes that are connected to 
our capacities for reflection, evaluation, and decision. For Scanlon, to be capable 
of judgment-sensitive attitudes is part of what it means to be a rational creature.
8 ibid., 20
9 ibid.
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But rationality is understood in very broad terms. ‘Rationality involves 
systematic connections between different aspects of a person’s thought and 
behaviour. But it is sufficient for rationality in the general sense I am describing -  
sufficient for being a rational creature -  that these connections be systematic, not 
merely accidental or haphazard.’10 A person is only being irrational if they hold 
contradictory judgments simultaneously. We might hold conflicting attitudes of 
course and still be rational: ‘I can take my hunger to be a reason for getting up and 
at the same time recognize my fatigue as a reason not to get up, and I am not 
necessarily open to rational criticism for having these conflicting attitudes.’11 But 
a person who judges that they have good reasons to (j) , and simultaneously that 
they do not have good reasons to $ , must be described as irrational. We may 
have grounds to criticise, disagree with, and reject a person’s judgments about the 
reasons they have, but these are substantive criticisms about their reasons as 
judgments, and not necessarily grounds for describing them as irrational.
Given the range of information and relevant considerations that may bear 
on any single question of judgment, it is doubtful if we could ever give a full 
account of what it is most rational to do. But between the extremes of irrationality 
and the most rational thing to do, stands the important notion of reasonableness: 
‘...I suggest that judgments about what is or is not reasonable to do or think are 
relative to a specified body of information and a specified range of reasons, both 
of which may be less than complete.’12 The range of information and reasons is 
defined by the purpose and object of the judgment. Scanlon claims that part of
10 ibid., 25
11 ibid., 24
12 ibid., 33
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what it means to be unreasonable is to fail to take all the relevant information or 
reasons into account. When we are discussing the quality of a person’s reasons, 
we are discussing the reasonableness of their judgment, not primarily whether 
they are being rational or irrational; when we argue about the appropriateness or 
soundness of someone’s judgments, we are disputing the reasonableness of the 
judgments. If we accuse someone of being irrational, we are in effect disputing 
whether he or she has made a judgment at all. So the notion of a reason is 
connected to the capacity of reasonableness. Rationality is a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition of reasonableness. Practical reasons are concerned with 
judgment-sensitive attitudes. They can be requested to provide an account of the 
evaluations, considerations, decisions, or omissions that affected our intentional 
attitudes and actions. Reasonableness refers to the quality of our judgments. 
Rationality is simply a condition that partly enables us to make reasonable 
judgments.
c) Reasons in the Standard Normative Sense
A reason as a consideration that counts in favour of something is a reason as an 
evaluation. It includes more than the notion of a belief. Beliefs are frequently 
objects of reasons as considerations, but not the constituent whole of reasons. A 
reason as a consideration is an integrally evaluative, and normative notion. It is in 
this sense that Scanlon describes his cognitivist notion of a reason as a 
consideration as a ‘. . .reason in the standard normative sense.’13
As we saw in section one, cognitivism and non-cognitivism are often 
associated with anti-Humeanism and Humeanism respectively. As Humeanism
13 ibid., 19
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operates with a distinction between desires and beliefs, cognitivism is often 
defined in terms of beliefs. Jonathan Dancy's ‘pure cognitivism’ about motivating 
reasons is defined in terms of beliefs, for example.14 Scanlon's view is certainly 
anti-Humean, and certainly cognitivist, but his cognitivism is not composed 
simply of beliefs. The normativity of reasons as considerations is a distinctive 
feature of his cognitive anti-Humeanism.
We can now perhaps see more clearly why it is more helpful to 
characterise our discussion of Scanlon's view of intentional action in terms of 
motivating and justificatory reasons. For Scanlon, a reason is a normative notion, 
in the sense that it involves an evaluation that a consideration counts in favour of 
something. Scanlon accepts that we can ask what a person’s operative reason for 
acting was. An operative reason is still a reason in the standard normative sense, 
as it is the biographical fact of what the person took as their considerations that 
counted in favour of acting. An operative reason can be distinguished from a 
justified normative reason, as the reason that in fact counts in favour of something. 
A person’s operative reason is a specific instance of a reason in the standard 
normative sense, and may or may not be justified. Our discussion of motivation 
in Scanlon refers to the motivational efficacy of reasons in his ‘standard 
normative sense.’ We are addressing the question of the nature and role of desires 
in the motivational efficacy of normative reasons. The question of the grounds 
and judgment of the justification of these normative reasons is a separate question. 
In this chapter we are concerned with what makes a normative reason a 
motivating one. In later chapters we will address the question of what makes a
14 We will discuss this in greater detail in section 5(c) when we compare Scanlon and Dancy's cognitivism.
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normative reason justified, and what does justification amount to in 
contractualism.
3. Reasons and Desires
We can discern three different arguments in Scanlon's account of desire. Firstly, 
he examines the phenomenology of desire, and finds that the phenomena referred 
to in the Humean notion of desires are not capable of motivation. Upon close 
examination, the phenomenology of desire reveals material events, cognitive 
judgments, and normative evaluations. Secondly, Scanlon argues that the 
structure of practical reasoning reveals that desires are unnecessary to an account 
of motivation, and do not fit appropriately the manner in which we deliberate. 
Thirdly, Scanlon allows for a limited sense of desire as the sometimes-unbidden 
distractions on our attention. But even in this limited sense, the objects of our 
attention, and the process of paying attention, are both in the form of reasons as 
considerations.
a) The Phenomenology o f Desire
Scanlon argues that motivation is constituted by the considerations that count in 
favour of ^-ing. The presence of a reason in the standard normative sense is 
sufficient to motivate action. In order to make his argument, Scanlon analyses the 
phenomenological experience that is associated with having a desire, and aims to 
show that the phenomena involved are incapable of motivating action. He gives 
the example of being thirsty, and suggests that this experience consists in three
components: ‘...a present sensation (the dryness in the throat), the belief that
\
some action would lead to a pleasant state in the future, and my taking this future
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good to be a reason for so acting... the motivational work seems to be done by my 
taking this future pleasure to count in favour of drinking.’15
A Humean may argue that the motivation is provided by the desire to slake 
my thirst. But for Scanlon, this notion of desire does not apply to any of the 
available phenomena. The original thirst is a sensation, a feeling of discomfort. It 
is not, in itself, a desire. It is like being in a draft, or having a headache, it is 
something that happens to us, and as a material event, it has no intentional or 
practical qualities in itself. This sensation may provide a prompt for cognition. 
We may judge that drinking water or closing the window could alleviate this 
sensation. This judgment may be taken as good grounds for the belief that this 
future state of being out of a draft, or slaking my thirst, is attractive. This belief 
may then itself be taken as good grounds to act to attain this future state. That is, 
the belief in the attractiveness of this future state may be taken as a good 
normative reason for acting. The initial prompt is not a desire but an event; we 
form a belief of the attractiveness of the future; and judge that this belief counts in 
favour of acting to slake my thirst. The Humean notion of a desire as we 
characterised it in section one, is absent.
A Humean might accept that an intentional action consists primarily in 
deliberated evaluations, but would ask: why would you deliberate about drinking 
without the urge to drink? Surely deliberations need an original prompt of some 
kind? The deliberations and plans of an agent remain valid whether an agent feels 
thirsty or not. What makes them the cause of the action, what makes them 
relevant, is the agent’s experience of the original urge to drink. Are particular
15 ibid., 38
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deliberations caused by particular desires? Scanlon replies that when we focus on
what this urge is, it does not seem to fit our notion of a desire very closely.
Scanlon imports Warren Quinn’s example of a person who feels an urge to turn on
every radio he comes across. There is no purpose to this behaviour, he does not
want to hear sound or avoid silence, he simply acts on the urge.
[W]e may sometimes have such urges, the idea of such a purely 
functional state fails to capture something essential in the most 
common cases of desire: desiring something involves having a 
tendency to see something good or desirable about it. This is clear 
from the example of thirst. Having a desire to drink is not merely 
a matter of feeling impelled to do so; it also involves seeing 
drinking as desirable (because, for example, it would be pleasant).
The example of the urge to turn on radios is bizarre because it 
completely lacks this evaluative element.16
b) The Structure o f Reasons as Considerations
Scanlon suggests the motivational sufficiency of reasons as considerations is
corroborated by the likeness of believing and acting. Scanlon notes that if we
judge that there are good reasons for a belief or an intention to act, we will
normally have that belief or intention. In other words, our attitudes are the
outcomes of the conclusions of our judgments. When we make a judgment about
something, we do not need some extra power, force, cause, or impulse to possess
that attitude as a motive.
A rational person who judges there to be sufficient grounds for 
believing that P normally has that belief, and this judgment is 
normally sufficient explanation for so believing. There is no need 
to appeal to some further source of motivation such as “wanting to 
believe.” Similarly, a rational person who judges there to be
16 ibid., 38
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compelling reason to do A normally forms the intention to do A, 
and this judgment is sufficient explanation of that intention and of 
the agent’s acting on it (since this action is part of what such an 
intention involves). There is no need to invoke an additional form 
of motivation beyond the judgment and the reasons it recognizes, 
some further force to, as it were, get the limbs in motion.17
Few would argue that if we come to a theoretical conclusion, we would 
only go on to believe it if we had a desire to believe it. The intention is entirely 
fulfilled by the act of judging considerations. Intentional action requires desires 
as much as intentional belief: not at all.
Scanlon argues that the motivational sufficiency of reasons as
considerations is also brought to light by consideration of the structure of
evaluative judgment. It is characteristic of desires that they have an object and a 
weight. On this view, deliberation and choice about desires is concerned with the 
relative strength of our desires: I desire chocolate ice-cream, but I desire to lose 
weight more, and so I am motivated to resist the chocolate ice-cream in order to 
lose weight. Scanlon accepts that there are occasions when our deliberation and 
choice are structured in this way, but he argues that this is actually a rather 
specific instance of evaluative judgment, that most readily applies to the 
intentional attitude of wanting. But reasons apply to a wide range of judgment 
sensitive attitudes, and deliberation on these reasons is not always a matter of 
weighing their relative strengths. Practical deliberation on reasons mostly 
proceeds through a consideration of the appropriateness and relevance of 
considerations, and not merely the weighing of our desires. Certain reasons allow 
and disallow other considerations: for example, the reasons involved in
17 ibid., 33-34
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professional responsibilities (normally) disallow nepotism and favouritism. The 
good reasons there are to obey the law eliminate any consideration we may give to 
our desires to steal lots of gold watches. Scanlon's point is that when we are 
looking into the jeweller’s window and feeling urges to steal the gold watch, we 
do not weigh this desire alongside other desires, such a being a good citizen, or 
not wanting to be caught. Even if we do experience such an urge to have the 
watch, we do not enter it into a calculation of relative weights of competing 
desires. ‘The reason-giving force of C not only competes with that of D; it urges 
that D lacks force altogether (at least in the given context). Often, our judgment 
that a certain consideration is a reason builds in a recognition of restrictions of this 
kind at the outset: D may be taken to be a reason for acting only as long as 
considerations like C are not present.’18 The content of practical reasoning is 
revealed as reasons as considerations. Scanlon argues that once again, we find 
that the Humean notion of desire that was presumed to be so common and 
apparent, eludes our search. The phenomenon that is referred to as desire by 
Humeans is found to be either an event, or a reason as a consideration.
c) Desire in the Directed-Attention Sense
Scanlon does not eliminate the notion of a desire altogether, however. It is 
indisputable that we sometimes act on urges, and perhaps feel at the mercy of 
desires that seem to assail us unbidden. The daily experience of our lives is not 
one of cool evaluation and execution of reasonable deliberations. We may find 
ourselves constantly drawn towards thoughts of food, or idleness; or we may find 
ourselves faced with a task we know we have to perform, and yet be overcome
18 ibid., 51
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with emotions that paralyse us from performing it. Scanlon recognises the 
experience of this fifth column in our consciousness, and describes it as desire in 
the directed-attention sense. ‘A person has a desire in the directed-attention sense 
that P if the thought of P keeps occurring to him or her in a favourable light, that 
is to say, if the person’s attention is directed insistently toward considerations that 
present themselves as counting in favour of P.’19 To experience desire in the 
directed-attention sense is not to experience irrationality, however. Whilst our 
attention may be directed seemingly independently of our powers of reasoning, 
the object of our attention remains a reason as a consideration in favour of 
something.
Scanlon retains desire in the directed-attention sense in order to account 
for the experience of reasons pressing on our attention unbidden. Whilst Scanlon 
describes this as a sense of desire, it is worth pointing out that both the object of 
our attention, and the articulation of our attention, is in the form of reasons as 
considerations. Scanlon's notion of desire is restricted narrowly to the experience 
of attention being sometimes unreliable and bome on the tides of our unconscious. 
And so whilst we may be justified in describing Scanlon's anti-Humean view as 
hybrid,20 Scanlon's remaining notion of desire is quite far removed from the 
typical Humean understanding.
We have seen in this section Scanlon's arguments against the Humean 
view that desires are a necessary condition for motivation. Scanlon argued that 
the phenomenon of desire breaks down either into material events, or cognitions 
as considerations that count in favour of something. He argues that desires are
19 ibid., 39
20 Russ Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2003), 134
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unnecessary to motivation, and that practical reasoning cannot accommodate the 
Humean notion of desire. The only sense of desire that remains is desire in the 
directed-attention sense, which is a very small and special feature of 
consciousness. Whilst anti-Humeanism is not uncommon, it is not 
uncontroversial. In the following section, four, we will examine three Humean 
responses to Scanlon's account, and ask if Scanlon's theory can respond 
adequately. In section five, we will ask if Scanlon's anti-Humeanism is the most 
compelling version available.
4. A Humean Retort
Let us recall briefly the outlines of Scanlon's view. We are concerned with 
Scanlon's account of intentional action. The question of intentional action can be 
addressed from two perspectives: motivation and justification. The motivational 
question seeks to explain how someone acted; the justificatory question seeks to 
explain if they were right to act as they did. In this chapter we are concerned with 
motivation. Scanlon's original account of motivation was Humean, as it included 
the notion of desire. Scanlon revises this Humean view of motivation, and 
proposes that a reason as a consideration that counts in favour of something is 
sufficient to provide motivation. A reason as a consideration that counts in favour 
of something is an integrally evaluative, and normative notion. The object of 
these normative evaluations is a judgment-sensitive attitude, which we are 
ultimately responsible for. Desires neither exist in the form that Humeans 
suppose, nor do they perform any motivational role. Reasons as considerations 
are motivationally sufficient, and account better for the structure of practical 
reasoning. We will now examine three different criticisms of Scanlon's view of
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reasons. The first concerns the problem of why and how we act contrary to 
reasons; the second raises the challenge that not all motivation need proceed from 
intentional reasons, and uses the example of the actions of young children; and the 
third challenges Scanlon's characterisation of desires, and suggests an alternative 
Humean notion that avoids Scanlon's criticisms.
a) Acting Contrary to Reasons
Scanlon stated that believing and acting were alike. They were alike, in Scanlon's 
view, in the sense that having a belief and having a reason to act do not require 
any further phenomena to be motivating. Having a belief is sufficient to believe, 
and having an intention is sufficient to intend. This argument seems sound when 
related to the question of belief and believing. Only a wilful contrarian would 
sincerely believe a thing they judged there to be no good reason to believe. But 
are believing and intending so alike? Surely everyone would attest to at least 
occasionally acting against our settled intentions. If we are not always being 
irrational when we act contrary to reasons, does this show that there is another 
source of motivation, different from our reasons? Does the fact that such contrary 
motivations can sometimes ‘assail us* and overwhelm our settled intentions 
suggest that this source of motivation is independent and particularly forceful?
Sarah Marshall argues that ‘...as regards intention and action, there are 
many cases in which an additional factor does seem to be required whereas with 
belief the necessary presence of any additional motivating factor appears to be 
very much the exception rather than the norm.’21 Marshall’s contention is that if 
someone acts contrary to his or her judgment, this can only be explained by the
21 Sarah Marshall, ‘Scanlon and Reasons’, in Scanlon and Contractualism, ed. Matt Matravers (London, 
Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), 18-20
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existence of an extra motivating force: desires, no doubt. If it is my settled 
judgment to stop eating chocolate, and I give in to temptation and eat some, surely 
this is best explained by my desire for chocolate overcoming my reasons to stop 
eating it? Does the supposed likeness between believing and acting indeed show 
that reasons as considerations are the necessary and sufficient condition for 
motivation?
Scanlon accepts that our consciously intended actions do not always, 
automatically, and ineluctably, flow from our conscious judgments. He does not 
deny the reality of the experience of acting contrary to our intentions. He accepts 
that there can be discrepancies between our judgments and the effects they 
produce. Our physical or mental condition can perhaps affect the way we order 
and respond to our judgments about reasons. But this discrepancy does not imply 
the presence, or absence, of another force or source of motivation. We can 
account for the animation of states within the doctrine of reasons as considerations. 
On Scanlon’s account, we can always trace a discrepancy back to a judgment 
about reasons; we can always explain it in terms of another simple reason. If we 
appear to act against our considered judgment, this should alert us to the presence 
of another, perhaps unnoticed but more persuasive, judgment. When our attention 
is diverted, perhaps against our better judgment, towards objects or anticipations, 
when we find ourselves consistently acting or doing things that we have judged 
that we should not do, we are certainly experiencing a state like a desire. But 
Scanlon describes this as desire in the attention-directed sense. Careful 
examination reveals that our deliberations are being oriented in a certain direction.
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There is no force pulling the firm intention of the mind’s eye to desire’s fancy.
Unbidden states are events. Unbidden actions are still intentional actions.
Desire in the directed-attention sense characterizes an important 
form of variability in the motivational efficacy of reasons, but it 
does this by describing one way in which the thought of 
something as a reason can present itself rather than by identifying 
a motivating factor that is independent of such a thought.22
All our judgments can, in principle, be informed or prompted by our 
physical, mental, or psychological condition. But, according to Scanlon, these 
conditions in themselves cannot be reasons, because they are not, in themselves, 
considerations of any kind. They can be taken into consideration, but they are not 
reasons understood as considerations. For Scanlon, this emphasises the primitive, 
simple, singular nature of reasons. To have a reason is sufficient motivation for 
action. Scanlon's argument is that before we turn to desires to explain seemingly 
contrary action, we should first make sure that there is no reason that could have 
been served by acting in this way. An effective, simple reason may not be a good 
reason, it may not be an obvious reason, but if there is a reason, we have done 
without desires.
b) Intentional Action Without Belief
Alfred Mele complains that ‘Scanlon’s account of what is usually called a desire 
is overly intellectualized.’23 Does Scanlon present an overly intellectualized 
version of practical reasoning, where all reasons are solely considerations that 
count in favour of something, independent of any psychological or subjective 
states or conditions?
22 Scanlon, What We Owe, 41
23 Alfred R. Mele, Motivation and Agency, (Oxford University Press, 2003), 28
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To clarify his criticism, Mele cites the example of very young children,
under the age of two. Scientific research suggests that these children are too
young to have developed the concept and power of beliefs and reasons in the
sense of considerations that can count in favour of something. But Mele points
out that we regard these children as having desires; for example, desires to feed
and sleep, for comfort and attention. On Scanlon’s model, we would have to say
that these young children do not have reasons in the standard normative sense, and
that their actions are not intentional. But Mele argues that this must be incorrect,
‘.. .such children act intentionally and for reasons... In the case of a thirsty toddler
or pretoddler, a desire to drink -  rather than any taking of “the pleasure to be
obtained by drinking” to be a reason for drinking -  seems to do the work of
motivating drinking.’24 The toddler is also able to try different strategies and
methods to acquire the drink.
Even though it is unlikely that thirsty toddlers have the conceptual 
wherewithal to take features, including anticipated consequences, 
of drinking to be reasons for (or count in favour of) drinking, they 
are attracted by cups of juice in a way characteristic of desiring 
agents. Being attracted to cups of juice because of a sensitivity to 
certain of their features is distinguishable from being attracted to 
cups of juice because of the agent’s taking these features to be 
reasons. An agent’s behaviour may be sensitive to attractive 
features of things without the agent’s taking those features to be 
reasons... When ordinary, thirsty adults drink (intentionally and in 
ordinary scenarios), they presumably are motivated at least partly 
by a desire to drink. The strength of the desire may sometimes be 
explained partly by their believing that drinking would be pleasant 
or, more frilly, by that belief together with a desire for pleasure. A
24 Ibid., 78
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toddler’s desire to drink water and an adult’s desire to drink water 
may admit of the same analysis.25
And this analysis includes the notion of a desire as an integral component 
of practical intentional action. The nub of Mele’s criticism is that we can identify 
elements of intentional action that are independent of Scanlon’s notion of a reason 
as a consideration that counts in favour of something. This is modelled in Mele’s 
example in the intentional action of toddlers that originates with a desire that 
motivates the subsequent action in the absence of intellectualized beliefs.
I would suggest that there are two problems with Mele’s criticism. Firstly, 
I think that it may confuse rather than clarify the question at hand to refer to very 
young children. I find it quite plausible that these infants behave in ways that are 
qualitatively different from animals, but their cognitive, physical, and 
psychological capacities are surely in a very early stage of development. They are 
underdeveloped in many important elements of intentionality, such as language. 
Their ability to move, speak, think, and act, is very incomplete. Indeed, some 
adults find themselves with similar characteristics. Examples such as infants or 
adults with sever linguistic or cognitive deficiencies are extremely important, but I 
would suggest that they might represent a special case of (fully human) practical 
reasoning. As their situation is complicated, I think that it is best to leave them 
aside, and try to focus on the more general point suggested by Mele. Do adults 
express the same structure of practical reasoning that we find in a nascent form in 
infants?
25 Ibid., 78-79, a similar point is made in David Copp and David Sobel, ‘Desires, Motives, and Reasons: 
Scanlon's Rationalistic Moral Psychology’, Social Theory and Practice, 28:2 (April 2002), 243-276
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Mele’s general claim is that we can identify some instances of intentional 
action that occur independently of intellection about reasons. It seems Mele 
suggests that Scanlon has set far too high a standard for action. Must every act be 
connected to a reason, an evaluation, or a consideration? Surely, sometimes we 
act just because we feel like it? We pick a red jumper rather than a blue one 
merely on impulse.
But Scanlon points out that reasons in the standard normative sense need
not be overtly intellectual or considered. The basis of Scanlon’s argument is not
to show how all people do in fact reason minute-by-minute, day-to-day. It is
rather to reveal the structure that underlies what is normally habitual and
unreflective practice.
It might be objected that this discussion has described our 
practical thinking as much more self-conscious and reflective than 
it in fact is. But the attitudes I have been discussing need not 
involve conscious judgment. One can have an intention without 
having gone through a conscious process of assessing the reasons 
for following this course of action and judging them to be 
sufficient. Similarly, when we have a desire for something in the 
directed-attention sense (when it occurs to us spontaneously as 
desirable) we often take that consideration to be relevant to our 
future decisions without having consciously decided to give it that 
status. The point of the preceding discussion was that whether or 
not the question is consciously addressed, one’s “taking” a 
consideration to be relevant is what has the reason-shaping 
consequences I described.26
We recall that Scanlon accepts that our subjective states may be taken into 
account in our reasoning. But he insists that reasons as considerations are 
sufficient for motivation. Subjective states may often be objects of reasons. They
26 Scanlon, What We Owe, 47
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may prompt or inform our evaluations. In this sense Scanlon does not assume that
the content or object of our deliberations will always be purely intellectual. We
might be perpetually concerned with our purely hedonistic subjective states and
their fulfilment. But these states themselves are not reasons, and future states
cannot be reasons either. We can make judgments about the importance or nature
or our (anticipated) states, but these judgments are the reasons that constitute
intentional action. A subjective state may be taken into account, but it is neither
necessary nor sufficient to an account of action.
Like the formation of an intention, such a “taking” is a move 
within practical thinking rather than, as desires are commonly 
supposed to be, a state which simply occurs and is then a “given” 
for subsequent deliberation. (This is shown by the fact that it 
continues to affect the reasons one has only in the absence of 
grounds for reconsideration).27
Mele seems to be implying that there is something else, something non­
intellectual that needs to be included in a correct account of intentional action. 
But we should be careful about what this criticism could amount to. We have just 
seen that Scanlon accepts that many features of a subject’s condition will be 
relevant in our judgments (however unconscious) about the reasons we have, and 
these could be intellectual or non-intellectual, if we understand non-intellectual to 
refer to feelings, moods, physical conditions and so on. So Scanlon does not 
maintain that the subject’s state has no role in reason judgments. The 
disagreement must amount to the role that these ‘non-intellectual* factors must 
play. Scanlon’s view is that the motivational efficacy of simple reasons does not
27 ibid.
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preclude the presence and importance of subjective states in deliberation; it 
merely establishes the simple efficiency of reasons as considerations.
Scanlon's aim is to deny the substantive Humean dualism of belief and 
desire. More precisely he wants to deny that our subjective states, or desires 
understood as pro-attitudes, are integral components of reasons. They can be 
taken into account as considerations, but we can show that reasoning can persist 
independently of our subjective states.
c) Desires and Directions o f Fit
Scanlon argues that motivation is composed solely of reasons as considerations. 
Subjective states may provide the original prompt for our deliberation on the 
relevant considerations. Subjective states may accompany, or may be affected by 
our deliberations and evaluations. But Scanlon argues that they are not necessary 
to an account of intentional action. Scanlon's view is that reasons as 
considerations are the solely necessary condition for motivating reasons. We have 
seen that Scanlon defines desires very much in terms of subjective states. These 
are the visceral and physical feelings and responses that we would readily 
associate with the notion of desire. But should our concept of desire be restricted 
to such phenomenally experienced subjective states? We recall that Davidson 
introduced a broad notion of desires as pro-attitudes. If a Humean can define 
desires in terms other than subjective states, perhaps Scanlon's anti-Humeanism 
can be refuted.
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Michael Smith argues that traditional objections to Humeanism perceive 
desires in a strongly phenomenological sense.28 David Hume originally associated 
desires with feelings and passions, but he also identified ‘calm passions’ which 
were not identified by psychological or physical sensations. These are more like 
settled dispositions and attitudes. Smith gives the example of the parent who 
loves their child and desires him or her to succeed. In moments of reflection and 
heightened sensitivity, the parent may have a physical or emotional expression of 
these feelings, but in the absence of these sensations or subjective states, are we to 
say that the parent no longer loves the child or desires their success? This seems 
absurd and reductive. The strongly phenomenological account of desires also 
fails to account for the propositional content of desires. The ascription of desires 
can be presented in the form ‘A desires to p \  But if desires are constituted solely 
in terms of subjective states this makes no sense, ‘...A ’s pain cannot be ascribed 
to A in the form A pains that p .'29 Smith argues that we should not take such a 
limited and strongly phenomenological view of desires. Instead, we should 
understand both beliefs and desires as defined by their function and not our 
phenomenological experience of them. This functional understanding of the 
notion of belief and desire can be formulated in the notion of two directions of fit.
We recall that Davidson’s definition of pro attitudes and beliefs was very 
broad. It seems that we cannot limit the constitution of pro attitude to one 
phenomenon. The broad notion of pro attitudes includes such different 
phenomena as ‘...desires, wantings, urges, promptings, and a great variety of 
moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, and
28 Michael Smith, ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation’, in Mind, 96:381 (January 1987), 45
29 ibid., 47
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public and private goals and values in so far as these can be interpreted as 
attitudes of an agent directed toward actions of a certain kind.’ Beliefs include 
‘...knowing, perceiving, noticing, remembering.’30 No doubt other philosophers 
sympathetic to this account of intentional action would add or subtract various 
phenomena that could be classed as kinds of pro attitudes or beliefs. It seems as 
though the notion of desires as pro attitudes and beliefs refer more concretely to a 
function rather than a phenomena. We may want to argue that only certain 
phenomena can fulfil this function, but in order to make this argument, we would 
need a clear description of the function in order to determine which phenomena 
can be appropriately included. So the argument for Humeanism seems to proceed 
from function to phenomena. The function of all those phenomena included in 
our notion of desire is to achieve an object, often taken as a certain state of affairs. 
If that state of affairs does not exist, the desire is not invalidated or automatically 
extinguished. The function of the attitude of the subject is to achieve an object or 
state of affairs; it is to have a goal or aim. Using the terminology at hand, the 
subject desires that the world fit their goal. This is the world-to-subject direction 
of fit. On the other hand, the function of all the phenomena included in our 
concept of belief is to correctly cognize the world. If the cognition is deficient it 
is invalid and has failed in its function. The function of the attitude of the subject 
is to achieve a correct cognition. The direction of fit in this instance is from 
subj ect-to-world.
From the degree of fluidity that we find in descriptions of the phenomena 
that constitute desires and beliefs, we can assume that Humeans do not determine
30 Davidson, Actions, Reasons, and Causes, 4
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the essence of their argument in terms of the particular phenomena that perform 
the role of desires and beliefs. The more important point that they seem to want 
to make is that, irrespective of the particular phenomena that comprise ‘desires’ or 
‘beliefs’ at any given moment, the subject will occupy two distinct states. Two 
functions are together necessary to produce intentional actions. It is a further task 
provided by a separate argument to establish the content of these functions. The 
direction of fit condition describes the formal conditions of intentional action 
provided by Humeanism.
Smith argues that the direction of fit conception of desires and beliefs 
retains the central Humean insight that two distinct states are required in order to 
constitute intentional action. These states are no longer defined in terms of their 
phenomenological nature, but in terms of their functional properties. We must 
retain a distinction between two subjective states fulfilling two directions of fit. 
The distinction between beliefs and desires can also be characterised in terms of 
the relationship to counterfactuals. If we desire that p, the counter factual not p, 
does not invalidate our desire that p. Our desire persists in spite of the 
counterfactual and disposes us to bring about p  instead of not p. However, our 
belief that p, is invalidated by not p. Our belief that p  should dissolve when we 
recognise the fact not p. ‘Thus, we may say, attributions of beliefs and desires 
require that different kinds of counterfactuals are true of the subject to whom they 
are attributed. We may say that this is what a difference in their directions of fit 
is.’ 31 Smith argues that we should not necessarily conceive of desires as 
phenomenological states. Desires may, in certain circumstances have
31 Smith, The Humean Theory o f  Motivation, 54
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phenomenological qualities, that is, they may have tangible qualities that we
perceive. But the proper definition of desire is provided in terms of the function it
serves. Smith argues that the world-to-subject direction of fit is the function of
having an aim. It is a view of how the world should be. The subject with this
direction of fit occupies a certain state, the state of having an aim, or goal. The
state of having an aim or goal is essential to the notion of having a motivation,
otherwise, how are we to explain an action we wish to perform to bring about a
state in the world that we aim at?
But what kind of state is the having of a goal? It is a state with 
which direction of fit? Clearly, the having of a goal is a state with 
which the world must fit, rather than vice versa. Thus having a 
goal is being in a state with the direction of fit of a desire. But 
since all that there is to being a desire is being a state with the 
appropriate direction of fit, it follows that having a goal just is 
desiring.32
For Smith, being motivated means that one has a goal. This is a 
teleological notion of motivation where goals are seen as states of affairs that are 
to be achieved. The notion of a direction of fit is meant to characterise the 
teleological notion of having a goal. Smith summarises his argument as follows: 
‘(a) Having a motivating reason is, inter alia, having a goal
(b) Having a goal is being in a state with which the world must fit 
and
(c) Being in a state with which the world must fit is desiring.’33 
Scanlon’s criticism of the role of desire does seem to be aimed at the
phenomenological interpretation. Smith makes the valid point that our common
32 ibid.
33 Michael Smith, The Moral Problem, (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 1994), 116
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conception of desire is much broader and more diverse than this purely 
phenomenological account. Does Scanlon’s criticism of the role of desires 
founder upon a limited view of desire?
I will suggest that there are two responses we can offer on Scanlon’s 
behalf to this criticism. The first involves a challenge to the notion of directions 
of fit; the second challenges the teleological premise of Smith’s argument. I hope 
to show that Scanlon's argument can be deployed to refute Smith’s more 
sophisticated Humean account of motivation.
For the sake of argument, let us accept for the moment that having a 
motivating reason is having a goal, understood in the teleological sense. Does 
having a goal correspond to Smith’s notion of a direction of fit? G. F. Schueler 
dissects Smith’s notion using the example of hope.34 Hope seems to share with 
desire a world-to-subject direction of fit. When we hope, we have a view of how 
we would like the world to be, just as we do when we desire something. Schueler 
points out that hoping involves many cognitive features, features that Smith 
describes in terms of the belief-like subject-to-world direction of fit. If I hope that 
I will see my partner later in the evening, but I know that she is in another country 
and it is impossible for us to see each other in the evening, my hope would be 
irrational. This points out that the notion of hoping, to make sense, is, composed 
of, inter alia, cognitive elements supposedly located in the subject-to-world 
directions of fit. This seems true of desire too. When we desire something, there 
must be a range of cognitive information about the object of our desires and the 
possibility of our achieving it, which constitute part of what it means for a rational
34 G. F. Schueler, ‘Pro-Attitudes and Direction of Fit’, Mind, 100:2 (April 1991), 277-281
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person to have a desire. Smith notes that the world-to-subject direction of fit
(desiring) consists in the quality of persisting in the face of counterfactuals. If I
want to have a cup of water, the counterfactual fact that there is no cup of water in
front of me does not cause my desire to extinguish. However, if I believed that
there was a cup of water in front of me, and then perceived the counterfactual that
there was not one, my belief will (or at least should) extinguish. But Schueler
points out that the distinction between the two directions of fit begins to blur.
On this account hope will, surprisingly, turn out to have a mind- 
to-world direction of fit, that is, the same direction of fit as belief, 
not desire. This is because I can’t hope that p once I discover that 
not-p. I can’t continue to hope that I turned off my desk lamp 
before I left my office when, as I am walking home across 
campus, I see it shining through my office window.35
Schueler’s point holds true of desiring too. If I desire to win the lottery 
despite never buying a lottery ticket, my desire should extinguish in the light of 
the counterfactual of never buying a lottery ticket. This seems to point out that 
the notion of two distinct directions of fit is not as clear and stable as Smith 
assumed. On the other hand, Scanlon's notion of a reason as a consideration 
includes both functional properties that are supposed to pertain to the different 
directions of fit. To have a reason is, for Scanlon, to take something as a 
consideration that counts in favour of something. The relationship of counting in 
favour will include what Smith describes as the world-to-subject direction of fit, 
but this must be composed of the beliefs, perceptions, and evaluations that are 
associated with the subject-to-world direction of fit. The radical functional 
separation implied by the notion of two directions of fit makes the notion of
35 Ibid., 280
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motivating reasons incoherent. If we try to remedy this by uniting the two 
functions into one notion, we have, I would argue, Scanlon's notion of a reason as 
a consideration.
Smith’s reference to the idea of two directions of fit was in part to 
challenge the anti-Humean notion that desires always have a phenomenological 
character. We have just seen that there are good, independent grounds, on which 
to challenge this notion of two distinct directions of fit. Smith’s point that the 
anti-Humean should not pick the easy target of desires in the phenomenological 
sense is a good one, and Scanlon's arguments were certainly composed of this 
understanding of desires. But we can take the point that anti-Humeanism must 
show why desires in the broad dispositional sense of pro-attitudes are not 
sufficient for motivation, without going the further step of accepting the direction 
of fit account of desires. It seems to me that the terms in which Scanlon makes 
his criticism may need augmentation. But as we have just seen, the direction of fit 
model has a significant problem accounting for the notion of an intentional reason, 
and Scanlon's notion of a reason offers a convincing explanation of how both 
directions of fit are unified into the single, simple, and primitive notion of a 
consideration that counts in favour of something.
Smith’s argument consisted in two claims: the first was that desires should 
be understood in the dispositional sense of a direction of fit; the second was that 
having a motivating reason is, inter alia, having a goal. We described this as the 
teleological account of desire. Does being motivated require one to have a goal? 
Scanlon argues that having a motivating reason is not always to be described in 
terms of having a goal. He gives the example of friendship. If I have friends, I
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may take it that I have reasons to value and promote my friendship. These 
reasons are derived from what I take the notion of friendship to consist in, and not 
the goal of being a good friend. Teleological reasoning would require me to 
weigh which reasons would promote the value of friendship best. The more that 
my goal was achieved; the better I have satisfied my motivating desire. But as we 
pointed out in section 3(b), the structure of practical reasoning does not generally 
follow this pro tanto structure. Reasons often eliminate and proscribe other 
considerations, and are not to be weighed against all comers in order to reach an 
all things considered conclusion. For Scanlon, reasons are derived from the 
considerations that count in favour of something, and this something may be, but 
is not restricted to, a teleological state of affairs. The object of our considerations 
may be a value, and belief, or some other object that is not a state of affairs in the 
world to be achieved.36 Russ Shafer-Landau makes a similar point:
On the anti-Humean picture, what can motivate an agent is a belief 
that an action is one’s duty, that it is valuable, etc. There is no 
statement of an end state in such a characterization of motivation.
Nor need there be an implicit, entailed postulation of some sought 
after state of affairs. Means-end reasoning, and the motivation it 
leads to, is quite naturally characterized as essentially involving 
the positing of an end state. But not all motivation need exemplify 
a means-end model... If the anti-Humean is right, then seeing that 
something is right or good is sufficient to motivate one to do it.
When this occurs, one may be motivated without having a goal.
One needn’t conceptualize an end state and seek to realize it.37
36 We will discuss the closely related topic of Scanlon's argument against an exclusively teleological account 
of value in chapter four. The present argument concerns the specific question of whether motivation requires 
having a goal, and not the broader question of whether the good is to be promoted.
37 Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 135
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Smith’s argument that desiring means, inter alia, having a goal, seems to 
be as reductive a view of motivation as the anti-Humean purely phenomenological 
conception of desire.
Scanlon's conception of reasons is, I would argue, resilient to Humean 
criticism. But Scanlon's anti-Humeanism is only one of a number of anti-Humean 
explanations of motivation. I will look at other anti-Humean accounts, and argue 
that Scanlon's view is more attractive and robust than other well-known 
alternatives.
5. Varieties o f Anti-Humeanism
We began our discussion in this chapter by recalling that Scanlon's original 
account of moral motivation was based on a desire to justify ourselves to others. 
We argued that the presence of this desire is contingent, and therefore moral 
motivation, and the authority of moral reasons, would be contingent too. Scanlon 
recognised this problem and set about explaining the motivation of intentional 
action in anti-Humean terms. This dissatisfaction with a Humean account of 
motivation has an eminent constituency, including the philosophers Thomas 
Nagel and Jonathan Dancy. Both Nagel and Dancy attempt to provide a strongly 
cognitive account of the origin of motivation. Whilst this unites them with 
Scanlon's campaign against Humeanism, their views share an important difference 
with Scanlon. Both Nagel and Dancy retain the Humean distinction between 
beliefs and desires. They therefore pose an anti-Humean challenge to Scanlon's of 
the motivational sufficiency of reasons as considerations. Whilst we may not 
want to maintain with the Humean that desires are the origin and engine of 
motivation, we may wish to retain the Humean insight that desires and beliefs are
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required in combination to constitute motivation. This would present a serious 
challenge to Scanlon's view that reasons are primitive, and cannot be broken down 
into more basic components of belief and desire. We will begin with Nagel’s 
view of unmotivated and motivated desires, before analysing Dancy’s pure 
cognitivism.
a) Nagel's Motivated Desires
Nagel argues that the Humean model of the necessary combination of beliefs and 
desires ‘...does not allow the expectation of a future reason to provide by itself 
any reason for present action, and... it does not allow the present desire for a 
future object to provide by itself a reason for present action in pursuit of that 
object.*38
Nagel argues that we should distinguish between motivated and 
unmotivated desires.39 Motivated desires are those that are the outcome of 
decision and deliberation. Unmotivated desires are those states we experience 
independently of decision and deliberation, for example, being hungry. So if I 
experience hunger, this is an unmotivated desire. If I decide I want to eat, this is 
my motivated desire. We recall the breadth of Davidson’s taxonomy of desire- 
phenomena from section one. It included urges and wants, expectations and 
ambitions. But on reflection, surely we can distinguish between such experiences 
as urges and expectations, wants and ambitions. Nagel encourages us to 
distinguish between desires as unmotivated subjective states, perhaps like urges, 
and desires as motivated evaluated considerations, perhaps more like expectations.
38 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility o f  Altruism, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1970), 39
39 ibid., 29
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Unmotivated subjective states have more in common with events than with
intentions. They may not always ‘assail us unbidden,’ but they can happen to us,
independently of deliberation and judgment. The experience of having a dry
throat or being cold is clearly different from wanting to be a lawyer or striving to
loose weight. He then asks: is it necessary for all motivated desires, for our
intentions, to be preceded by an unmotivated desire?
Although it will no doubt be generally admitted that some desires 
are motivated, the issue is whether another desire always lies 
behind the motivated one, or whether sometimes the motivation of 
the initial desire involves no reference to another unmotivated 
desire.40
Nagel argues that an intentional action must be given a motivated 
explanation. But his motivated explanation is given by the deliberation and 
decision of the agent, and not necessarily by a chronologically prior subjective 
event.
If we bring these observations to bear on the question whether 
desires are always among the necessary conditions of reasons for 
action, it becomes obvious that there is no reason to believe that 
they are. Often the desires which an agent necessarily experiences 
in acting will be motivated exactly as the action is... The fact that 
the presence of a desire is a logically necessary condition (because 
it is a logical consequence) of a reason’s motivating, does not 
entail that it is a necessary condition of the presence of the reason: 
and if it is motivated by that reason it cannot be among the 
reason’s conditions.41
So an unmotivated desire is not a necessary condition of a reason for 
action. There are of course subjective states, and these can be very important
40 ibid.
41 ibid., 30
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factors in a motivational explanation. But they are distinct from our reasons for 
action, and can be shown to be unnecessary as a condition for motivation. Nagel's 
point is that the true necessary origin of an intentional action is a deliberation. A 
motivated desire is the outcome of a deliberation. Without this, intentional action 
is impossible. Unmotivated subjective states are not essential to motivation. 
Motivated desires are a consequence of deliberation, and not a condition of 
deliberation.
So Nagel retains an element of Humeanism by affirming that desires are a 
component of motivating reasons, but the origin, definition, and role of these 
desires is quite different from that presented in standard Humeanism. For Nagel, 
desires are not a necessary condition of motivation, but they are a logical 
consequence of being motivated.
Nagel’s anti-Humean notion of motivated desires challenges Scanlon's 
view because it maintains that desires are a necessary component of motivation, if 
only in the sense that they are derived from an original cognitive act of 
deliberation and decision. Scanlon's view is that motivation is explained 
sufficiently by the notion of a reason as a consideration, which does not include 
the notion of a desire, except in the limited desire in the attention-directed sense. 
Is Nagel’s anti-Humean view of the role of desire more plausible and attractive 
than Scanlon's absolute rejection of desire?
In order to answer this, we should look closely at Nagel’s notion of desire. 
It seems to me that Nagel offers two views of motivated desires. Nagel could be 
making the weaker claim that motivated desires are in fact a necessary component 
of motivation, but they are a logical outcome of the process of deliberation and
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decision. This seems to be similar to John McDowell’s view that a person can 
recognise the moral value of an act, and then desire to do it because it is the right 
thing to do. In this case, the desire is necessary for motivation, but it is not 
chronologically prior, and is constituted by the belief that the act is right. So in 
one sense this diverges from substantive Humeanism because now the desire does 
not select the end of action and provide the original prompt. This McDowell- 
Nagel view of the role of desires is different from standard Humeanism because 
desires are now derived from the belief that something is to be desired. They are 
a logical outcome, and not the original cause. This view is still recognisably 
Humean, as it accepts the substantive Humean view that two different phenomena 
are necessary in combination to produce motivation: desires and beliefs. The 
logical and chronological ordering is reversed, but they are still required in unison 
to provide the possibility of intentional action.
But Nagel’s view of desire could be understood in a second, different 
sense. Rather than retain the substantive Humean commitment to motivational 
dualism (the necessity of two phenomena: belief and desire), Nagel could be 
proposing that decision and deliberation transform ordinary beliefs, reasons, and 
desires, into a new, single phenomena: motivated desires. Nagel says that ‘...if 
the desire is a motivated one, the explanation of it will be the same as the 
explanation of his pursuit, and it is by no means obvious that a desire must enter 
into this further explanation.’42 On this reading, the motivation is the deliberation 
transformed into the intentional action. The motivation is therefore provided by 
the deliberation and evaluation. This seems to me to mirror Scanlon’s view of a
42 ibid., 29
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reason as a consideration. To be motivated is to see a reason as a consideration 
(or in Nagel’s terms, the explanation of his pursuit), and this explanation does not 
require the presence of desire. As Dancy puts it, ‘[b]y allowing that some 
motivation is Humean, even if other motivation is not, it allows that some beliefs 
need the help of desires if they are to motivate, and others do not, even though it 
can be the same beliefs both times. This is surely awkward at best.’43 Nagel 
seems to argue that on certain occasions, deliberation and decision will motivate, 
and on other occasions, deliberation and decision will lead to motivated desires 
that will motivate. I agree with Dancy that this seems awkward at best. Nagel’s 
own anti-Humean account of the role of desires seems challenged (in a Scanlonian 
form) by his view that motivation can be solely derived from and constituted by 
deliberation and decision.
It seems clearer to adopt Scanlon's strategy of referring to motivations as 
reasons. Nagel is surely correct that the ‘...assumption that a motivating desire 
underlies every intentional act depends.. .on a confusion.. .,44 But I would disagree 
that this confusion is ‘...between two sorts of desires, motivated and 
unmotivated.’45 It seems to me that Nagel's insight is even more radical than he 
allows. The confusion that Nagel sheds light on is between subjective states and 
motivating reasons. If we take Nagel's argument in Scanlon's direction, the 
remnant of desire evaporates, and we are left with the reduction of a reason as a 
consideration.
43 Dancy, Practical Reality, 81
44 Nagel, The Possibility o f Altruism, 29
45 ibid.
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b) Dancy’s Pure Cognitivism
Jonathan Dancy’s pure cognitivism shares a common root with Nagel and Scanlon. 
He too argues that the problem with Humeanism is the commitment to the 
primacy of desire in the account of motivation. Dancy suggests that part of the 
problem with this view is that it takes desires to be integrally motive, and beliefs 
as entirely passive.46 Understood in this way, it is clear why the combination of 
desires and beliefs is invoked to produce intentional action. Dancy’s pure 
cognitivism is based on the view that beliefs alone can motivate. Part of his 
argument echoes Scanlon's comparison of theoretical beliefs and practical 
intentions. He notes that taking reasons for theoretical beliefs as directly 
efficacious, presumes that the capability of belief requires no further capability to 
be effective.
How could there be this complex structure of reasons favouring 
and disfavouring actions, if humans were incapable of registering 
the fact? And how could it be possible in general for people to 
recognise the fact and not to take it into account in practical 
deliberation? Is there any difference here between practical and 
theoretical deliberation? Suppose that there are reasons for and 
against different beliefs, as there are for and against different 
actions. Again it seems inconceivable that there should be this 
structure on the theoretical side unless humans were capable of 
recognising it, at least to some extent. And surely it is 
inconceivable that we should do other than take the things we 
recognise to be relevant to the question what to believe.47
Humeanism holds that motivation is constituted by the combination of 
belief and desire. Dancy, on the other hand, holds that the origin of motivation is
46 Dancy consistently questions whether this is the view Hume actually held, and gives good reasons to show 
that Hume’s own view was more complex, and that he did not make such a simple active/passive distinction.
47 Dancy, Practical Reality, 12
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a purely cognitive belief. But he also maintains that when we take this belief as
motivating (in the absence of contrary beliefs), the state of being motivated can be
described as desiring. So Dancy accepts a kind of Humean dualism between
belief and desire, but allocates these phenomena differently. Substantive
Humeanism compounded belief and desire into the origin of motivation. But
Dancy separates belief and desire: beliefs are the origin of motivation, and desires
are the state of being motivated. The essence of this argument is found in
Dancy’s view that
...the desire that is necessary if there is to be action is just a 
motivation; and we are understanding this as a state of being 
motivated -  a motivatedness, as it were -  rather than as what 
motivates. That state of being motivated will itself need an 
explanation, and this must now be given either in terms of the 
supposed nature of the thing desired -  which, in psychologism’s 
terms, would be to appeal to belief to explain desire -  or in terms 
of a further desire. Either way, if motivation is to be eventually 
explained, it will be in terms of the (supposed) nature of that 
which motivates, which cannot be a desire and must be thought of 
as belief, if it is a psychological state at all.48
Dancy recognises that this is a Humeanism of sorts, as it maintains a
dualism of belief and desire. But it is a purely cognitivist Humeanism because
desire is taken as a mere psychological state of being motivated, and not an
element of that which motivates. Dancy makes clear that pure cognitivism shares
with Humeanism the view that
A desire is an “independent existence,” perhaps with its own 
phenomenology. It is not a logical “shadow” of the motivating 
beliefs, such as, for instance, the fact that the agent is motivated 
by those beliefs, but a distinct psychological state co-present with
48 ibid., 85
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the beliefs when they motivate... There can be no motivation 
without desire.49
Dancy’s pure cognitivism is reminiscent of Nagel's view of motivated 
desires. But Nagel's view was a distinction between two kinds of desires: those 
subject to deliberation and decision, and those untouched by cognition. But 
Dancy maintains that this is confusing and inconsistent. On Nagel's view, desires 
are sometimes part of the complex causation of motivation, and sometimes are 
mere logical outcomes of deliberation. Their role in motivation seems elusive, 
whereas that of cognition seems essential. So Dancy follows Scanlon in removing 
the notion of desire from the constitution of that which motivates. For Dancy, 
beliefs alone are the origin of motivation. But Dancy accepts Smith’s view that 
two directions of fit are required for motivation, but argues that beliefs can fulfil 
both these directions of fit. We are motivated if we have sound belief about the 
world as it is, combined with a belief about the world as we would like it to be. 
Dancy therefore disagrees with Smith’s view that the different directions of fit are 
associated with the different dispositions of beliefs and desires. They are instead, 
on Dancy’s view, associated with differently oriented beliefs. Someone with two 
beliefs that fulfil both directions of fit will occupy a subjective state called 
desiring, but the composition of these subjective states are the purely cognitive 
phenomena of beliefs. It is in this sense that Dancy describes his view as pure 
cognitivism. It can be described as anti-Humean, as it rejects the view that desires 
are a separate phenomenon that are necessary for the original constitution of 
motivation, but it is a distinct challenge to Scanlon's anti-Humean view in that it 
accepts both the direction of fit model that featured in Smith’s Humeanism, and it
49 ibid., 90
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accepts the presence of both beliefs and desires in a complete motivating state. It 
directly challenges Scanlon's view that the primitive sense of reasons as 
considerations is sufficient for motivation.
Dancy’s pure cognitivism in part relies on the direction of fit distinction 
that we discussed in the previous section. It features in his argument in two places: 
firstly, it accounts for the necessity of two beliefs; and secondly, it accounts for 
the necessity of desire, and a subjective state with a distinct world-to-subject 
direction of fit.
The desire does not occur until one is motivated, nor does it seem 
possible to have the desire without being motivated... in general, 
then, there seems no difficulty in identifying the desire with the 
motivatedness. Further, being motivated to act in certain ways is 
surely a state which has the direction of fit normally associated 
with desire, and it varies in strength as desire does.50
We recall that the different directions of fit are in part defined in terms of 
their response to counterfactuals. For a belief to conform to the world-to-subject 
direction of fit, it would need to persist in the face of my belief in the counter 
factual of the world as it is. But what kind of belief could this be? In what sense 
could we rationally say that I have a belief that p  combined with the belief that 
not-pl Dancy’s notion of two beliefs fulfilling two directions of fit between 
world and subject seems to be a definition of irrationality. Dancy also relies on 
the direction of fit model in order to account for the necessary presence of desire. 
But we recall from our earlier discussion that it is very difficult to maintain the 
distinctness of two directions of fit. Schueler pointed out that the world-to-subject 
direction of fit must include cognitions. I followed Schueler in arguing that the
50 ibid., 87
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distinctions between the two directions of fit seem to collapse. If the distinctions 
between the two directions of fit do indeed collapse, then what happens to 
Dancy’s pure cognitivism? On the one hand, the cognitivism would become very 
impure, saturated as it would be with the intentional disposition of desiring as part 
of the constitution of motivation. On the other hand, if Dancy fought to save the 
purity of his cognitivism, the very notion of a desire would seem to become less 
distinct, and we could ask in what sense does it fulfil the requirement of being a 
distinct state that fulfils the world-to-subject direction of fit, a requirement that 
Dancy regards as essential to an account of motivation. It seems to me that we 
should reject Dancy’s pure cognitivism as it relies on a questionable distinction 
between two directions of fit, and involves a view of motivation that seems to 
require persons to be irrational and hold two contradictory beliefs.
6. Motivational Internalism
In the preceding sections, we have examined Scanlon’s view of the constitution of 
motivation. He argues that the motivation is constituted solely by reasons as 
considerations. I defended this view from Humean and other anti-Humean 
accounts of the constitution of motivation. In this section we will address the 
question of the necessary conditions of motivation. Whilst motivation may be 
constituted by reasons as considerations, is it the case that a person is necessarily 
motivated when they judge they have a reason? In raising this question we are 
introducing the problem of internal and external reasons. For the purposes of our 
discussion, I will distinguish between two kinds of internalism about reasons: 
motivational internalism, and reason internalism. Motivational internalism is the 
view that a person who makes a judgment that they have a reason to <j>, is
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necessarily motivated to (j). Reason internalism is the view that reasons are 
necessarily connected to a person’s motivations. Motivational internalism 
concerns the judgment of an agent regarding the reasons they have; reasons 
internalism concerns the reasons there are. A person’s judgment may by incorrect 
or confused, but they may still be motivated by their reason. When examining 
motivational internalism we are bracketing the question of the nature and 
conditions of justification of reasons. We may describe this difference as between 
the motivational conditions of reasons and the existence conditions of reasons.51 
Both these kinds of internalism feature in Bernard Williams’s well known article 
Internal and External Reasons.52 However, I will argue in the next chapter that 
Williams’s argument is directed primarily towards reasons internalism. I will 
therefore reserve detailed discussion of Williams’s argument for chapter four.
We recall the question with which we began this section: is there a 
necessary connection between judging that a consideration counts in favour of </>- 
ing, and being motivated to (jf! We could conceive of a Humean non-cognitivism 
in which such a necessary connection was denied. The statement ‘I see that I have 
a reason to lose weight, yet I have no desire to lose weight’ makes sense. Given 
the discussion in the preceding sections against such a Humean non-cognitivist 
view of motivation, I will set this possibility to one side. I will concentrate on 
Scanlon's anti-Humean cognitivism and motivational internalism.
511 take this distinction, in somewhat revised form, from Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 144
52 Bernard Williams, ‘Internal and External Reasons,’ in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1981)
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Scanlon argues that motivational internalism is a requirement of rationality.
It is a sufficient condition of rationality that the connections between a person’s
thoughts and behaviour are systematic and not arbitrary or haphazard.
Irrationality in the clearest sense occurs when a person’s attitudes 
fail to conform to his or her own judgments: when for example, a 
person continues to believe something (continues to regard it with 
conviction and to take it as a premise in subsequent reasoning) 
even when a person fails to form and act on an intention to do 
something even though he or she judges there to be 
overwhelmingly good reason to do it.53
This does not mean that a person will always reason adequately or 
appropriately. We may criticise a person’s judgment as confused, or as repulsive, 
whilst maintaining that they are rational. On Scanlon's view, it is irrational not to 
respond, not to be motivated, by a reason we judge ourselves to have. Therefore, 
Scanlon's view is that to hold sincerely, and reasonably, that there is a reason to <p, 
is to be motivated to (p.
Rus Shafer-Landau takes a similar anti-Humean view to Scanlon, but
argues that motivation internalism is not a necessary feature of anti-Humean
cognitivism. On his view it is not irrational for someone to say that they see that
they have a reason to (p, but they are not motivated to <p. Shafer-Landau concedes
that anti-Humean cognitivism seems to lend itself to motivational internalism, as
reasons are taken as inherently evaluative. Shafer-Landau argues that evaluative
judgments may be intrinsically motivating, but not necessarily motivating.
Evaluative judgments are defeasible.
Yet there seems that there might be circumstances in which an 
intrinsically motivating belief exerts no motivating influence
53 Scanlon, What We Owe, 25
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whatever, say, owing to competing beliefs or desires, physical 
exhaustion, severe depression, etc. If this is possible, then a belief 
may be intrinsically motivating without being necessarily 
motivating. This if this is possible, Humeanism may be false, and 
internalism false as well. So the falsity of Humeanism would not 
entail the truth of internalism.54
Shafer-Landau argues that the defeasibility of reasons may be described in 
two different ways. A reason, r, may be overridden by another reason, s, whilst, r, 
retains its original motivational efficacy. Alternatively, a reason, r, may be 
extinguished by another reason, st and so the original motivational efficacy of r 
disappears. Shafer-Landau describes the first kind of defeasibility as pro tanto, 
and second as prima facie, and argues that motivational internalism should accept 
a prima facie view of motivating reasons. ‘Alternatively, if intrinsic motivation is 
prima facie, then evaluative beliefs, even if intrinsically motivating, may 
nevertheless entirely fail to motivate in certain contexts, owing to defeaters that 
extinguish the motivation that would otherwise exist. So evaluative beliefs would 
not necessarily motivate.’55
Shafer-Landau gives a number of examples of instances where prima facie 
defeasibility, and therefore, motivational extemalism might arise. We may judge 
that we have reason to <j), but also think that </>-ing, is futile. Or we may find that 
our judgment that there is a reason to perform the moral duty of ^-ing is 
extinguished by our judgment that ^-ing would be extremely imprudent. The 
motivational externalist believes that the connection between a judgment and
54 Shafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 147-8
55 ibid., 148
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motivation is contingent, and that it is perfectly rational to judge that we have 
reason to <f>, and to not be motivated to (/>.
This argument poses a challenge to Scanlon on two grounds. Firstly, and 
most importantly, his conception of the motivating conditions of reasons as 
considerations is threatened by this anti-Humean motivational externalist 
challenge. Secondly, Shafer-Landau’s view that prima facie reasoning implies 
extemalism seems to contradict Scanlon's association of prima facie reasoning 
with internalism. We recall from section 3(b) ‘The Structure o f Reasons as 
Considerations' that Scanlon argued that deliberation on reasons as considerations 
took a prima facie form (although he did not use Shafer-Landau’s terminology). 
On his view, reasons as considerations are different from Humean reasons 
because they can extinguish and eliminate other reasons, unlike Humean reasons 
that will normally have a pro tanto structure because a desire can remain even if 
we choose not to act on it. I will defend Scanlon's view from both challenges 
derived from Shafer-Landau’s argument.
Shafer-Landau quotes cases where it seems we can recognise a reason to (j>, 
and yet not be motivated to (j>. This view seems problematic on two grounds. 
Firstly, it suggests an implausible, and inappropriate account of the nature of 
intentional action and motivation. It seems to imply that motivation is an extrinsic, 
and not intrinsic condition of self-consciousness; it seems to imply that there is a 
condition that precedes and is different from motivation. But what is this 
condition? A Humean might argue that this is the condition of not having a desire. 
On the Humean account desire is constituted by the combination of belief and 
desire. One could have a belief, and not a desire, and therefore, not be motivated.
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Such a person could believe that they have a reason to <j>, but in the absence of a 
desire to (/>, not be motivated to (j>. But Shafer-Landau accepts an anti-Humean 
view of motivation. The anti-Humean view of motivation, however it is cashed 
out, regards the cognitive state of having a reason as sufficient for motivation. If 
we assume that most philosophers regard cognition as, inter alia, an intrinsic 
condition of self-consciousness, being motivated is also, inter alia, a condition of 
self-consciousness. All that this claim involves, is that at any given time, an agent 
will possess a belief, opinion, evaluation, preference, or some other kind of 
cognitive state. They will in this sense be responding to a reason for something. 
On Scanlon's view, a person, even if sitting absentmindedly in an armchair, is 
responding to the reason in favour of sitting absentmindedly in an armchair. 
There is no pre- or non-motivated state that a self-conscious rational agent 
occupies which needs the addition of some further reason or cognitive state to 
motivate. The presence of such a state would either require a Humean view of 
motivation, or a plausible example of non-motivated rational self-consciousness. 
Neither are available to Shafer-Landau.
We have just seen that Shafer-Landau’s anti-Humeanism is at odds with 
the view of motivation required by extemalism. Our second response to the 
extemalism challenge is to point out that in both Shafer-Landau’s main examples 
of defeasibility quoted above, the agent is responding to some kind of reason. The 
notion of extemalism introduced by Shafer-Landau supposes that in failing to 
respond to the initial reason, the bond of necessity has been broken between 
reasons and motivation. But Shafer-Landau’s examples show no such thing. 
What they show is that some reason is motivating the agent’s actions. In the first
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example, the judgment that there is reason to ^ is extinguished by the view that <jh 
ing would be futile. But this is an instance of an agent being motivated by the 
judgment that there are reasons against acting fiitilely. The same kind of response 
applies to the person who decides not to <j) as it would be imprudent. Here the 
reasons to act prudently are motivating the agent rather the reasons they judge to 
count in favour of imprudent ^-ing. These examples, it seems to me, do not show 
that there is no necessary connection between reasons and motivation. They 
instead show that motivation will always be connected to a response to some 
reason. We can conclude that Shafer-Landau has failed to present a convincing 
account of the extemalism anti-Humean motivation.
Whilst Shafer-Landau’s advocacy of motivational extemalism may be 
resisted, it did throw up an apparent contradiction in Scanlon's view of motivation. 
We recall that Scanlon argued against pro tanto reasoning, and in favour of 
motivational internalism. Shafer-Landau pointed out that motivational 
internalism seemed to required a pro tanto view of reasons. On Shafer-Landau’s 
view, pro tanto reasons imply a necessary connection between reasons and 
motivation because the defeasibility of a reason does not extinguish its 
motivational efficacy. On a pro tanto account, I may have a reason to eat a cream 
cake (my pleasure) and also a reason to loose weight (my health). I may choose 
not to eat the cream cake, but this does not extinguish my reason for wanting to 
eat it: my motivation to eat it remains. The necessary connection between reasons 
and motivation seems intact. But Scanlon argues that when we deliberate on 
reasons, our deliberation does not take a pro tanto form. I would suggest that 
there are two responses to make to this challenge.
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Firstly, Scanlon accepts that there will be instances of pro tanto reasoning. 
This will be particularly likely in cases such as that of cream cakes and dieting. 
But his point is that in the main, practical deliberation is not of the pro tanto form. 
This is merely to point out that Scanlon's internalism accommodates the pro tanto 
form on some occasions. The second response is to note that Scanlon's argument 
against pro tanto reasoning is targeted at the problem of deliberation, and not 
motivation. Scanlon argues that when we consider whether to play a game against 
a friend to win or for fun, we may decide that, in the circumstances, it is wholly 
inappropriate to play to win, and discount the relevance of our reason to play to 
win in our deliberation on how to play the game. When we dismiss the reason as 
inappropriate, we are saying, in this context, it is not a reason. The connection 
between the reason and motivation remains, but both are eliminated from our 
deliberation. Should we decide that the circumstances have changed and it is 
appropriate to play to win, our reintroduction of the reason will bring with it the 
motivation to play to win (as these are identical). So, using Shafer-Landau’s 
terminology, we can say that Scanlon has a pro tanto view of the relationship 
between reasons and motivation, but a prima facie view of the nature of practical 
deliberation.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued in favour of Scanlon's understanding of motivation. 
I have described his view as a kind of anti-Humeanism about motivation. 
Scanlon's distinctive argument is that motivation is constituted by reasons as 
considerations. I have argued that this conception of motivation is better able to 
explain motivation than either Humean or anti-Humean alternatives. Scanlon's
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view amounts to an internalism about motivating reasons. Internalism about 
motivation is different from internalism about normative reasons. Our discussion 
in this chapter has left to one side the question of the constitution of normative 
reasons. Whilst Scanlon accepts that having a consideration is a necessary 
condition for having a motivation, we will see that Scanlon holds a different view 
when it comes to normative reasons. And so we now turn from asking if there are 
subjective grounds for the constitution of motivation, to the question of whether 
there are subjective grounds to the constitution of normative reasons.
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Chapter Three
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL REASONS
Introduction
We found, in chapter two, that for Scanlon, motivation is constituted by reasons as 
considerations. This is an anti-Humean view, to the extent that it rejects the 
necessity of desires in the constitution of motivation. It was also an internalist 
view of motivation: in other words, it accepts that there is a necessary connection 
between reasons and motivation. We recall that whilst introducing our discussion 
of motivational internalism, I made a distinction between motivational internalism, 
and reasons internalism. Motivational internalism applies to the conditions of 
motivation, whilst reasons internalism applies to the conditions of reasons in the 
standard normative sense. Motivational internalism is concerned with the 
contents and conditions of an agent’s actions; reasons internalism is concerned 
with the nature and conditions of normative reasons. Reasons internalism is a 
view about the conditions necessary to make the sentence *A has a reason to (jf 
true.
In this chapter I will set out the debate regarding internal and external 
reasons. I will begin section one with Williams’s original discussion. In the 
second part of section one I will set out the varieties of strong and weak 
internalism and extemalism. I will then, in section two, explain Scanlon's 
argument against internalism. I will present a reading of Scanlon as a weak 
externalist about reasons. Weak extemalism allows for the possibility of an agent
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recognising a normative reason, and yet rationally rejecting the normativity of the 
reason for them. In the final section, four, I will discuss the question of the 
objectivity of normative reasons, and show that Scanlon is committed to the view 
that the aim of practical deliberation is truth and objectivity. We will therefore 
come to see that Scanlon's view combines a commitment to weak extemalism and 
the objectivity of normative reasons. In conclusion, I will argue that this is an 
unsatisfactory, and incoherent combination. I will suggest that Williams's view is 
in fact more coherent as it combines weak internalism with a rejection of the 
possibility of truth and objectivity in normative reasons. Whilst more coherent, I 
will suggest that this is unattractive, and ask if we can find a means of combining 
Williams's weak internalism with Scanlon's commitment to the objectivity of 
normative reasons.
1. Internal and External Reasons
a) Williams's Distinction Between Internal and External Reasons 
Williams argues that there are two possible interpretations of the statement *A has 
reason to <j>A The first, internal, interpretation states that there is a necessary 
connection between the existence of a normative reason and a subject’s actual or 
possible motivations. The second, external, interpretation denies that there is 
necessarily any such connection between the existence of a reason and a subject’s 
motivations.1 Williams's purpose is to show that only internal interpretations are 
valid, and that there are no external reasons.
1 Bernard Williams, ‘Internal and External Reasons’ in Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 101
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On this view, the statement ‘X  has reason to f t  is true if and only if X  is 
motivated, or could come to be motivated, to $ for that reason. Unless I am 
motivated to be educated, or could come to be motivated, I cannot be said to have 
a reason to seek education; unless I am motivated to live a long healthy life, I 
cannot be said to have a reason to live healthily. This is a view about the 
existence of normative reasons. It denies that a normative reason can exist 
independently from a person’s motivations. ‘ What is it that one comes to believe 
when he comes to believe that there is a reason for him to ft if it is not the 
proposition, or something that entails the proposition, that if he deliberated 
rationally, he would be motivated to act appropriately?’2
On Williams's description of the external view, it is not a truth condition of 
the statement ‘X  has reason to ft  that X  is motivated to ft An external reason is 
one that is supposed to exist and apply to someone irrespective of their 
motivations or dispositions.
For Williams, a person’s motivations are described as their subjective 
motivational set. The notion of a subjective motivational set is drawn broadly, 
and is not restricted to a Humean view that motivation necessarily includes desires. 
A subjective motivational set may include ‘...dispositions of evaluation, patterns 
of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may be 
abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent.’3 Given that Williams 
defines the constitution of motivation very broadly, reasons internalism could be 
compatible with a Humean or anti-Humean view of motivation. Williams is not 
concerned to define the nature of motivation very strictly. His argument is that
2 ibid.
3 ibid., 105
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the internal interpretation of normative reasons is characterised by the 
commitment to a necessary connection between motivation and reasons.
Williams’s internalism is not restricted simply to the range of actual 
motivations that a person possesses. He accepts that internal reasons can apply to 
an agent so long as we can show that there is a sound deliberative route from the 
existing motivations to the new, augmented motivations. Williams later amended 
his original statement of the internalist view such that it read: 'A has a reason to $ 
only if there is a sound deliberative route from A’s subjective motivational set... 
to ^ ’s ^-ing.’4
Sound deliberation is not restricted to an instrumental fulfilment of the 
contents of a subjective motivational set. Ernesto Garcia has helpfully pointed out 
that Williams's notion of a sound deliberative route involves two constraints. ‘For 
Williams, we must avoid both (a) “procedural error”, where certain procedures of 
practical reasoning that we engage in are, in some sense, invalid ones, and (b) 
“factual error”, where we base our reasons upon false beliefs.*5 Sound 
deliberation may include reflection, revision, imagination, and transformation. 
However, any reflection, revision, imagination, and transformation is controlled 
by the original contents of the subjective motivational set. Williams gives some 
examples of what sound deliberation might consist in: we may seek to convince 
someone who is thirsty that they should not drink the liquid in front of them 
because it is petrol not gin. In this case they may believe they have an internal 
reason to drink the liquid, but reflection and examination shows that they do not:
4 Bernard Williams, ‘Postscript: Some Further Notes of Internal and External Reasons’ in Elijah Millgram
(ed.), Varieties o f  Practical Reasoning, (London, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2001), 91 
Ernesto V. Garcia, ‘Value Realism and the Intemalism/Extemalism Debate,’ in Philosophical Studies, 117 
(2004), 234
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we have committed a factual error. An example of procedural error is found in 
Williams's example of man who is nasty to his wife. This man might be entirely 
consistent in his actions if he is motivated to express his anger nastily, and sees no 
reason against being unpleasant to his spouse. But Williams does not suppose that 
his man is immune from rebuke. We could still, on an internalist account of 
normative reasons, criticise the man as ‘...ungrateful, inconsiderate, hard, sexist, 
nasty, selfish, brutal, and many other disadvantageous things. I shall presumably 
say, whatever else I say, that it would be better if he were nicer to her.’6 But we 
cannot appeal to the man’s reasons and motivations to be nicer to his wife, as he 
does not care for this. But Williams seems to hope that somewhere in this man’s 
wider moral makeup, there are commitments and motivations that we can appeal 
to, and provide a sound deliberative route from, in order to show the man that he 
has reason to be kind to his wife. In this sense our criticism is related to the 
procedure that he has used to employ and reflect on his various moral and 
practical motivations, and we appeal to his presumed wish to have coherence 
amongst these different commitments. When we make such criticisms ‘...we 
launch them and hope that somewhere in the agent is some motivation that by 
some deliberative route might issue in the action we seek.’7
The external interpretation denies that the existence of normative reasons 
is restricted in this way. Williams criticises people who attempt to justify 
normative reasons to those who are not motivated to act on them. No matter how 
loud or vehement the attempted justification, no matter how logical or valid the 
reasoning, normative reasons that do not connect, at least potentially, with a
6 Bernard Williams, Internal Reasons and the Obscurity o f  Blame, in Bernard Williams, Making Sense o f  
Humanity, (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 39
7 ibid., 40
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subject’s motivation simply do not exist. Williams suggests that believers in 
external reasons often browbeat their audience with claims that an external reason 
is a requirement of rationality, and that a person who does not accept an external 
reason is being irrational. The externalist does not recognise the internal 
condition that normative reasons must connect to an agent’s motivations. On the 
externalist’s view, the effectiveness of an external reason is apparently derived 
from the rules of rationality and not the substance of a subjective motivational set. 
But Williams argues that this must be wrong. Normative reasoning must be 
substantive. We cannot produce effective normative reasons by pure logical 
deduction from premises external to an agent’s subjective motivation set. There is 
no substantive content to formal rationality. The notion of an external reason fails 
to recognise the substantive subjective conditions of normative reasons and 
reasoning. External reasons fail to recognise that having a motivation is a 
necessary condition for having a normative reason.
To clarify the difference between internal and external reasons, Williams 
refers to Henry James’s story Owen Wingrave. Owen has been in preparatory 
training for a military career. However, he decides to reject this career. His 
family are shocked as, for 300 years, male Wingraves have pursued the martial 
life. But Owen decides that war is ‘crass barbarism’ that only brings 
‘immeasurable misery.’8 Owen is of firm conviction that he does not have a good 
reason to continue in the footsteps of his male ancestors, but his family tries to 
persuade him that he should join the army.9
8 Henry James, ‘Owen Wingrave,’ in Henry James, Ghost Stories o f Henry James, (Hertfordshire, 
Wordsworth Editions, 2001) 131-132
9 In James’s story, Owen’s father is dead, killed in battle when Owen was an infant, but in Williams's 
description, he is alive and tries to persuade his son. Williams's point is unaffected.
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...Owen’s father urges on him the necessity and importance of his 
joining the army, since all his male ancestors were soldiers, and 
finally pride requires him to do the same. Owen Wingrave has no 
motivation to join the army at all, and all his desires lead in 
another direction: he hates everything about military life and what 
it means. His father might have expressed himself by saying that 
there was a reason for Owen to join the army. Knowing that there 
was nothing in Owen’s S which would lead, through deliberative 
reasoning, to his doing this would not make him withdraw the 
claim or admit that he made it under a misapprehension. He 
means it in an external sense.10
Williams is not arguing that there is no value in the military life, or that 
Owen’s father is wrong to value it. Owen’s father’s reasons are good reasons for 
him, because he is motivated by a respect for family martial tradition. Reasoning, 
with others or on our own, must begin from an agent’s subjective motivational set. 
Owen’s father is wrong to browbeat his son with justifications based on values 
and reasons Owen is not motivated by.
The reasons to join the army are internal reasons for Owen’s father, but
external for Owen. Having a pro-attitude to <j> is taken as a necessary condition for
the judgment that there are good reasons to </>, and for subsequently ^-ing. Quite
simply, Williams believes that external reasons do not exist. It is a requirement of
normative reasons that they connect substantively to a person’s motivations. An
external reason has no such connection; it is therefore not a reason. Christine
Korsgaard offers a helpful summary:
An internalist theory is a theory according to which the 
knowledge (or the truth or the acceptance) of a moral judgment 
implies the existence of a motive (not necessarily overriding) for
10 Williams, Internal and External Reasons, 106
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acting on that judgment. If I judge that some action is right, it is 
implied that I have, and acknowledge, some motive or reason for 
performing that action. It is part of the sense of the judgment that 
a motive is present: if someone agrees that an action is right, but 
cannot see any motive or reason for doing it, we must suppose, 
according to these views, that she does not quite know what she 
means when she agrees that the action is right. On an externalist 
theory, by contrast, such a conjunction of moral comprehension 
and total unmotivatedness is perfectly possible: knowledge is one 
thing and motivation is another.11
b) Varieties o f Reasons Internalism and Extemalism
Williams's well known distinction is between internal and external reasons. We 
can, though, make a further distinction between weak and strong versions of 
reasons internalism and reasons extemalism. I will set out briefly what each 
would consist in.
• Strong Reasons Internalism 
This is the view that the existence of a normative reason to (j) depends on the 
presence of a motivation to ^ in a subject’s actual motivational set. On this view, 
normativity depends on motivation. Normative reasons are the kinds of things 
that can motivate because they are identified with actual motivations: normative 
reasons must be potentially explanatory of action. The strong version of reasons 
internalism introduces a significant restriction on the constitution of a normative 
reason. An example is that Owen Wingrave could only be said to have a
11 Christine M. Korsgaard, ‘Skepticism about Practical Reason,’ in The Journal o f Philosophy, 83: 1 (Jan, 
1986), 8-9. We should note that whilst this quote helpfully expresses the difference between internalism and 
extemalism, I am working with a distinction between motivational internalism and reasons internalism, which 
Korsgaard does not seem to employ. So when Korsgaard speaks of the ‘...judgment, or truth, or acceptance 
of moral reasons...’, I am interpreting this as a question of the existence of these reasons, not merely the 
perception or judgment of them.
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normative reason to join the army if he actually was motivated to join the army.
As Korsgaard puts it,
.. .in order for the principle to provide reasons for a given agent, 
acceptance of the principle must constitute part of the agent’s 
subjective motivational set. If the principle is not accepted by the 
agent, its dictates are not reasons for her. Reasons are relativized 
to the set. If this is true, it looks at first as if all practical reasons 
will be relative to the individual, because they are conditioned by 
what is in the subjective motivational set. Reasons that apply to 
you regardless of what is in your subjective motivational set will 
not exist.12
• Weak Reasons Internalism 
Weak Reasons Internalism says that a normative reason to <j> is dependent on the 
possibility of an agent developing a motivation to <f>, based on sound deliberation 
from their actual motivational set. This view stipulates that normative reasons 
must still be identified with the motivations of agents; it must still be potentially 
explanatory of action. But weak reasons internalism is more permissive of the 
range of motivations that ground reasons, constituting them in terms of valid 
deliberation. However, whilst weak reasons internalism includes the notion of 
deliberation and criticism on normative reasoning, the terms of this reasoning are 
limited to the limits of sound deliberative route from a person’s actual motivations. 
It seems as though sound deliberation consists in seeking the greatest coherence 
between reasons and motivations, along with widest range of correct information. 
The methods of sound deliberation may include logical analysis and imaginative 
reflection. What is essential to the view is that the existence and validity of the
12 Korsgaard, Skepticism about Practical Reason, 21
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normative reasons is limited to a necessary connection with a person’s possible 
motivations.
Both weak and strong reasons internalism take it that normative reasons
must be explanatory of action.
If it is true that A has a reason to $  then it must be possible that he 
should $ for that reason; and if he does act for that reason, then 
that reason will be the explanation of his acting. So the claim that 
he has a reason to ^ - that is, the normative statement “He has 
reason to -  introduces the possibility of that reason being an 
explanation...13
They differ in their understanding of the range, scope, and propagation of 
motivations that underpin the existence of normative reasons. What is essential to 
both views, is the principle that normative reasons are necessarily connected to 
the motivations of a subject.
• Strong Reasons Extemalism
Strong Reasons Extemalism is the view that there are normative reasons that exist 
independently of the constraint that they be potentially explanatory of action, and 
independently of the condition that they are necessarily cognisable by humans. 
Such a view would probably be rejected by most philosophers, but may be one 
reading of Plato’s notion of forms (although not the only reading of this doctrine).
• Weak Reasons Extemalism
Weak reasons extemalism holds that reasons may exist independently of any 
motivations of a subject. Weak reasons extemalism differs from the strong 
version in that it accepts that normative reasons are necessarily potentially
13 Bernard Williams, Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame, in Bernard Williams, Making Sense o f 
Humanity, (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 38-9
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explanatory of action, and necessarily cognisable by humans. Thus the agent has 
the capacity to recognise the reason and to act on it. But if the agent does not 
recognise the reason, the reason still exists for him even though its existence does 
not depend on there being any sound deliberative route from his existing 
motivations. For weak extemalism, the validity of a reason does not depend on 
there being any such route from a person’s existing or possible motivations. It is 
possible, on a weak externalist view, for an agent to be rational, and to recognise
i
the existence of a normative reasons, but to deny that it is normatively 
authoritative for them, as they are not motivated appropriately. In the absence of 
a motivation, a person can claim exemption from the normativity of a reason.
• Objectivity, Truth, and Normative Reasons 
The distinction between internal and external refers to the connection between 
normative reasons and motivations. In itself, this distinction does not imply a 
thesis about the truth or objectivity of normative reasons. We will discuss 
Scanlon and Williams’s understanding of the notion of truth in normative 
reasoning in section three, and so I will not offer a definition of truth in normative 
reasoning at the moment. The notion of objectivity is somewhat less obviously 
addressed in the work of Scanlon than Williams. For the purposes of our present 
discussion, I will understand the question of the objectivity of normative reasons 
to relate to the universality and necessity of the ascription of normative reasons. 
An objective view of normative reasons could be grounded on a metaphysical, 
naturalist, or rationalist argument. In the arguments that follow, I will distinguish 
an objective view of normative reasons from a non-objective view. I choose the 
notion of non-objectivity because it leaves open the question of the whether the
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non-objective view is a subjective, intersubjective, or some other doctrine of the 
nature and ascription of normative reasons.
Let us take a brief look at the ways internalism and extemalism could be 
combined with differing views on the objectivity of reasons. Weak reasons 
extemalism is the view that the existence and validity of normative reasons is 
constituted independently of the (possible) motivations of the agent. But weak 
extemalism is compatible with either an objective or non-objective view of the 
nature and ascription of normative reasons. It could, for example, include the 
view that normative reasons are grounded on cultural or historical practices. On 
these grounds, normative reasons are not defined in terms of a relationship with 
the motivations of agents (this is the externalist thesis), but as the reasons are 
derived from contingent and particular practices, these reasons are seen as neither 
universal nor necessarily ascribable to persons: they are not objective. 
Alternatively, weak reasons extemalism could include the view that normative 
reasons are grounded on natural (or even non-natural) facts, which constitute the 
universal and necessary ascription of normative reasons to persons.
Weak reasons internalism is also open to objective and non-objective 
possibilities. If there is an ‘objective list’ of motivations, based say on a 
naturalistic account of human needs and interests, weak reasons internalism could 
produce an account of objective normative reasons. On the other hand, a weak 
reasons internalism could present a non-objective view of normative reasons 
where motivations are, for example, constituted by cultural or social practices, or 
on a radically individualistic basis. In each case, both objective and non-objective, 
there may be terms of valid deliberation and therefore truth about normative
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reasoning. But a minimalist conception of truth in normative reason is compatible 
with both the objective and non-objective interpretations of the nature and 
ascription of normative reasons.
I will argue in section three, that Williams and Scanlon share a similar 
view of the nature of truth in normative reasoning. But whereas Williams 
combines his weak internalism with a non-objective view of normative reasons, 
Scanlon argues for an objective weak reasons extemalism. I will suggest that both 
these combinations are unsatisfactory. For now, I wish merely to make clear that 
whilst Williams objects to both objective normative reasons, and external reasons, 
these are different commitments and different arguments. Weak reasons 
internalism is compatible with an objective view of normative reasons. This is the 
combination I will be arguing in favour of later in this thesis.
In the following section, I will set out Scanlon's response to reasons 
internalism. We will see that Scanlon rejects both strong and weak internalism. I 
will then examine Scanlon's weak reasons extemalism.
2. Scanlon's Rejection o f Internalism
In this section I will first set out Scanlon's rejection of the view that normative 
reasons must connect to a person’s desires or beliefs. I will then set out Scanlon's 
objection to Williams's conception of weak reasons internalism.
a) Desires and Normative Reasons
In some instances, a normative reason is primarily concerned with the satisfaction 
of a subjective state, such as the satisfaction of a pleasure, or the relief of pain. In
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these cases we might say that this normative reason depends on the subjective 
state.
With respect to some of our reasons, acceptance of this 
dependence poses no problem. It is easy to accept the claim that 
my reasons for eating coffee ice cream and for going to the 
seashore rather than to the mountains depend on the fact that these 
things appeal to me. And this is true not only of reasons that are 
trivial or have to do with “matters of taste.”14
Scanlon therefore accepts that motivation can be connected to the 
existence of a valid normative reason. But is this specific instance an example of 
the general nature of normative reasons? Is a desire a necessary condition for the 
existence of a normative reason? Scanlon's answer is typically robust: ‘...desires 
almost never provide reasons for action in the way described by the standard 
desire model.*15
Scanlon describes an example of someone who is ‘.. .beset by the desire to
have a new computer.’16 Does being in the state of having a desire for a new
computer give a person a reason to buy one? Scanlon argues that it does not.
[D]oes my being in this state make it the case that I have a reason 
to buy a new computer (because doing this would satisfy my 
desire)? It seems to me clear that it does not. Such a state can 
occur (indeed, it often does) even when my considered judgment 
is that I in fact have no reason to buy a new machine, since I 
believe (correctly, let us suppose) that the features of the newer 
models would be of no real benefit to me. In such a case the fact 
that I have this desire gives me no reason to buy a new computer 
(aside, perhaps, from the indirect one that it would put and end,
14 Scanlon, What We Owe, 42
15 ibid., 43
16 ibid.
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for a time, to my being nagged by the desire and wasting time 
reading computer advertisements).17
Scanlon uses this example to point out the independence of reasons and 
desires. The discrepancy between what we desire, and the reasons we have, 
shows us that a desire is not a necessary condition of a normative reason.
However, Scanlon's example may be under described. Scanlon argues in 
this example that the desire and the reason have no relationship (except a 
contingent, indirect one). My desire for a new computer is not a reason for a 
computer, and I could have a reason to not buy a new computer in the face of a 
desire for one. But rather than the desire and the reason being strangers, this 
example could merely show that the reason derived from a desire for a new 
computer is outweighed by my reason derived from a desire to be frugal. It could 
be the case that my desire to live within my means gives me a better reason than 
satisfying my desire for the latest machine. Scanlon has merely pointed out the 
defeasibility of substantive internal reasons, and not that there is no necessary 
connection between desires and normative reasons. A person may have a 
plurality of conflicting reasons based on a plurality of conflicting desires.
But Scanlon wants to show that the effective normative reason against 
buying a new machine has no connection to a desire. He wants to show, in other 
words, that a desire for a new computer is not a necessary condition for having a 
reason to buy a new computer, and conversely, that having a desire not to buy a 
computer is not a necessary condition for there to be a normative reason against 
buying a computer.
17 ibid., 43-44
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It is not just that the reason provided by the desire is outweighed 
by other considerations. I would not say “Well, I do have some 
reason to buy the computer since it would satisfy my desire, but 
on balance it is not worth it.” The desire, even if it persists, 
provides no reason at all (except possibly the indirect one just 
mentioned).18
For Scanlon, the necessary and sufficient condition for having a normative 
reason to (j) is that there are sufficient good considerations in favour of (j> -ing. It 
seems to me that Scanlon's argument has not quite shown what he intended here. 
It is entirely plausible that this example could merely point to the defeasibility of 
internal reasons, and not the independence of subjective states and normative 
reasons. However, I believe we can strengthen Scanlon's argument if we recall 
two doctrines introduced into the discussion of the structure of reasoning and 
desires from the previous chapter. The first concerns the motivational efficacy of 
reasons as considerations (if my reason to be frugal is devoid of desire, can it 
stand as a normative reason that is potentially explanatory of action?); the second 
concerns the objection to the pro tanto view of practical reasoning.
I set out and defended Scanlon's view that reasons as considerations are 
motivationally efficacious. Therefore, our ‘subjective motivational set’ was 
constituted by our reason judgments about the considerations there are, and not 
desires or pro-attitudes. There is no problem, on this account, of the connection 
between motivation and normative reasons. On a Humean view, we might ask 
how a judgment that there is a reason can provide motivation in the absence of 
desire; but on Scanlon's view the judgment that there is a reason is to have a 
motivation. Following from this, Scanlon argued that on close examination, there
18 ibid., 44
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was no phenomenon that corresponded to the Humean notion of a desire, pro­
attitude, or direction of fit. Desires are not needed in account of normative 
reasons, but even if they were, the phenomenon described as desires by Humeans 
does not exist and could not supply this need. So in the example of the desire to 
buy a new computer, Scanlon can claim that this is not an instance of one desire 
overwhelming another desire, as the reason to be frugal is motivationally 
efficacious without any reference to desires. The notion of a normative reason 
can therefore include the necessary condition of being at least potentially 
explanatory of action whilst existing independently of desires or subjective states.
The second argument that Scanlon alludes to in this section is the nature of 
practical deliberation. For Scanlon, simple reasons can exclude other reasons or 
objects of consideration from deliberation. Practical deliberation is not a matter 
of weighing the strength of various desires. It is rather a matter of judging which 
considerations are appropriate and relevant. Normative reasons would not have 
this evaluative quality if they were necessarily connected to desires. Desires may 
conflict sharply and persist. It cannot be a property of a desire to exclude other 
desires. Desires have an object and a weight. They are not normally understood 
to have any evaluative properties. Indeed, our judgments evaluate our desires. 
Scanlon accepts willingly that our subjective states, past, present, and future, can 
be important objects of our reasons. The fact that I enjoy coffee ice cream is a 
subjective condition that is extremely relevant to deliberation about ice cream. It 
is certainly the case that the person who craves coffee ice cream is more likely to 
have a reason to buy a coffee ice cream than someone who dislikes the taste of 
coffee ice cream. This is a clear instance where our subjective state affects the
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constitution of normative reasons. Does this establish that subjective states are a 
necessary condition for normative reasons?
If I like coffee ice cream, this can manifest itself in a very direct way as an 
urge to eat coffee ice cream. My preference for coffee ice cream is a feature of 
my taste that is true of me all the time (probably). It is true that preferences and 
tastes distinguish people and provide them with different reasons, but these 
subjective conditions do not fulfil the definition of desires required by the 
substantive motivational condition of internal reasons. This condition states that 
having a desire is necessary to have a reason, because the desire motivates the 
normative reasons. But when I desire some coffee ice cream, the important 
subjective state is the future experience of eating the ice cream. The reason to eat 
coffee ice cream need not depend on my having a prior desire to eat ice cream, my 
reason might be derived from my anticipation ‘.. .of future enjoyment, not present 
desire.’19 It might also be true that someone regards their preference for coffee ice 
cream as rather vulgar. They might want to educate their palate and refine their 
taste, such that they will, in future, prefer strawberry ice cream. In this case, the 
normative reason is to ignore one’s current states and to acquire a certain desire in 
the future. It is not derived from, and does not depend on, present desire. So my 
preferences and tastes are certainly important objects of consideration, but they 
are not necessary conditions of normative reasons. Scanlon has shown once again, 
that desires and normative reasons can exist independently. Normative reasons 
clearly do set limits and proscriptions on appropriate reasons or objects of
19 ibid.
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consideration. Desires and subjective states are objects of consideration and 
evaluation, and not necessary conditions.
The example of the person beset by a desire for a new computer points out 
the independence of desires and normative reasons. This discrepancy shows that 
we can have desires without having reasons, and that we can have reasons without 
having desires. These are strong arguments to reject the notion that normative 
reasons require the presence of desires.
We have just seen that being in a certain subjective state, namely having a 
desire, is not a necessary condition for the existence of a normative reason. We 
can recognise the validity of normative reasons even when they contradict the 
promptings of our subjective states. This independence of normative reasons and 
desires is explained by the view that our judgments of the considerations that 
count in favour of something are the origin of our normative reasons, and not 
desires. This is the first step in Scanlon's refutation of the internalist thesis of 
normative reasons. But Williams’s notion of a subjective motivational set 
included more than desires. Should we therefore conclude that subjective states 
have no place in the constitution of normative reasons? An internalist like 
Williams might happily accept that good normative reasons are not usually 
connected to the satisfaction of pleasure, or the appeasement of a pressing desire. 
But an internalist would steadfastly maintain that a subjective motivation is a 
necessary condition for having a reason. The object of the motivation need not be 
so closely connected to preferences or urges for someone to want it. The good of 
the object of my desires might be constituted independently of my desires. I 
might want to save the rain forests because I believe they are valuable in
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themselves. But my being in a state of wanting to save them distinguishes me
from someone who does not want to save them. I take this wanting as a good
reason to act to save the rainforests.
I think that this is often what we do mean when we say that a 
person has a reason to act because he or she wants something that 
that action would produce. When we say, for example, that a 
person has a reason to call the travel agent because she wants to 
go to Chicago, we don’t mean merely that she would enjoy 
Chicago, or that she thinks longingly of it and finds the thought of 
going there tempting, but rather that she takes herself to have good 
reason to make the trip. Here we have identified a state whose 
occurrence can affect the reasons an agent has, but it is misleading 
to call it “desire.”20
Scanlon accepts that there is a clear subjective difference between 
someone who wants to save the rain forest, or as in the case of Owen and his 
father, someone who wants to join the army, and someone who does not. But is 
being in this state of wanting this state of affairs a necessary condition to have a 
reason?
Scanlon argues that this state of having a desire cannot be an original 
source of reasons. The subjective state might be taken as an object of our 
normative reasoning, but it is a mistake to move from understanding a subjective 
state as an object of normative reasoning, to take a subjective state as the origin of 
normative reasoning. For the state to count in any way in the planning or 
intentions of an agent, it must become a consideration: it must be taken as a 
reason. Normative reasons are derived from our judgment of the considerations 
that count in favour of something. Scanlon accepts that adopting certain plans or
20 ibid., 45
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making certain judgments will affect our subjective state. But our state is 
dependent on our judgment that there are good reasons, and not the other way 
around. Our judgment about reasons can affect our subjective state. But in this 
sense, the subjective state is not an object of deliberation as in the previous two 
examples. The subjective state is rather an outcome of our practical reasoning. 
This might sound very similar to Jonathan Dancy’s position as set out in the 
previous chapter. Dancy maintains that a belief can cause a motivation, but the 
complete state of being motivated is described as desire. Scanlon's view is 
different, because he does not argue that the subsequent state, derived from the 
reasoning, has any contribution to make to the constitution of the motivational or 
normative reason. The normative reasons are essentially unaffected by the 
subjective state. It is of no normative significance if I experience a huge change 
in disposition, or experience none. These subjective experiences might be of great 
personal significance, and may distinguish me from someone who has not made 
the judgments that I have made. But these subjective states are independent from 
the motivational and normative efficacy of the reasons. As these subjective states 
are derived from the judgment about reasons as considerations they are neither the 
origin nor condition of normative reasons.
The normative sufficiency of reasons as considerations is confirmed by 
comparison of desire-based reasons and intention-based reasons. Scanlon refers 
to Michael Bratman’s notion of an intention as a (possibly incomplete) plan. A 
person who has an intention has a reason to pursue that intention in their future 
plans and deliberations ‘...unless he or she has reason then to reconsider it.’21 If
21 ibid., 46
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we reconsider our reasons, then we will (normally) alter or abandon our plans and
intentions. A change in our reasons is caused by a re-evaluation of the
considerations that count in favour of something, and not by our subjective states.
Desire based reasons are not revisable in this way. The presence of an opposing
desire does not eliminate its negative. Scanlon points out that the ‘unless* clause
in the description of intention-based reasons does not apply to desire-based
reasons. If a desire is a necessary condition for a reason, the presence of a revised
intention is only explained by the occurrence of a new desire. But revised reasons
are based on a re-evaluation of the considerations that count in favour of
something. This re-evaluation may affect our subjective states, but it is not
caused by our subjective states. Its cause is the assessment of the considerations
that count in favour of something.
[Ojne’s “taking” a consideration to be relevant is what has the 
reason-shaping consequences... described. Like the formation of 
an intention, such a “taking” is a move within practical thinking 
rather than, as desires are commonly supposed to be, a state which 
simple occurs and is then a “given” for subsequent deliberation.
(This is shown by the fact that it continues to affect the reasons 
one has only in the absence of grounds for reconsideration).22
Desires are neither necessary for the evaluation of reasons, or for any 
subsequent adoption of reasons. A revision might affect the subject greatly, but 
this merely points out that subjective states can be affected by reasons. There is 
no necessary role for desires in the formation and revision of normative reasons.
In the preceding discussion we have seen that Scanlon objects to the 
internalist connection between desires and normative reasons. Having a desire is
22 ibid., 47
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not a necessary condition for having a reason. Subjective states and normative 
reasons are frequently related, but only as objects or outcomes of practical 
reasoning, and not as source and condition. Scanlon's argument rests on: (a) the 
independence of subjective states and normative reasons; and (b) the susceptibility 
of our normative reasons to reconsideration, which points to desires as outcomes 
of reasoning and not condition of reasons.
b) Beliefs and Normative Reasons
We recall from the previous chapter that a typical anti-Humean view of
motivation supposed that beliefs were the necessary condition and origin of
motivation. Scanlon notes that normative reasons may be connected to beliefs.
If I am explaining to someone why I did not buy the hat I might 
cite my belief about its color: “Why didn’t I buy it? Because I 
could see that it was day-glo pink, that’s why.” If I did this I 
would be giving my operative reason. But when I am deciding 
what to do, and hence considering reasons in the “standard 
normative sense,” what is relevant is something about the hat, not 
about my state of mind. That the hat is day-glo pink is a reason 
not to buy it: that admitting how I feel about such hats would hurt 
my friend’s feelings is a reason to dissemble; and so on. What are 
here cited as reasons are not beliefs but the sort of things, picked 
out by “that” clauses, that are the contents of beliefs.23
Scanlon's argument against the necessity of beliefs in the constitution of 
normative reasons is rather brief. As mentioned in the previous section, a
reasonable requirement on an account of normative reasons is that they are
potentially explanatory of action. It is unclear how a feature of the world could be 
potentially explanatory of action, unless it is connected to an aspect of our
23 ibid., 56
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intentional agency. In what sense is the colour of a hat a reason? Surely, my 
belief in the colour of the hat and the effect it has on my friend’s feelings is the 
essence of the reason, and not an empirical quality in the world? Scanlon's 
arguments do not seem to offer a sufficient refutation of this anti-Humean 
intemalism. But we can find further support for the form of Scanlon's argument 
in Jonathan Dancy’s rejection of the role of beliefs in the constitution of 
normative reasons. Dancy’s arguments seem entirely complementary with 
Scanlon's view stated above, but offer further depth.
Scanlon took a normative reason to be a feature of the world. When we 
deliberate on practical questions, we ask: do the roses smell fragrant; is my friend 
in need? These are features of the world that provide us with reasons to act one 
way or another. But a motivating reason is the subjective state of believing; it is 
not the sort of thing that could be a normative reason. A subject’s state of 
believing might be taken as a fact of the world to be taken into account, such as 
my friend’s belief that I will help them. But my subjective state of belief is a 
condition that I occupy, and is not a feature of the world that I am inquiring into. 
Dancy notes that the reasons that favour an action can explain the reasons that 
there are for acting, which in turn can explain the actions. ‘We emerge with a 
three-part story in which everything has its place, and nothing is missed out. The 
story is: normative reason —» motivating reason -» action. The arrows in this 
story indicate relations of explanation...’24 There is no equivalent three-part story 
that explains normative reasons in terms of motivating reasons. It is not the case
24 Dancy, Practical Reality, 101
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that an intentional action explains motivating reasons (beliefs) that in turn explain
normative reasons (features of the world).
...the reasons why we act can never be among the reasons in 
favour of acting, if the three-part story is true... The crucial point 
here is that believing that p  is never (or hardly ever) a good reason 
for ^-ing. It is what is believed, that p, that is the good reason for 
^-ing, if there is one.’25
An internalist may respond to this complaint by arguing that beliefs are not 
simply a subjective state of believing, wholly and categorically different from 
reasons as features of the world. They are instead understood as subjective states 
with content, a proposition, which can be true or untrue. This suggests a different 
model from the three-part explanatory model that we introduced earlier. On this 
view a belief ‘...is psychological state plus content that together constitute the 
motivating reason, and the content alone that constitutes the normative reason, if 
there is one.’26 Does this interpretation avoid the categorical mistake of the three- 
part account?
Dancy offers two reasons to reject the belief plus content view. Firstly, he 
points out that propositions are different from states of affairs. Let us suppose 
that my friend is in need, and I help him. If someone asks me: why did you help 
your friend, it seems correct to answer, because he was in need, rather than, 
because I believed the proposition, ‘my friend is in need.’ As we see from 
Scanlon's quote, it is that fact that the hat is green that provides the reason, not my 
belief in the proposition ‘the hat is green.’ On this view, features of the real world 
provide reasons. I might conceptualise these in propositional terms, but that is an
25 ibid., 104-107
26 ibid., 113
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act of cognitive apprehension, and not constitution. Secondly, someone might 
respond that it is not simply propositions that are supposed to be good normative 
reasons, but true propositions. But Dancy insists that this difference is insufficient 
to provide what we need. ‘The argument was not that false propositions cannot be 
good reasons... If propositions are deemed incapable of being good reasons for 
action on the ground that they are too thin or insubstantial, or that they are the 
wrong sort of thing, true propositions will be not better than false ones, since all 
will be equally inadequate to the task.’27
Dancy also accuses the belief model of normative reasons of involving the 
fallacy of detachment. Detachment is a move made in argument where a 
requirement on a complex, say a complex of belief and action, is broken down 
(detached from the complex as a whole) and applied to one part if the other 
obtains. For example, I should not believe that promises must be kept, and then 
not keep promises. The requirement holds to that particular complex of belief and 
action. But it does not follow that if one believes that one should keep promises, 
that acts of breaking promises are necessarily wrong, and it also does not follow 
that if I break a promise, I should believe that there is no reason to not break 
promises. The mistake made is to view the belief as something other than part of 
the relevant state of affairs. The belief does not make the action wrong, and the 
performing a wrong action does not require us to believe that the action is not 
wrong. But it is wrong to believe something and not act on it (as a complex). The 
reasons for this are not constituted by the belief, or the action, but by the state of 
affairs of having the belief and acting contrary to it.
27 ibid., 116
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Should we say that, if he believes that there is most reason to do 
D, D is what he should do? To say this would be to make his 
belief infallible, and surely that would be a mistake. To avoid that 
mistake, we should suppose only that there is a rational 
prohibition against the combination of [believing that the reasons 
call for this but not doing it]. To prevent this from yielding a 
prohibition against failing to doing it, for those who believe that 
this is what there is most reason to do, we need the ban on 
detachment.28
The final argument that Dancy deploys against the belief view of
normative reasons is derived from Arthur Collins’s view that ‘...the three-part
story makes possible something that is in fact impossible, namely for the agent to
explain his action in a way that makes no commitment to the truth of the beliefs
that he cites in that explanation.’29
When we explain an action, we are taking into account that the action was
performed from the perspective of the agent. The statement, *A ^-ed because she
believed that p ' is a statement about the state of mind of A in ^-ing. It is in fact
another description, as Collins calls it, a ‘psychologising restatement,’ of the event
(A ^-ed because /?.’ The belief does help explain the event of the agent’s actions,
but it does not constitute the reason why the agent acted. That reason inhered in
the situation that the agent apprehended.
The agent takes ‘I am doing it because p ’ and ‘I am doing it 
because I believe that p' as equivalent explanations. The second 
explanation does not have a new and quite different subject- 
matter, the psychology of the agent rather than its being the case 
thatp... It is really the same explanation both times... either the 
reason for which he acts is something that is the case, or it is
28 ibid., 63
29 ibid., 108, referring to Arthur W. Collins, ‘The Psychological Reality of Reasons,’ in Ratio (New Series), 
10:2(1997), 108-123
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something that is not the case. In the second instance, we do not 
need to locate something else that is the case to be the reason for 
which he acts.30
The subject matter of ‘I believe that p ' is */?*, not ‘my belief that p .’ If I 
believe ‘that p ,’ we should ask if it is the case ‘that p.'
This view points us towards the proper understanding of beliefs and
normative reasons. The arguments that I have set out here should not lead us to
deny the existence of beliefs, or to think that beliefs are irrelevant. In fact, beliefs
are essential to our understanding and evaluation of an agent’s actions. In this
sense, they have an important third person, evaluative, role. When we ask, why
did Richard smell the roses, Richard’s beliefs are an important part of our
evaluation of his action. We should also consider how appropriate his beliefs
were, and how well judged. Our evaluation of the person’s actions will include
the evidence available to them, and the consideration they gave to that evidence.
Their judgment and beliefs are important to explain their decision to (j), but if we
ask, was there reason to <f>, we are no longer referring to their beliefs, but the
features of the situation. Dancy describes this as the appositional account.
The [account of the role of beliefs] that appeals to me is what I 
call the appositional account. This hears “He is doing it because 
he believes that p” as “He is doing is because p, as he believes.”
The “as he believes” functions paratactically here, attaching itself 
to the “p.” Again, it is not part of the specification of his reason, 
but is a comment on that reason, one that is required by the nature 
of the explanation that we are giving. That explanation specifies 
the feature in the light of which the agent acted. It is required for 
this sort of explanation that those features be present to the agent’s 
consciousness -  indeed, that they be somehow conceived as
30 ibid., 110-111
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favouring the action; so there must always be a way of making 
room for this fact, in some relation to the explanation that runs 
from features as reason to action as response. It is not required, 
however, that the nature of the agent’s consciousness itself either 
constitute, or even be part of, die explanans. The appositional 
account tells us how to hold all these thing together in coherent 
whole.31
c) Normative Reasons and the Scope o f Sound Deliberation 
In the previous sections, we have discussed Scanlon's rejection of the internalist 
view that motivations in the form of desires or beliefs are a necessary condition 
for the existence of normative reasons. The strong internalist view held that 
normative reasons were constituted, at least in part, by a connection to the actual 
desires or beliefs of an agent. But the weak internalist view stated that normative 
reasons could exist separately from a person’s actual motivations, but that they 
must connect to possible motivations through sound deliberation. The notion of a 
sound deliberative route allows for a much greater degree of normative criticism. 
In this section, I will set out the difference between Williams's view of a sound 
deliberative route and Scanlon's notion of reflective modification. We will see 
that their differences clarifies the extent to which Scanlon is a weak externalist, 
and Williams a weak internalist.
Williams argues that the internal account of normative reasons requires
scope for normative deliberation and criticism.
Unless a claim to the effect that an agent has a reason to <f> can go 
beyond what that agent is already motivated to do -  that is, go 
beyond his already being motivated to <j> - then the term will have 
too narrow a definition. “A has reason to means more than “A
31 ibid., 128-129
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is presently disposed to One reason why it must do so is that it 
plays an important part in discussions about what people should 
become disposed to do. One example of this, which is 
uncontentiously related to questions raised by the internalist view, 
is given by advice in the “if I were you...” mode. Taking other 
people’s perspective on a situation, we hope to be able to point out 
that they have reason to do things they did not think they had 
reason to do, or, perhaps less reason to do certain thing than they 
thought they had.32
Scanlon argues that Williams’s view of internal reasons is not a sceptical 
criticism of the possibility of normative reasons with critical force. The fact that 
Williams accepts that reasons can be referred to in the mode of offering advice, 
and that we can criticise people, or encourage them to accept new reasons means 
that ‘...Williams seems to be offering a substantive, normative thesis about what 
reasons we have.’33
For Williams, the process of deliberating soundly with our powers of 
practical imagination requires that we reason carefully and for ourselves; 
‘soundness’ in practical reasoning consists in getting to the reasons themselves, 
and being alert to manipulation, bluff, or rhetoric. We might defer to someone’s 
authority, but that authority must be affirmed by us in the first place. The 
deliberation and affirmation must be sincere and authentic. This is, of course, 
good advice to all deliberators, and would not look out of place in any account of 
practical deliberation. But the distinctive feature of Williams's view is that there 
is a limitation on the kinds of reasons that are available for affirmation by us. 
These limits might be fluid and vague, but practical imagination cannot 
encompass all possible reasons, only those that can connect to our original
32 Bernard Williams, Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame, 36
33 Scanlon, What We Owe, 365
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subjective motivational set. The methods of practical deliberation and the 
subjective condition of normative efficacy limit the terms of normative validity.
Scanlon also seems to accept that there are limits on the lengths that we
can expect someone to travel in their normative deliberation. We should not
expect a person to adopt a reason simply on the strength of our proclamation of its
truth. We must try to explain our reasons to them, in terms they can understand
and hopefully come to accept, given their original subjective state. Scanlon
describes his conception of practical deliberation as ‘ “reflective modification” of
one’s reasons.’ Reflective modification
...consists of such manoeuvres as trying to consider the right 
aspects of the things that others claim to value, considering helpful 
analogies, trying to be sure that one has not overlooked relevant 
distinctions (or relied upon spurious ones), and considering one’s 
reactions to new (real or hypothetical cases) and thinking about 
how these reactions are best accounted for.34
Reflective modification and sound deliberation have much in common, in 
that they share a view that practical reasoning will include the beliefs and 
commitments of the deliberator. But Scanlon and Williams disagree about 
whether the limitations of deliberation implies a weak intemalism or extemalism 
about normative reasons. To help us see this difference, Scanlon introduces the 
example of Mr. O’Brien. O’Brien wants to be a gracious host, but O’Brien is 
insensitive, obdurate, and has poor judgment about how to behave graciously. It 
might be the case that O’Brien’s insensitivity and poor judgment impede his 
deliberation about how to be a good host. He might reject criticism of his 
behaviour, and maintain that he has no reason to act differently. Williams and
34 ibid., 368
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Scanlon accept that this person has good internal reasons to behave differently, 
and that he is fairly criticised for failing to adopt these reasons. In this case, 
O’Brien is deficient because he has adopted a certain goal (that of being a good 
host), but he is mistaken about how to achieve his chosen goal. Both would agree 
that sound deliberation would certainly lead him to see that there are reasons to 
behave differently. But Scanlon would hold that the mistake the host makes ijs not 
simply one of coherence (the procedural and empirical conditions that we referred 
to in section one). O’Brien’s failure includes a mistake about what reasons there 
are to guide behaviour to guests. Scanlon emphasises this point by introduction 
the character of O’Brien’s son, O’Brien Junior. Unlike his father, O’Brien Junior 
does not want to be a good host and does not care about the feelings of his guests. 
When he throws parties he behaves just the same as his father. In this case, 
O’Brien Junior has no motivation to be a good host, and no deliberative route 
could be found from his existing motivations towards the new motivations of 
behaving kindly to his guests. Scanlon fears that on Williams’s view, O’Brien 
Junior has no reason to treat his guests well, and we cannot complain and 
remonstrate with him that he should heed the reasons there are to be a kind host. 
Scanlon argues that normative reasons cannot be connected necessarily with the 
(possible) motivations of an agent, as this allows paradoxes like O’Brien and 
O’Brien Junior. Deficiency relates to the degree of truth achieved in the 
deliberation, and not to the degree of coherence between motivations and 
evaluations.
Scanlon continues this theme by picking up Williams's example of the 
man who is nasty to his wife. This man’s motivations are to be aggressive,
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violent, and unsympathetic to the effects of his actions. Williams says that we are
able to criticise this man from an internal reasons perspective. We can say he is a
violent, brutish bully who should stop it. But this case is quite different from that
of O’Brien, because the violent man is reasoning appropriately from his subjective
motivational set. Scanlon notes that Williams’s commitment to the possibility of
normative criticism sits at odds with his intemalism.
[Williams’s criticisms] do involve accusing him of a kind of 
deficiency, namely a failure to be moved by certain considerations 
that we regard as reasons. (What else is it to be inconsiderate, 
cruel, insensitive, and so on?) If it is a deficiency for the man to 
fail to see these considerations as reasons, it would seem to me 
that they must be reasons for him. (If not, how can it be a 
deficiency for him to fail to recognize them?).35
Scanlon may have somewhat missed Williams’s point here though.
Williams does not criticise the man who is violent to his wife by saying that he is
wrong to be violent. This would amount to browbeating, as the man in question
sees nothing wrong with acting out his anger violently. But Williams is perhaps
assuming that this man has wider motivations: to be considerate, not cruel,
sensitive, at least in some aspects of his life. This is surely a reasonable
assumption by Williams; otherwise this man would be a particularly vicious
person indeed. Such a person could exist of course, but the main point is that
Williams does not argue that the man is deficient because he is violent, but rather
that his violence breaks other moral commitments that man, presumably, has.
Scanlon argues that,
[ijnsofar as we do not think that our own reasons for refraining 
from being cruel to our spouses are dependent on our having some
35 ibid., 367
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“motivation” that is served by so refraining, we cannot regard 
others’ reasons as being so dependent. On this point Williams’s 
internalist thesis seems to be in tension with the breadth he claims 
for the idea of a subjective motivational set.36
But it is precisely Williams’s view that ‘...our reasons., are dependent on
our having some “motivation.”’ We can read Williams’s argument in such a way
as to show that it is not confused or in tension. Indeed Scanlon himself says that
...it does seem to be browbeating to insist that a person has a 
reason when he denies this, and when he truly could not see the 
force of the consideration in question no matter how hard he tried.
It is browbeating to go on saying this in such a case. It is 
generally browbeating in any argument simply to repeat in a more 
insistent tone the very point that your opponent has already 
denied, without offering any new reason for accepting it. But 
from the fact that it would be browbeating to go on saying 
something in such a context it does not follow that that thing is not 
true.37
This quote points to the substantial difference that makes Scanlon a weak 
externalist, and Williams a weak internalist. Scanlon believes that normative 
reasons are necessarily potentially explanatory of action, and that they are 
discemable through proper deliberation. In this sense, he is not a strong 
externalist. But he shares with strong extemalism the view that the existence and 
normativity of practical reasons is not constrained by the scope of a sound 
deliberative route from a subject’s motivational set. In light of this, Scanlon 
argues that both O’Brien, and O’Brien Junior are susceptible to normative 
criticism, as the truth and validity of the normative reason is constituted 
independently of their (possible) motivations. Williams, on the other hand,
36 ibid.
37 ibid., 372
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regards normative criticism as essentially limited by the scope of sound 
deliberation from a subjective motivational set, and would disagree that the truth 
and validity of normative reasons can be referred to in justification if those 
normative reasons are not connected to the (possible) motivations of the agent.
Scanlon's sympathy and respect for Williams's arguments should not 
disguise the important difference between their views. As we have seen 
throughout section two, Scanlon disagrees with Williams that there is a necessary 
connection between the existence of normative reasons and the (possible) 
motivations of a subject. We have seen that Scanlon is a weak externalist about 
normative reasons, in opposition to Williams's weak intemalism.
3. Truth and Objectivity in Normative Reasons
We recall from section 1(b) that I argued that both internal and external views of 
reasons are capable of a subjective or objective view of normative validity. In this 
section I will make clear that Williams takes a subjective view of reasons 
alongside his weak reasons intemalism, and that Scanlon takes an objective view 
of reasons alongside his weak reasons extemalism. We will look at each in turn.
a) Williams, Truth, and Objectivity
We have seen that Williams is a weak internalist about normative reasons. This is 
the view that the existence of a normative reason depends on its connection with a 
person’s (possible) motivations. Williams combines this weak intemalism with 
the view that normative reasoning can yield non-objective truths about normative 
reasons.
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In his discussion Truth in Ethics, Williams argues that truth in normative 
reasoning ‘...in itself isn’t much.’38 Williams employs a minimalist notion of 
truth as equivalence, where ‘...[i]f we can start from anything in the question of 
truth, we can start from the idea that ‘p * is true just in case that p.*39 ‘That /?’ is 
given by certain surface facts that relate to the object p. There are two kinds of 
surface facts for Williams: those relating to the logical and formal features of 
assertion and proposition; and secondly, those features relating to the substantive 
normative content of ‘that /?.’ These latter features include such qualities as 
appropriateness and reasonableness, in a non-question begging way which we will 
explain in a moment. In the practical normative domain, Williams argues that the 
objects (p-objects) could be understood as either thick or thin concepts. In other 
words, practical phenomena are the objects conceptualised in either thick or thin 
terms. Thick concepts are substantive normative phenomena such as courage, 
promising, honesty, moderation; thin concepts are those such as right, wrong, and 
good. Williams argues that thick concepts are the proper objects of normative 
reasoning because they can yield truth and knowledge more successfully. The 
practice of promising can be observed, studied, reflected upon, and interrogated 
more substantively and concretely than the thin concept of right, so Williams 
argues. Therefore, truth in normative reasoning should be concerned with thick 
practical concepts. After sufficient examination and reflection on the practical 
phenomena of promising, Williams seems to suggest that we should have a good 
idea of the truth regarding the practice of promising. However, Williams argues
Bernard Williams, ‘Truth in Ethics’ in Truth in Ethics ed. Brad Hooker (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 
1996), 19. We note that Williams's article is concerned with the ethical domain and not the broader 
normative, which we are discussing here. However, as will be clear in the discussion, his arguments also 
apply to the broader practical dimension of normative reasons.
3 ibid., Williams notes that the minimalist notion of truth as equivalence is derived from Tarski.
116
that thick ethical concepts vary over time with the variety of practices, both within
plural societies, and between different societies. But Williams denies that this
undermines the notion of truth in normative reasoning. It just means that truth is
confined to particular practical communities with particular practical concepts.
There is still a truth regarding ‘that p ' but this truth is confined to those groups
that practice p  and use the concept p.
This draws our attention to an extremely important form of ethical 
difference -  namely that between those who do and those who 
don’t use a certain concept. There was a marvellous moment in 
one of Oscar Wilde’s trials when counsel read to Wilde a passage 
from one of his works and asked “Mr. Wilde, don’t you think 
that’s obscene?” Wilde replied “ ‘Obscene’ is not a word of 
mine.” This illustrates that the question of what your repertoire of 
think concepts is reveals your own or your society’s ethical 
attitude. An important difference between different ethical 
cultures concerns what think ethical concepts do any work in 
them.40
Williams argues that whilst normative reasoning might yield truth, it 
cannot yield objectivity. As normative concepts and reasons are derived from 
specific practices, objectivity is an unobtainable ambition. Given the contingency 
and particularity of practices and their norms, objectivity exceeds truth in the 
domain of normative reasons. The truth of normative reasons is limited to the 
practical and linguistic specificity of particular communities. For Williams, 
objectivity implies the existence of a homogenous set of thick ethical concepts 
across all human existence, in time and place. His rejection of objectivity in 
normative reasons is grounded on his rejection of the universality and necessity of 
any particular conception of persons, their practices, and their thick ethical
40 ibid., 29
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concepts. Williams’s view is therefore a commitment to a minimal conception of 
truth, and a rejection of the objectivity of normative reasons.
b) Scanlon, Truth, and Objectivity in Normative Reasons
For Scanlon, deliberation on normative reasons is concerned precisely with the
truth of those reasons.
Judgments about right and wrong and, more generally, judgments 
about reasons for action, seem, on the surface, to claim to state 
truths. They obey the principles of standard prepositional and 
quantificational logic, and satisfy (at least most of) the other 
“platitudes” about truth enumerated by Crispin Wright and others.
Moreover, some of these judgments seem to be true, rather than 
false, if anything is... I find it difficult to resist saying that I 
believe that these things are so.41
Scanlon argues that the deliberation of the truth of reasons consists in 
4.. .four stages... not all of which need occur in every case.’42 The first stage is the 
initial appearance of something as a reason, where X seems to be a reason to A. 
The second stage is described as the first critical stage. This is the first 
assessment of whether something really is a reason in favour of an action, for 
example, whether my fatigue is a reason to have another cup of tea, or whether it 
is in fact a reason to go straight to bed, it cannot be a reason for both (to act to 
stimulate my attention and retreat to sleep), and so we look in a basic sense at 
what this reason seems be a consideration in favour of, if anything. The third 
stage is the second critical stage, where we ask, given all the relevant 
considerations, including X, is there sufficient reason to A. Finally, if I judge that
41T. M. Scanlon, ‘Metaphysics and Morals’ in Proceedings and Addresses o f  the American Philosophical 
Association Vol.77, No.2, (2003), 7
42 Scanlon, What We Owe, 65
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there are sufficient reasons to A, then I will probably intend to A. This will be a 
considered intention based on a judgment that will guide further intentional action 
and deliberation.
Scanlon spells out the practice of this kind of practical deliberation using
the example of a parent seeming to have a reason to strike their child for defiant
and insolent behaviour. The parent should ask why they want to strike the child.
Is it to exert control and power, is it to express and relieve their frustration and
anger, or is it to teach discipline in a contained and loving context? What do these
various reasons reveal about other attitudes to the parent-child relationship, and
are these wider attitudes to be affirmed and used to corroborate the decision to
strike the child or not? Is there a better, a less violent way to express the parent’s
feelings and intentions? All these questions bear on what seems to be a reason to
strike the child, and also refer to other reasons and attitudes that comprise the
context of this choice. There is no reference to any principle, or object, or faculty
that does not substantively consist in the reasons there are to behave in a certain
way towards your child. Similarly, there is also no privileged reference to the
desires, feelings, and subjective states occupied by the parent.
The process here is first to clarify what kind of reason this is 
supposed to be and then to see whether the initial tendency to take 
this as a reason stands the test of reflection. If your initial 
tendency (to think that the child’s insolent behaviour gives you 
reason to strike it) stands after this re-examination, then you 
conclude that it really is a reason; if not, then you conclude that it 
is not.43
43 ibid., 66
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Scanlon states that there are three reasons to hold that our judgment of 
practical reasons concerns the correctness of our judgments. Firstly, deliberation 
on reasons eliminates contradictions on pain of irrationality. A rational, 
reasonable, person would not deliberate critically on what seems to be a reason to 
strike their child, and conclude that, in these circumstances, what originally 
seemed to be a reason is and is not a reason to strike the child. If our reason to 
strike the child comprised desires or attitudes, these contradictions could persist. 
We often experience contradictory feelings and states, and this is not irrational, as 
they are not in themselves reasons, and have no original cognitive component. 
But something cannot be a reason to (f> and to -i <j>. Therefore, if practical 
deliberation leads to a change in attitude, it seems as though this is derived from a 
judgment that what originally seemed to be a reason is not a reason, judgments 
can be correct or incorrect. If this were not the case, then rational deliberation 
might lead to new attitudes, but it could not account for the deliberative 
elimination of what seemed to be reasons.
Secondly, the process of practical deliberation set out by Scanlon gives us 
good grounds to think that the outcomes of our reasoning are clearer and more 
considered reasons that deserve greater confidence. We might not want to claim 
that they are correct in any absolute sense, but they will be more readily accepted 
and adhered to as derived from critical evaluation. It is not at all clear why any 
kind of practical deliberation should affect the confidence we have in reasons as 
desires. The quality of desires is not related to our judgments, they exist, persist, 
and affect or not. And so given that we tend to ascribe greater confidence to
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considered reflections, rather than bare and urgent promptings of psyche, this 
implies that our judgments of normative reasons can be correct or incorrect.
Thirdly, ‘...in virtue of this reflection, it is less likely to be affected by 
distorting factors such as your rage.’44 Whether rage is or is not something that 
should be taken into account in our deliberation is a substantive question, and 
there is no automatic exclusion of any particular state or consideration. But we do 
have to make a judgement about which factors will lead to better and more correct 
judgments. In some instances, the colour socks you wear might be a relevant 
consideration, in many others, it will not. Such decisions about which are relevant 
and appropriate background judgments will themselves proceed in the manner of 
practical deliberation that we have described above. Every judgment-sensitive 
attitude and intention is subject to revision by further reasons as considerations. 
Our intentional stance and comportment is composed of the reasons that we have. 
‘[T]he fact that an intention alters one’s subsequent reasons only so long as one 
does not have reason to reconsider its adoption indicates that the normative force 
of this intention depends on the substantive reasons that made it worth adopting in 
the first place.’45
Scanlon argues that this view of practical deliberation does not amount to 
a coherence theory of reasons. Simply put, such a view would state that ‘. . .belief 
is justified by, and only by, its being a member of a coherent set of beliefs.’46 
Scanlon takes up briefly the common criticisms that coherentism results in 
conservatism and relativism about reasons for action.
44 ibid., 67
45 ibid., 70
46 James Griffin, Value Judgment, (Oxford University Press, 1996), 9
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‘[I]t might be thought an embarrassment to my view that every move in 
the process of correction I have described depends on a prior framework of 
accepted judgments about reasons. It seems that I am endorsing a complacent 
reaffirmation of whatever we happen to think.’47 But Scanlon emphasises that all 
the reasons in a person’s subjective set of reasons are susceptible to criticism and 
revision, and that any process of radical criticism would eventually amount to this 
method because we have shown that reasons are, inter alia, beliefs about 
considerations that count in favour of something. There is no source of guidance 
or authority external to the reasons that there are, and the substantive judgment of 
them. Scanlon's notion of practical deliberation and judgment will not yield 
unconditional imperatives: ‘[a] 11 that can be established is that they seem, on 
reflection, to be correct. That, it seems to me, is enough, and as much as one 
could reasonably ask for.’48
From this discussion, we can see that Scanlon seems to hold a view of 
truth regarding normative reasons that is not altogether dissimilar from Williams's. 
Scanlon maintains, as does Williams, that reflection and criticism of normative 
reasons can yield a truth regarding their content and application. Scanlon seems 
to follow Williams's notion that reflection on normative reasons concerns thick 
normative concepts that are constituted by particular social practices. But does 
Scanlon follow Williams's view that this implies a non-objectivity regarding 
normative reasons? Does the commitment to the thickness of normative reasons 
require us to forgo the possibility of objectivity regarding normativity?
47 Scanlon, What We Owe, 70
48 ibid.
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Scanlon agrees with Williams that the particular social practices of a 
community will affect the nature of normative reasons. He accepts the view that 
there will be a significant degree of variability between communities regarding 
the existence, nature, and employment of thick normative concepts: ‘...it is true 
that what people have reason to want depends on the conditions in which they are 
placed, and among these conditions are facts about what most people around them 
what, believe, and expect.’49 But Scanlon argues that the variability derived from 
the connection of normative reasons to ways of life should not lead one to a non­
objective, relativist view of normative reasons. Scanlon argues that whilst thick 
normative concepts and their practices will vary widely across time and cultures, 
there is an irreducible core of substantive reasons relating to what people owe to 
each other, which is impervious to the natural variations of social practices. It is 
in this sense that Scanlon describes himself as a realist about moral reasons. 
Scanlon argues that this commitment to the objectivity of normative reasons does 
not necessarily commit him to a metaphysical view of normative reasons.
What is special about reasons is not the ontological category of 
things that can be reasons, but rather the status of being a reason, 
that is to say, of counting in favour of some judgment-sensitive 
attitude.50
Scanlon intends to show that a commitment to the objectivity of reasons 
does not imply a commitment to a metaphysical or ontological view of reasons. 
But he argues that normative reasons are special kinds of facts. He asks, when we 
criticise a person’s normative judgment, are we entitled to say that their judgment 
was based on an incorrect judgments of a special kind of fact, a fact that is
49 ibid., 341
50 ibid., 56
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‘...neither merely a fact about our psychology nor an ordinary empirical fact 
about the world outside us?’51 Or are we restricted to criticising their choice of 
holding that X counts in favour of A? Is normative judgment based on the 
determination of a special kind of facts, or the holding of special kinds of attitudes? 
If normative judgment consists in special-attitudes, then normative criticism 
cannot speak to any kind of fact about the relationship that holds between X and 
doing A. On this view, that relationship is constituted by, and therefore dependent 
on, the subjective judgment about this relationship. These different kinds of 
criticism involve different canons of analysis and different views of the error 
incurred. Scanlon points out that these criticisms amount to an assault on the 
objectivity of normative reasons. If we cannot ascribe any kind of objects, 
methods of judgment, and subsequently correctness, to our normative beliefs, then 
‘...judgments about reasons are not about anything real, but just expressions of 
certain attitudes. ’52
Scanlon argues that we have good reason to think that normative judgment 
about actions consist in beliefs regarding a special kind of fact, rather than a 
special-attitude, because both normative judgments about our beliefs about the 
empirical world, and normative judgments about action share a declarative 
propositional form that obeys the ‘normal laws of logic... If, then, we are 
disposed on reflection to confidently affirm judgments of these kinds we seem to 
need some reason not to take them as saying something which can be true and 
which can be the object of belief .,53 The sceptic would surely argue that this is a 
superficial similarity, and that our normative judgments are not kinds of beliefs
51 ibid., 58
52 ibid., 59
53 ibid., 60
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about special kinds of facts that follow the normal laws of logic and which can be
correct or incorrect. Rather, they are statements about the attitudes we have. The
sceptic argues that normative reasons as beliefs about reasons as special kinds of
facts cannot account for the force of normative judgments. Is this a good reason
to doubt that normative judgments about action cannot consist in beliefs but must
take the form of special attitudes? Scanlon argues that it is not.
...[A] defender of the belief interpretation of judgments about 
reasons need not, and should not, claim that statements about 
reasons are statements about the natural world but only that they 
are the kind of thing that can be said to be true and can be the 
object of belief. This general claim gives rise to no problem about 
normative force. Normative force of the kind in question is just 
the force of recognizing something to be a reason (to “count in 
favor of’ a certain attitude). If recognizing something to be a 
reason amounts to seeing the truth of a statement about reasons, 
then this recognition will have normative force of the requisite 
kind.54
Does the recognition of a reason have ‘normative force of the requisite 
kind?’ Scanlon offers two arguments to show that normative reasons as beliefs 
can provide the normative force that we seek from practical reasons.
Firstly, Scanlon argues the judgments of rational agents will be effective 
on their further deliberation and judgment. Part of what it means to make a 
judgment that X is a reason to A, is to believe that X counts in favour of A, such 
that in first person deliberation this will lead directly to the adoption of the 
intention to A. If the conclusions of judgments are beliefs, then these beliefs will 
have the normative force, in the sense that they will be effective towards their 
object, whether attitudes, further beliefs, or actions. So normative judgments as
54 ibid.
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beliefs can have the normative force required, in the sense that they can directly 
produce intentions and actions.
Secondly, Scanlon points out that the force of these judgments about
reasons is not restricted to first person deliberation. The effectiveness of our
beliefs is not restricted to questions that affect us directly; the conclusions will
apply to others in hypothetical or third person cases. The nature of the effect, or
forcefulness of our beliefs will be different, in that our judgments may only result
in approval or disapproval, or in the offer of advice. But nevertheless, we can
show that judgments of reasons in the form of beliefs can provide the normative
force that the sceptic denied.
The distinctive motivational force of such judgments... can then 
be accounted for by the fact that it is central to being a rational 
creature that one’s attitudes are responsive to one’s judgments 
about reasons: in particular that if one accepts a judgment of the 
form just mentioned and believes one’s situation to be of the kind 
in question then one modifies one’s attitudes accordingly, because 
one sees reason to do so.55
Scanlon argues that normative judgments about reasons can comprise 
beliefs about a special kind of fact that can be correct and incorrect, and these 
reasons can be normatively effective in the way that the sceptic denied they could.
We now turn to the second and third of the sceptic’s challenges: normative 
judgments about reasons as beliefs imply the existence of a strange metaphysical 
object, perception of which cannot be unaccounted for. Scanlon described these 
as the metaphysical and the epistemological questions. Let us take the 
epistemological question of perception first.
55 ibid., 62
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The sceptic challenges the view that there are normative reasons as beliefs 
that can be correct or incorrect. The strength of this challenge seems to derive 
from a comparison with empirical judgments. Empirical beliefs, in a more or less 
sophisticated way, are generally taken to refer to objects that exist independently 
of the judging subject. Philosophical investigations into our perception of the 
natural world are frequently faced with explaining how we come to acquire 
knowledge of objects that exist so separately from us. This problem at least 
begins with the assumption that there is a phenomenon of empirical perception 
and judgment. The sceptic points out that it is not clear that practical judgment 
has any kind of evidently existent object, and so questions whether moral 
judgment can be described in perceptual terms at all. But Scanlon points out that 
it is a mistake to assume that the notion of practical judgments that consist in 
beliefs must take the same form as empirical judgments that consist in beliefs 
derived from perception. ‘There is no reason to hold that nothing can be called a 
belief at all unless it can be understood as about some subject matter at a distance 
from us which must somehow be represented to us, and which therefore raises 
epistemological problems to which causal interaction is a natural solution.*56
Scanlon argues that if follows from this that we should also not assume 
that the notion of normative reasons as beliefs requires a metaphysical object of 
our judgment. The sceptic’s argument seems to take the following form: if 
normative reasons are beliefs that can be correct or incorrect, this must rely on the 
existence of an object independent of our beliefs. The comparison of our beliefs 
with the actual nature of this object informs us of the correctness or otherwise of
56 ibid.
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our judgments. This argument derives from comparison of the mode of empirical
judgment with practical judgment. But Scanlon points out that even the empirical
observer need not include a metaphysical account of the nature of the empirical
object. What matters is that there are clear standards by which we can assess the
status of the reasons for our beliefs. Our mathematical judgments can proceed
without us making a particular metaphysical claim about the nature of
mathematical objects. Mathematical judgments also include clear rules and
standards to determine correctness. And so it does not follow that the existence of
clear standards of judgment about reasons as beliefs rely on an object that exists
independently of us.
|T|n order for judgments about reasons to be taken to be about 
some subject matter independent of us in the sense required for it 
to be possible for us to be mistaken about them, what is required is 
for there to be standards for arriving at conclusions about reasons. 
Conclusions about reasons that can be reached only through 
modes of thought that are defective by these standards are 
mistaken. It is not necessary, in order to explain the possibility of 
being mistaken, to construe the relevant subject matter in a 
metaphysical way as existing outside us.57
But how do we know whether there are such standards for normative 
reasons for action? Scanlon regards this as a substantive question that must be 
answered within an account of practical reasoning. That is, when we discuss 
particular practical problems, we can also deliberate on the kinds of standards that 
are available and that should be employed. This apparent substantive 
indeterminacy should not worry us any more than it does in empirical judgment. 
Even within natural science there are substantive discussions and controversies
57 ibid., 63
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about the most basic standards and their applicability: for example, are the 
standards of judgment derived from the observational method appropriate at all 
levels of empirical enquiry? There seems to be some dispute as to whether they 
are appropriate at both the atomic and the sub-atomic level. This question is 
debated at the level of empirical enquiry, or theoretical reflection on empirical 
enquiry, and is not normally taken to demand a philosophical-metaphysical 
answer. Clearly there is wide disagreement about the nature of the standards that 
are appropriate to practical deliberation on reasons. ‘Substantive doubts about 
reasons for action may have moved some people to maintain that claims about 
reasons express pro-attitudes rather than beliefs, but the question of the* 
substantive defensibility of claims about reasons for action in fact cuts across the 
question of how these claims should be interpreted.*58
Scanlon therefore believes that the sceptic’s challenge to the notion of 
normative reasons in the form of beliefs about special kinds of facts that can be 
correct or incorrect can be met. On the one hand, we simply need to show that the 
sceptic limits inappropriately the possibility of normative force to the holding of 
an attitude, whereas Scanlon argues that to have a reason as a belief is to be 
effected by the consequences of holding that belief as a reason. The effectiveness 
of reasons as considerations fulfils the requirement of normative force that the 
sceptic sought. On the other hand, we can accept that normative reasons based on 
esoteric perception of a questionable object should be doubted. But Scanlon 
points out that commitment to the belief interpretation of normative judgment
58 ibid., 64
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does not require a metaphysical argument, and therefore it does not require a 
special epistemology to explain perception of our supposed metaphysical object.
Thus Scanlon's argues that sensitivity to the variability provided by the 
contribution made by particular ways of life can avoid relativism and an 
ontological account of reasons. The origin of the objectivity of normative reasons 
must therefore be sufficient to explain the universal and necessary ascription of 
normative reasons to all those who, as Williams says, have a plurality of different 
normative practices and concepts.
We are now left with the question of what are the special kind of facts that 
provide for the objectivity of what we owe to each other. For this we must move 
from a general discussion of normative reasons, towards a more specific 
examination of his view of right and wrong.
Conclusion
A Review and Preview
My aim in this chapter has been to show clearly that Scanlon is a weak externalist 
about normative reasons. I have presented Scanlon’s arguments against 
Williams’s weak intemalism. I have also examined the conceptions of truth and 
objectivity that Williams and Scanlon combine with their respective weak 
intemalism and extemalism. We are now, hopefully, able to see more clearly the 
structure and status of a normative reason that Scanlon will use in the specific 
arguments for what we owe to each other. However, before we engage in these 
arguments, I wish to point out a problem in Scanlon’s combination of weak 
extemalism and objectivity regarding normative reasons.
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Weak extemalism implies that normative reasons can exist independently 
of a person’s motivations and recognition of them as normative for them. A 
person could, rationally, deny that a normative reason is ascribable to them. It 
seems to me that this sits at odds with the commitment to the objectivity of 
normative reasons. We described the objectivity of normative reasons as 
involving a claim that normative reasons are universal and necessarily ascribable. 
Thus Scanlon's combination of weak extemalism and objectivity of normative 
reasons seems to entail the contradictory view that a normative reason is at once 
universally and necessarily ascribable, and that a person could rationally deny that 
a normative reason is ascribable to them. In later chapters we will examine this 
problem in more detail under the heading of amoralism. I will argue that the 
problem of amoralism, which we can see in an abstract structural sense in our 
discussion of this chapter, threatens Scanlon's contractualism. Whilst I believe 
that there is a structural problem in Scanlon's combination of weak extemalism 
and objectivity, I do not believe that we should adopt Williams’s alternative. 
Williams’s combination of weak intemalism with non-objectivity of normative 
reasons is more coherent than Scanlon's view it seems to me. But Williams’s 
view forgoes that very ambition of objectivity that was so central to Scanlon's 
original statement of contractualism. On Williams’s view, it is neither irrational 
nor objectionable that morality is reduced to a special taste of preference. My 
arguments in later chapters will seek to find an alternative basis on which we can 
combine weak intemalism with objectivity.
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Chapter Four
THE AUGMENTED BUCK-PASSING ARGUMENT
Introduction
In the previous chapter, we found that Scanlon’s view of normative reasons 
combines weak extemalism with objectivism. In this chapter we will examine a 
key aspect of Scanlon's account of the objectivity of normative reasons: his 
argument for the buck-passing account of value. Scanlon’s objectivism is 
distinctive, in part, because of its commitment to a buck-passing account of value. 
In the course of this chapter I will defend the buck-passing strategy as part of a 
successful account of the objectivity of reasons. However, I will argue that 
Scanlon’s account is unsatisfactory as presented in What We Owe to Each Other. 
My main purpose in this chapter is to explain the problem with his account and 
develop a response based on Scanlon’s original buck-passing argument, but which 
augments the buck-passing from solely the good, to the good and the right. I hope 
to show that my proposed augmented buck-passing argument will be better able to 
contribute to an account to the objectivity of reasons against wronging.
The argument of Scanlon's contractualism moves in ‘...three concentric 
and successively narrower normative domains: reasons, values, and what we owe 
to each other.’1 Before we can set out the content and grounds of Scanlon's 
argument for the importance and priority of our duties towards each other, we 
need to address Scanlon's understanding of the relationship between reasons and
1 Scanlon, What We Owe, 13
132
values. Scanlon's account of value consists in two distinctive features. Firstly, he 
holds that values are not necessarily teleological in nature; and secondly, he 
argues that value is a formal second order property that relates to the substantive 
and objective first order property that is valued. This he describes as the buck- 
passing account of value. My purpose in this chapter is to critically examine 
Scanlon's abstract account of value. In sum, I defend Scanlon's pluralist account 
of the structure of value. I argue that it is important to regard Scanlon as a 
pluralist about the structure of value. Scanlon is a pluralist about the structure of 
value, as he does accept that values can be teleological in form, even if this is not 
their necessary structure. This pluralist account is opposed to those who argue 
that Scanlon rejects entirely the notion of teleology as an account of value.
I am more critical of Scanlon's argument about buck-passing. We will see 
that the buck-passing argument is invoked primarily as a response to G. E 
Moore’s open question problem about the good. I suggest that the buck-passing 
strategy is a promising response to this problem, but that Scanlon applies it 
improperly. In Scanlon's version, the buck is passed from the evaluative notion of 
the good to the normative notion of a reason grounded on the natural properties of 
a valuable object. I argue that this is inconsistent with Scanlon's notion of a 
normative reason, which for him also includes an evaluative component. More 
troubling, this merely moves the open question problem from the evaluative to the 
normative, from the question of the good to the question of reasons. I suggest an 
augmented buck-passing argument where both values and reasons are defined in 
terms of second order formal qualities, and the buck is passed from both to the 
first order substantive properties of the object of value and of right. This
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augmentation is important in order to make the buck-passing account more 
consistent internally. Yet, as we will see in the next chapter, it is also crucial to a 
defence of Scanlon’s contractualism from criticisms of redundancy and circularity. 
Consequently, the augmented buck-passing argument that I will present here helps 
explain the structural nature of the right and the good, and also provides an 
important part of the explanation of the objectivity of the substantive reasons 
against wronging.
1. Values and Teleology
a) States o f Affairs, Reasons, and Values
In his discussion of value, Scanlon states that he is presenting ‘...an abstract 
account of value.’2 His abstract account of value contains two main features. The 
first is a refutation of the view that value is necessarily teleological in structure; 
the second is the buck-passing account of value. Scanlon's discussion centres on 
the relationship between values and reasons, or, as it is sometimes described, 
between the evaluative and normative. Dancy and Suikkanen trace the history of 
this discussion in the work of Moore, Ross, Ewing, and others.3 They point out 
that the teleological account of value was put forward by Moore as a ‘. . .claim that 
value is a property that has the unique feature amongst all properties of being 
reason-providing. It is a property that makes possible states of affairs such that 
we have reason to attempt to make them actual.’ 4
2 Scanlon, What We Owe, 95
3 See Jussi Suikkanen, ‘Reasons and Value -  In Defence of the Buck-Passing Account’ in Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice, Vol. 7, No. 5 (2004), 513-535 and Jonathan Dancy, ‘Should We Pass the Buck,’ in 
Philosophy: the good, the true, and the beautiful, ed. A. O’Hear (Cambridge University Press/Royal Institute 
of Philosophy, 2000)
4 Suikkanen, Reasons and Value, 518
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The teleological view of value takes bearers of value to be states of affairs, 
states of affairs where some actions take place, or where certain phenomena are 
present or absent. Some people may value a state of affairs where people act 
kindly or courageously, others may value a state of affairs where there is a greater 
degree of material equality, or an absence of oppression and exploitation. These 
states of affairs are taken to have intrinsic value, and other states of affairs are 
valuable to the extent that they contribute to bringing about these intrinsically 
valuable states of affairs. On this view, the exercise of value judgment consists in 
determining which are the intrinsically valuable states of affairs, which states of 
affairs have more value and which less, and which of our actions will bring about 
these valuable states of affairs.
The teleological notion of value is frequently associated with 
consequentialist reasons, and often contrasted with the supposed normative nature 
of rights and duties. Scanlon refers to NageTs discussion of a puzzling feature of 
moral reasons that seems to follow from this distinction between teleological and 
normative reasons. In ‘ The View From Nowhere’, Nagel takes it to be the case that 
there are deontological reasons that apply to certain actions, for example, a 
prohibition against torture. But Nagel also holds a teleological view of value, 
where certain states of affairs are of intrinsic value, and there are objective 
reasons to promote these intrinsically valuable states of affairs. The teleological 
reasons are based on the goodness or badness of the states of the affairs, but the 
deontological reasons do not seem to be based on these states of affairs. If they 
were, they would not be a simple prohibition against performing an action 
intentionally; rather they would be a different kind of reason, a reason to promote
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a state of affairs in which these actions do not occur. ‘So the problem that Nagel 
raises is a general one: how can there be a reason not to bring something about 
which is not grounded in the badness of its happening, and hence equally a reason 
to prevent it from being brought about by some other agent or by the forces of 
nature?’5
Scanlon points to Samuel Scheffler’s notion of ‘maximising reason’ as one 
possible answer to this conundrum. Scheffler suggests that at the heart of 
consequentialism is the view that if we are faced with a choice between two 
options, the one that maximises the goal is, ceteris paribus, the more rational one 
to make. Returning to Nagel’s example, it is possible to conceive of a case where 
torturing one person will prevent the torturing of five people, and so the state of 
affairs where fewer people are tortured is better promoted by performing this one 
act of torture. But if we hold, as Nagel does, that there is a deontological reason 
against torturing someone, then, according to Scheffler’s notion of maximising 
reason, we are behaving irrationally.
We recall that Scanlon disagrees with the view that normative judgment
consists in weighing the outcomes of reasons, but rather consists in making
evaluative judgments that allow and eliminate reasons according to their
appropriateness and relevance:
.. .judging that a certain consideration does not count as a reason 
for action is not equivalent to assigning negative intrinsic value to 
the occurrence of actions based on this reason. Such a value can 
always simply be outweighed by some countervailing value, but 
the judgment that a consideration is irrelevant cannot.6
5 Scanlon, What We Owe, 82
6 ibid., 84
136
Taking the example of the case of torturing a person in order to save others, 
Scanlon argues that the principle against torturing eliminates other considerations 
about the disvalue that follows from failing to torture someone from inclusion in 
any judgment. This principle is not based on the negative disvalue that follows 
from either allowing or prohibiting torture. If the principle is judged correct, then 
we do not need to weigh the value or disvalue of the state of affairs that it 
produces. The principle itself is constituted by the permission and elimination of 
certain reasons and actions, and is not grounded on the value that inheres in the 
state of affairs. Scanlon argues that to take there to be good reasons not to torture 
someone is to judge that the prohibition against torturing is of value. This 
judgment does not mean that the value that we ascribe to the principle of the 
prohibition against torturing is derived from the state of affairs where there is no 
torture. We therefore do not necessarily have reasons to promote a world where 
there is no torture. This might sound counter intuitive, particularly when we 
consider such a repugnant act as torture which is based on the intentional 
infliction of pain. Scanlon does not argue that values can not be teleological, that 
is, that we will judge that a state of affairs where the principle abounds is not 
better than a state of affairs where the principle goes neglected. His point is that 
the teleological structure is not a necessary part of the notion of value, and also 
that value judgments can have a deontological character, where the correctness of 
the principle underlies the value. The value of the principle is not derived from 
the contribution actions performed under it make towards another inherently 
valuable state of affairs. Scanlon notes that discussions of the teleological 
account of value have most attraction when discussing such phenomena as
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pleasure and particularly pain. In these cases it is quite proper to value a state of 
affairs in which there is less rather than more pain, but it is also quite proper to 
take there to be reasons for a principle, that is to make a judgment that a principle 
is of value, on the grounds that the principle is correct in itself. The order of 
explanation is different in this case, and this begins to resolve the puzzle that 
Nagel pointed to. If we do not take a teleological account of value, we can judge 
that the intentional infliction of pain is wrong because of qualities about this 
phenomenon that we take to lead to this judgment. This is a judgment about the 
nature of the act itself: that it is impermissible, and that there are no good reasons 
that count in favour of it. A world in which there is much less pain, and in which 
this principle is pervasive and effective is to be preferred, but it is not the 
existence or possibility of such a state of affairs that confers value. Scanlon 
objects to the teleological notion that the state of affairs in which the value is 
realized the most is to be preferred, and therefore is to be promoted. We might 
then set a goal for ourselves of reducing the amount of torture in the world, but 
this is because the initial principle is judged to be of value, and because we then 
choose to promote this. The adoption of this goal is not derived from the value of 
the state of affairs in which there is less torture. Scanlon does not deny that 
maximising rationality is one distinctive way of exercising practical reason, but he 
argues that it is not a necessary feature of value judgment, and not the singularly 
correct way to account for the notion of value. Scheffler himself accepts that 
maximising rationality is a particular and contingent feature of value judgment 
and practical reasoning, and therefore Scanlon claims that Scheffler is
....correct [not to] claim that all the considerations that figure in
determining the eligibility of an action have to take the form of
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“goals” and their “desirability.” As I have said, it does not seem 
plausible to understand the deontologist’s prohibition against 
killing in this way.7
Scanlon also points out that we should not take the ceteris paribus clause
at face value. This notion that we should perform an act, other things being equal,
should not be taken to imply that our judgment of the value of a principle relies on
the superior weight of the value compared to others. The value of a principle is
not derived from a comparison of its relative weight, which could change if the
relative weightings were different. If it is wrong to torture someone, we make the
judgment that there are reasons that count in favour of this principle, and that it is
therefore a principle that we value. If we say that it is wrong, other things being
equal, to torture someone, this does not mean that this value, in these
circumstances, is to be promoted, but perhaps if the circumstances were different,
if for example an act of torture would save one thousand lives, then the weighting
would be different and other things are no longer equal, and the principle can be
ignored or violated because another weightier value weighs in. We should take
this notion of others things being equal to mean that there is no other value or
reasons that eliminate and declare invalid the reasons that count in favour of the
principle against torturing.
.. .the intentions that constitute adopting the goal specify the kinds 
of occasions on which it is to be pursued, the ways it is to be 
pursued, and so on. So the limitations indicated by the 
qualification that other things must be equal include conditions 
determined by our understanding of the goal and the way in which
7 ibid., 85
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it is a goal for us, not just limitations imposed by other values that 
might “override” it.8
Scanlon works through different examples to expound the notion that the 
structure of value is not necessarily teleological and maximal. One of the most 
interesting cases he examines is that of friendship. Friendship is often taken as a 
value which features centrally in most people’s lives. We consider it a good thing 
that someone would have many close and dear friends. But does it follow that the 
value of friendship is derived from the state of affairs where we have a greater 
amount of truer friends? Is the value of friendship teleological in structure?
Scanlon points out that we should take care to distinguish the question of 
what it is for friendship to be valuable, from the question of what it is to value 
friendship. We can of course value things for which there are no good reasons, or 
value valuable things in inappropriate ways. We are here concerned with the 
general question of the structure of value, and so with the question of what it is for 
friendship to be valuable. Scanlon argues that to value friendship in the most 
appropriate way involves recognising the principles that contribute to the notion 
of friendship. These would include being loyal, supportive, to spend time 
maintaining the relationship and so on. To act on these principles is to value 
friendship properly according to Scanlon. This attitude to friendship is different 
from the view that a world in which there are more and better friends is better than 
a world in which there are fewer and more superficial friendships. Our actions 
towards acquiring and developing friendships are not constituted and governed by 
the value of the state of affairs in which there are more and better friends. If we 
take friendship to be of value then we certainly have good reason to promote this,
8 ibid., 86
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but this promotion will occur within the framework and ordering of our attitudes 
and actions according to which friendship is conceived of and related to. As 
Scanlon says ‘[w]e would not say that it showed how much a person valued 
friendship if he betrayed one friend in order to make several new ones, or in order 
to bring it about that other people had more friends.’9 The examination of 
friendship reveals the complexity of the structure of value, and most importantly it 
points out that values are not necessarily teleological in form. ‘What I want to 
suggest... is that the claim that friendship is valuable is best understood as the 
claim that it is properly valued, that is to say, that the reasons recognized by 
someone who values friendship are in fact good reasons.’10
Scanlon notes that some values will properly have a teleological structure, 
and the example the value of a pain free life is one. A world in which I 
experience great pain is of disvalue as a state of affairs, and I have good reasons to 
avoid such a state of affairs. Certain reasons count in favour of pursuing a life 
free from pain because the end goal of a state of affairs free from pain is 
extremely attractive. But this should not lead us to imagine that all values have 
this teleological structure necessarily. There are many values, such as friendship 
as we have just seen, and also scientific enquiry, artistic excellence, scholarship, 
and many others, where ‘...the best account of our reasons for those actions may 
not flow from the value of these results to our concern with them.’11
For Scanlon, the general notion of a value is derived from the notion of a 
reason that was set out in the earlier chapters. A value is defined in terms of there 
being reasons that count in favour it. The reasons that count in favour of
9 ibid., 89
10 ibid.,
11 ibid., 93
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something that we properly value need not be derived from states of affairs that
the value seems to express. In this sense, Scanlon hopes to resolve the dilemma
that Nagel introduced, by arguing that reasons do not derive from the goal and the
maximisation of that goal. To be valuable is for there to be reasons that count in
favour of the object of value, and these reasons take the form that we explained in
the preceding chapters, where the reasons are given in terms of the object itself,
where this may be a maximal object such as the relief of pain, or equally a
principle of strict admission or prohibition. In this sense Scanlon is a pluralist
about value, that is, he accepts that many different kinds of things can be valuable,
and they will be valued differently. Their nature will require different kinds of
reasons, some maximising, others not.
We value many different kinds of things, including at least the 
following: objects and their properties (such as beauty), persons, 
skills and talents, states of character, actions, accomplishments, 
activities and pursuits, relationships, and ideals. To value 
something is to take oneself to have reasons for holding certain 
positive attitudes toward it and for acting in certain ways in regard 
to it. Exactly what these reasons are, and what actions and 
attitudes they support, will be different in different cases. They 
generally include, as a common core, reasons for admiring the 
thing and for respecting it, although “respecting” can involve quite 
different things in different cases.12
The reasons that count in favour of the object derive from the nature of the 
object itself. In this sense, a value is a secondary property, and this notion 
constitutes the second distinctive element of Scanlon's account of value, the buck- 
passing account of value.
12 ibid., 95
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b) Teleology and the Necessary Structure o f Value
In the previous section we saw that Scanlon rejects the necessity of the 
teleological notion of value. We can, on closer analysis distinguish two features 
of this argument. Firstly, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, 
or are generally not intrinsically valuable, and secondly, that reasoning about 
value should not be restricted to the ‘maximising* mode as described by Scheffler. 
In this section, I will argue that we have good reasons to accept both these 
arguments. We will examine each in turn.
There are two well-known versions of the teleological account of value, 
both derived from G. E. Moore’s work.13 The first version states value is an 
intrinsic, abstract, non-natural property of goodness. Reasons are defined in terms 
of goodness. All rational action is defined in terms of the production of goodness. 
The best reasons are those that produce the greatest good. There is an analytic 
connection between values and reasons. This analytic connection between values 
and reasons raises significant problems. Values and reasons are not so closely 
related. When I reflect on the value of an object, for example, an event in the past, 
I may decide that this event was of great disvalue, for example, the First World 
War.14 But do I have any reasons as a result of this judgment? It seems not. This 
led to the formulation of the open question problem. When we judge that ‘x is 
good’ we can nonetheless ask ‘But do we have reason to promote xT  This 
question has an open feel, in the sense that it brings to light the uncertain 
relationship between good and reasons. In response to this open question problem,
13 The first account is found in G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, (Cambridge University Press, 1903), and the 
second in G. E. Moore, Ethics, (Cambridge University Press, 1912), see Dancy, Should We Pass the Buck, 
159, and Suikannen, Reasons and Values, 516-522 for helpful summaries.
14 This example is taken from Suikannen, Reasons and Values, who attributes it to Bertrand Russell, ‘The 
Elements in Ethics’ in Philosophical Essays, (London, Routledge, 1910[1994]), 13-59
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Moore revised his view such that good and reasons were no longer defined
analytically. Good and reasons are now understood as separate entities, but good
is the origin of reasons. The intrinsic property of good makes acts right, and
provides the necessary and sufficient condition for reasons. But as Dancy notes
‘[i]f it is an open question whether goodness is conduciveness to happiness, it is
equally an open question whether rightness is conduciveness to goodness. And if,
as Moore claimed in the first case, its being an open question shows that the
answer to it is no, the same applies in the second case.’15
The problem of the question points to Scanlon's criticism of the
teleological account of value. If torture is of disvalue, does that mean that we
have a reason to allow one act of torture in order to prevent nine others? If
friendship is of value, does this mean that we have a reason to accumulate as
many superficial friends as possible at the expense of a small number of close and
intimate friends? Scanlon's answer is no, and his explanation is that there is no
necessity to the teleological relationship between values and reasons.
In the course of making his argument against the necessary teleological
relationship between reasons and values, Scanlon argued against the maximising
mode of practical reasoning. It is clear why the teleological account prefers a
maximising view of practical reasons. *
Value is the feature of options through which we seem to decide 
which possible relevant alternatives we have reason to choose.
More precisely, the property of value is the reason we use to 
choose some option over another. In addition, the more certain
15 Dancy, Should We Pass the Buck, 159
144
state of affairs has value, the more reason we have to endeavour to 
ensure that those states of affairs come true.16
But the argument against the teleological/maximising account of reasons 
should not, at face value, be taken as an argument against consequentialism. In 
his discussion of Scanlon's argument about teleology and value, R. Jay Wallace 
says that
If we accept this teleological conception, it becomes extremely 
difficult to resist a consequentialist interpretation of the structure 
of moral reasoning in particular. Any proposal about (say) the 
value of actions will get interpreted as a claim about the kinds of 
states of affairs that are to be promoted or discouraged, and this 
provides one basis for scepticism about the very idea that there 
could be agent-centred prohibitions or requirements.17
This seems to me to be an inappropriate account of Scanlon's argument. 
Wallace claims that Scanlon rejects a teleological account of value, and that this 
amounts to an opposition to consequentialist reasoning about moral reasoning. 
But both these claims are questionable: questionable as an account of Scanlon's 
view, and questionable philosophically. As we recall from our earlier discussion, 
Scanlon accepts that the objects of value are plural and diverse, and that they will 
require different responses from us. These responses may well involve promoting 
a particular state of affairs, as Scanlon points out when he considers the case of 
the experience of pain. But other objects of value, such as friendship, or music, 
may require different modes of reasoning. Scanlon's argument is that when we 
examine different objects of value, we should conclude that value is plural in form. 
It is neither exclusively teleological nor non-teleological. This is a moderate and
16 Suikannen, Reasons and Values, 519
17 R. Jay Wallace, ‘Scanlon's Contractualism’, in Ethics, Vol. 112, No. 3, (April 2002), 446
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reasonable claim to make, it seems to me, particularly when we bear in mind that
Scanlon at this stage is only intending to provide an abstract account of value, and
not to describe the structure and substance of any values in particular. Wallace,
therefore, seems mistaken to say that Scanlon holds that value is exclusively non-
teleological in form, and the strength of Scanlon's analysis reveals that there is a
plurality of forms of value that depend on the nature of the object, as seen from
the comparison of friendship and pain. Scanlon's argument here is very
reminiscent of that made by Elizabeth Anderson in Value in Ethics and
Economics. Anderson states that
...states of affairs are generally only extrinsically valuable, 
because our intrinsic evaluative attitudes do not generally take 
them as their immediate objects. It makes sense for a person to 
value most states of affairs only because it makes sense for him to 
value people, animals, and other things.18
We should note that Anderson also casts her argument in qualified terms. 
States of affairs are generally extrinsically valuable, and not exclusively 
intrinsically valuable. Scanlon's argument, it seems to me, is of the same, 
qualified, sort.
In the course of his discussion of the role of teleology in our account of 
value, Scanlon does refer to the debate about consequentialist and deontological 
moral reasoning. However, he does not conclude that moral reasoning must be 
non-consequentialist in form. The consequentialist and maximising modes of 
reasoning are different. Consequentialism, on a basic reading, is the view that 
decisions are made dependent on the outcomes of actions, whereas maximising 
reasoning is the view that the maximal outcome is always to be preferred. To give
18 Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Economics, (London, Harvard University Press, 1993), 26
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a concrete case: someone may take the view that a marriage can only be said to be 
successful if the couple have children. On the consequentialist account, if the 
couple have a child, the marriage is deemed to be successful; on the maximising 
account the marriage is more successful the more children that are bom. We 
should take care then not to slip from a rejection of the necessity of the 
teleological/maximising view of value and reasons to a supposed rejection of 
consequentialist reasons. Scanlon does not focus his attention on the 
consequentialist interpretation of moral reasoning at this point, and it is to 
somewhat miss the target of his arguments to confuse consequentialist reasoning 
with the topic of the teleological account of value.
Scanlon's arguments against the teleological account of value focus 
attention on the open question problem. Many philosophers have found the 
teleological/maximising account of values and reasons problematic, and have 
proposed alternatives. Scanlon argues that there is an important connection 
between reasons and values, and a connection that is able to avoid the problem of 
the open question. This is Scanlon's buck-passing account of value.
2. The Buck-Passing Account of Value
As we have just seen, Scanlon suggests that there are different kinds of 
phenomena that can be of value, and that these different objects of value can be 
valued differently. Scanlon's objection to the necessity of the teleological account 
of value was based on his view that not all reasons are derived from a state of 
affairs which is worth promoting. Scanlon was here concerned to show that 
values and reasons could have a non-teleological character. The reasons that 
count in favour of something might not lead one to promote it, and they may also
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prohibit other considerations of a teleological kind that conflict with the non- 
teleological value.
In the light of his rejection of the teleological account of value, Scanlon
argues for an alternative explanation of the relationship between reasons and
values. The teleological account of value agrees with Moore’s view in taking
...goodness and value to be non-natural properties, namely the 
purely formal, higher-order properties of having some lower-order 
properties that provide reasons of the relevant kind. It differs from 
[Moore’s view] simply in holding that it is not goodness or value 
itself that provides reasons but rather other properties that do so.19
The buck-passing account of value states that the property of being ‘of 
value’ is a formal property of other properties that have reasons that count in 
favour of them. Value is not a primary quality that is the origin of our normative 
reasons. For Scanlon, value is a formal, second order quality that refers to the 
primary quality that is in itself worth valuing. To describe x  as ‘of value’ is to 
state that there are good reasons that count in favour of x: ‘.. .to call something 
valuable is to say that it has other properties that provide reasons for behaving in 
certain ways with regard to it.’20
This view rejects the notion that value, or good, is an object with its own 
intrinsic property, which would be found in certain states of affairs. Instead, we 
are presented with a picture of natural objects and their intrinsic properties. These 
may be a beach that is pleasant, or a new understanding of how cancer develops. 
These properties will have reasons that count in favour or them: the fact that the 
beach is pleasant provides a reason to visit it; the new understanding of cancer
19 ibid., 97
20 ibid., 96
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provides a reason to pursue and promulgate it. An object’s goodness consists in 
the property, and its reasons. This notion of goodness as a higher order property 
that is derived from there being reasons, is a non-natural property. To say that 
something is good, or of value, is to say that there are reasons that count in favour 
of it. The attitude of valuing is retained as a distinct mode of relating to an object. 
But the value of something does not confer reasons, but rather is derived from 
there being reasons in the first place. This characterisation is meant, at least in 
part, to avoid the problem of the identification of value and reasons that we saw in 
Moore’s account earlier. Scanlon hopes to have closed the open question. Now, 
when we ask, *x is pleasant, but is it good?’ we answer firmly, ‘yes.’ We answer 
‘yes’ because we have reasons to pursue pleasant objects, and because an object 
that has reason counting in favour of it is valuable.
The notion of a buck-passing account of value is the notion of two 
categorically distinct realms (the natural non-normative and the non-natural 
normative) that taken together constitute a valuable object. The buck is the locus 
of value, and is passed from the concept of value to the nature of the object that is 
valued. To be of value is to have a property that requires an appropriate response. 
So whilst value is described as a higher order formal property, it nonetheless 
features distinctively in our practical experience. For example, if an object is 
beautiful, we should act towards it appreciatively; if an object is awesome, we 
should respond to it respectfully. Valuing is a distinct attitude that is different 
from simply judging or acting on reasons.
In his discussion of buck-passing arguments, Jonathan Dancy notes that 
Scanlon's view is very similar to that presented by A. C. Ewing in his The
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Definition o f the Good. Ewing argued that ‘...goodness is not a distinct 
evaluative and intrinsic property in objects, one whose presence we can discern 
and to which we do or at least should respond with approval and admiration. The 
goodness of the object just is the relational fact that we should respond to it with 
approval, admiration or other pro-attitude.’21 Dancy gives a rather striking 
example of this argument when he says that the ‘.. .badness of a toothache exists 
in virtue of certain features which give us reason to act in certain ways; the 
badness of the ache adds nothing to the reasons given us by the lower-level 
features. In short, value adds no reasons to those generated by the ground of that 
value.*22
Scanlon offers two arguments in support of the buck-passing account of
value. Firstly, he suggests that normative experience confirms that it is the natural
(primary) qualities of objects that provide us with normative reasons, such as a
person being in need, or a beach being clear and hot.
These natural properties provide a complete explanation of the 
reasons we have for reacting in these ways to things that are good 
or valuable. It is not clear what further work could be done by 
special reason-providing properties of goodness and value, and 
even less clear how these properties could provide reasons.23
Secondly, Scanlon argues that as a wide variety of phenomena are of value, 
there is no readily discemable common property that unites all valuable 
phenomena. The lack of a common, shared, quality suggests that value is not a 
primary, constitutive, property. ‘There does not seem to be a single, reason-
21 Dancy, Should We Pass the Buck, 161
22 ibid., 164
23 Scanlon, What We Owe, 97
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providing property that is common to all these cases.’24 Roger Crisp describes 
these as the redundancy argument and the arguments from pluralism 
respectively.25
Scanlon takes the objection to the necessity of the teleological account of
value and the buck-passing account of value to be mutually complimentary views
about value, although they do not necessarily entail each other. The plurality of
forms of value contains the idea that the objects of value are diverse and require
different responses from the reasons that count in favour of them, some responses
will be teleological, others will not. It is a rejection of a common, single form to
value. The buck-passing view of morality rejects the view that there is a single,
common quality or property of value. Value is a higher second order property
that is grounded on primary natural qualities, and these primary qualities are
diverse in their substance and therefore in the kinds of reasons that they produce.
Understanding the value of something is not just a matter of 
knowing how valuable it is, but rather a matter of knowing how to 
value it -  knowing what kinds of actions and attitudes are called 
for. It is an advantage of the present account that it calls attention 
to this aspect of our ideas of value, one that is easily concealed by 
the assumption that the primary question about the value of 
something is how great that value is.26
3. Scanlon's Buck-Passing Account Considered
Scanlon’s abstract account of value is crucial to his understanding of what we owe 
to each other. For Scanlon, the domain of what we owe to each other, the realm 
of duties and obligations that constitute our moral relationships, is explained in
24 ibid., 98
25 Roger Crisp, ‘Value, Reasons, and the Structure of Justification: how to avoid passing the buck’ in 
Analysis, 65.1, (January, 2005), 81
26 Scanlon, What We Owe, 99
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terms of the value of right and wrong. We will discuss the substance of the value 
of right and wrong in the next chapter, but before we do this, we should pause to 
assess the abstract account of value that will structure this substantive value of 
right and wrong.
Scanlon buck-passing account of value has attracted criticisms that I will 
discuss under two headings: the wrong kind of reasons criticism; and the reasons 
and properties criticism. We will examine each in turn.
a) Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind o f Reasons
According to Scanlon's buck-passing view, being of value is a higher order quality 
derived from the reasons that attach to first order natural properties. The wrong 
kind of reasons criticism suggests that the buck-passing relationship creates 
strange paradoxes in the relationships between what we value and what reasons 
we have. Roger Crisp has given a well-known example of this argument. 
‘Imagine that an evil demon will inflict severe pain on me unless I prefer this 
saucer of mud; that makes the saucer of mud well worth preferring. But it would 
not be plausible to claim that the saucer of mud’s existence is, in itself, 
valuable.’27 The wrong kind of reasons problem may arise in either of two ways. 
The buck-passing account may provide false positives (reasons that are of no 
value), or false negatives (values that have no reasons).28 An example of a false 
positive regarding value is given in Crisp’s demon example above. In this 
instance, I have reason to prefer the saucer of mud, as I have reason to avoid pain,
27 Crisp, ‘Review of Kupperman, Value... and what follows’ in Philosophy, 75 (2000), pp. 458-92, quoted in 
Jonas Olson, ‘Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons’ The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 215, 
(April, 2004), 296, also see Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, ‘The Strike of the Demon: 
On Fitting Pro-attitudes and Value’ in Ethics, 114 (April 2004), 391-423 for a detailed exposition of this 
criticism.
28 This distinction appears in Suikannen, Reasons and Value, 531
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but the saucer of mud is not of value. An example of a false negative is when I 
see that a beautiful painting washed away in a flood that I can do nothing to 
prevent. Here, the painting is of value, but there is no reason that I have to save it, 
as I am unable to save it.
Both Olson and Suikkanen address the problem of the wrong kind of 
reasons in the buck passing account, and offer similar arguments, although 
presented differently. Olson attempts to rebuff this problem by drawing on a 
distinction made by Derek Parfit between state-given and object-given reasons, 
whereas Suikkanen points to the traditional distinction between instrumental and 
integral value.29 I believe their responses are enhanced if we combine them. Let 
us take the false positive of the value of the saucer of mud. We do no generally 
have reasons to prefer saucers of mud, and so in this case, the object of the saucer 
of mud is not of value. But the state of not being in severe pain has very clear 
reasons attached to it, and so the state of not being in severe pain provides our 
reasons. The saucer of mud is valuable instrumentally. A similar argument 
applies to the example of the painting that is of value but which I cannot save. In 
this case, the object is of value, but there is no state that I could occupy to save it. 
There is no means to save the beautiful painting that I could instrumentally 
pursue. But I do still have reason to value the painting. The distinction employed 
by Olson between the state-given and object-given reasons, combined with 
Suikkanen’s reference to the instrumental and intrinsic values seems to offer a 
reasonable response to the wrong kind of reasons objection. Whilst the buck- 
passing account may not produce the wrong kinds of reasons, there is a second
29 Derek Parfit, ‘Rationality and Reasons’, in D. Egonsson et al. (eds), Exploring Practical Philosophy: from 
Action to Values (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2001), 17-39 at 21-22, quoted in Olson, Buck-passing and the Wrong 
Kinds o f  Reasons, 297
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problem that is of much greater significance. This is the relationship between 
reasons and properties.
b) Reasons and Values, the Right and the Good
Scanlon's buck-passing account of value stated that the value of an object is
derived from the reasons that attach to an object’s primary natural properties. The
property of being ‘of value’ refers to a formal quality of having reasons that count
in favour of the object. In his discussion of Scanlon's buck-passing argument,
Jonathan Dancy points out that Scanlon may have slightly mis-described the
buck-passing view that he is trying to establish. Scanlon seems to suggest that on
the buck-passing account, when we take something to be of value, we are making
the judgment that other people also have reasons to regard this object as valuable.
But on the buck-passing view, the reasons are derived from the first-order
properties of the object, and would not be ‘reasons to value’ but would be reasons
to admire, protect, celebrate, etc. The passing of the buck means that the reasons
are derived from the properties that have reasons that count in favour of them, and
not from the property of being of value. The whole purpose of the buck-passing
account is to say that the property of being of value produces no reasons in itself.
It cannot be right to say that to take something to be valuable is to 
take it that others also have reason to value it, as you do. For in 
valuing it we do not take ourselves to have reasons to value it; at 
least, not on the buck-passing view. On that view, to value it is to 
take oneself to have reasons of certain other sorts... reasons for 
admiring, respecting, preserving and protecting; of reason to be 
guided by the goals or standards that the value involves; of reason 
for promoting; and of reasons to act in certain ways... when we
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value the object we are not taking ourselves to have reason to 
value it, exactly.30
Scanlon certainly does hold that when we judge that an object is valuable, 
we are making the judgment that others should also judge that the object is 
valuable. But as Dancy points out, this must mean that we and others should 
adopt the substantive reasons that count in favour of the object. We are 
responding to the substantive reasons that count in favour of the object; we are not 
responding to the object’s property of being of value.
In his discussion of Scanlon's buck-passing account of value, Wallace 
draws attention to a problem with the way that Scanlon has presented this 
argument. We recall that
[t]he root idea here is that goodness or value is not some 
substantive nonnatural property that itself provides us with reasons 
for action. Reasons are instead provided by the natural properties 
that make things valuable along different concrete dimensions, 
and to say that something is good is just a way of signalling that 
there are some such substantive reasons for choosing, preferring, 
recommending, or admiring it.31
This notion of a buck-passing account of value suggests that the property 
that confers reasons, and by extension value, is the natural property of an object, 
for example, its physical properties or its contribution towards a need we 
experience. On this reading, the ‘buck’ of the essence of the property of value is 
passed from the concept of value, to the natural property of the object of value. 
The formal concept of value is descriptive of a practical relationship that we have
30 Dancy, Should We Pass the Buck, 162
31 Wallace, Scanlon's Contractualism, 446
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with the object in terms of the reasons that there are that count in favour of it for 
us.
Wallace points out that on Scanlon’s account ‘...what is at issue is the 
explanatory priority of reasons vis-a-vis values, or (as we might put it) of the 
normative vis-a-vis the evaluative.*32 On the buck-passing view, the evaluative 
and the normative are distinct, but related. The reasons there are ground the 
evaluative attitudes with which we react to the object. Scanlon refers to the 
pleasantness of a beach being a reason to value it and to choose to visit there for a 
holiday. The beach’s natural qualities and the reasons that they give us to visit it 
are the locus of its normative significance for us, and the property of being of 
value is the formal quality of having these reasons, but this formal, evaluative 
quality does not contribute any reasons for action for us. The normative, the 
reasons there are, are grounded on the natural qualities of the object, and the 
evaluative is a second order description of the relationship between these 
grounds/qualities and the reasons they produce for us. But Wallace fears that this 
falls foul of Scanlon's account of normative reasons, and is therefore inconsistent 
within his theory. He also argues that this notion of the normative as distinct from 
and prior to the evaluative is philosophically questionable.
Wallace argues that Scanlon's account of normative reasons includes an
evaluative element.
...Scanlon represents... judgments about reasons as involving 
what he himself calls a distinctively “evaluative element” (p.38), 
or an appeal to some “evaluative category” (p. 65), and he 
suggests that the task of practical reflection about our reasons is to 
“characterize” precisely the concrete ways in which particular
32 ibid., 447
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actions would be good or desirable (pp. 65-69)... This important 
strand in Scanlon's discussion strongly suggests that the task of 
understanding reasons for action goes hand in hand with the task 
of clarifying the concrete forms of value that can be achieved or 
realized in action. At least as far as the epistemology of reasons 
and values is concerned, in other words, neither domain can claim 
priority vis-a-vis the other.33
Wallace’s criticism is therefore that Scanlon has contradicted his own 
account of practical deliberation in his formulation of the buck-passing account of 
value, and in so doing made questionable his abstract account of value. This 
criticism is echoed by Roger Crisp. Pursuing Scanlon's example of the pleasant 
beach, where Scanlon holds that the beach being good provides no reason, rather 
its being pleasant provides a reason which we then recognise as valuable. But 
Crisp argues that this is a paradoxical explanation. He imagines a case of two 
people, one who knows the evaluative concept of good, and the other who doesn’t. 
When asked why they visited the beach, the first may say because it is good, and 
the second would say because it is pleasant. On the buck-passing view, we should 
deny the first person’s explanation, and accept the second. But Crisp and Wallace 
argue that these explanations are not incompatible. Rather than distinguish 
between normative and evaluative properties, and locating the buck of origin in 
normative properties, Crisp and Wallace argue that we should distinguish between 
general and specific properties. Returning to the beach example, the general 
property is that the beach is good, whilst the specific property is that it is pleasant. 
It is not the case, according to Crisp and Wallace, that the normative and the 
evaluative are entirely distinct and the normative prior to the evaluative. The
33 ibid.
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normative and the evaluative express different modes of explanation regarding the
evaluative properties there are and the reasons that attach to them. Berys Gaut
echoes this argument:
... it is not true that one can always cite a natural (in the sense of 
non-evaluative) property as a complete explanation of the ground 
of one’s choices. Even his own example of choosing a resort 
because it is pleasant doesn’t cite a natural property. The pleasing 
resort isn’t what causes pleasure, since one may take pleasure in 
what isn’t pleasant and not take pleasure in what is pleasant. The 
pleasant is a species of the good... So in such cases there must be 
an ineliminable reference to what is valuable in explaining one’s 
reasons for choice, and then one can give a partial specification of 
the grounds for one’s judgments of why something is valuable by 
citing some of the natural properties of the object. It turns out on 
closer inspection that one cannot eliminate reference to value in 
giving a full explanation of one’s reasons for choosing.34
In making this criticism of Scanlon, Wallace proposes a revised buck- 
passing account that he argues avoids this problem. He argues that the notion of a 
reason and the notion of value (the good) are both general notions, and both are 
related to more specific concrete normative, evaluative, or natural properties. On 
this view, practical deliberation concerns the relationship between general and 
particular qualities. The particular qualities are the locus of value and ground the 
substantive reasons and evaluations that together constitute our intentional actions. 
The general qualities are descriptive of these qualities in terms of rightness and 
goodness, and capture the specifically practical dimension of our relationship with 
the first order, natural properties of the objects. Wallace therefore seems to accept 
that the buck is passed from the concept of the good and the right, to the
34 Berys Gaut, ‘Justifying Moral Pluralism,’ in Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations, ed. P. Stratton-Lake,
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2002), 151
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substantive primary qualities of the object. The formal second order qualities do 
not add anything evaluative or normative to the reasons that there are. The natural 
qualities of the beach give us reasons because of their particular properties, and 
because these properties are valued by us. These particular, concrete qualities are 
the locus of our reasons; they are natural qualities that generate specific reasons 
that are adopted in part because of their value to us. For Wallace, the general 
concept of value and goodness is formal and abstract, just as Scanlon argues in the 
buck-passing account, but so is rightness and normativity. The buck is not passed 
from the evaluative notion of value and goodness to the normative notion of 
rightness or wrongness. In this way, Wallace hopes to retain the buck-passing 
move of rejecting value as a source of reasons, but avoiding the idea that 
normative reasons are first-order properties. In response, Scanlon says that he 
finds this reformulation convincing.35
It seems to me that Wallace is correct to suggest that Scanlon's portrayal of 
the buck-passing account is unsatisfactory. The distinction between the 
evaluative and normative cannot match the distinction between first and second 
order qualities, because Wallace has shown, with textual support from Scanlon 
himself, that the evaluative and the normative are both included in the notion of a 
practical reason. Wallace’s analysis suggests that the buck-passing account of 
value is not implausible. But Wallace merely points out that Scanlon’s notion of 
normative reasons includes an evaluative element. He characterises the revised 
buck-passing argument as concerned with the relationship between general and 
particular reasons. This seems to me to be not quite enough. I suggest that we
35 see Scanlon, ‘Replies’ in Ethics, Vol. 114, No. 3 (April, 2002), 513
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should characterise this revised buck-passing argument in terms of the unified 
ground of reasons and values in the first order particular properties of objects, and 
the shared status of reasons and values as formal second order qualities that 
express the practical relationship we have with these first order qualities. In other 
words we should not, as Scanlon does, describe this as a buck-passing argument 
about the good, we should instead re-describe the buck-passing view as concerned 
with formal properties of good and reason, and substantive first order qualities. 
The substantive first order qualities ground the second order formal qualities of 
reasons and value together. This view does not assert that reasons and values are 
the same of course; we can still retain the distinction between the evaluative and 
the normative, whilst maintaining that they share the same status as formal second 
order qualities, grounded on a shared primary quality. This seems to me a more 
plausible account of the main point of Scanlon's buck-passing account of value.
This view moves away from Scanlon's argument in a significant way. The 
buck is no longer passed from the good to reasons, but from the good and the right 
as higher order formal properties, to lower order, particular properties, that could 
be singularly or a combination of normative, evaluative, or natural properties. 
Whilst inspired by Wallace’s suggestion of a revision of Scanlon's argument, this 
view comes close to what Suikkanen calls the Dancyan account.36 The Dancyan 
account suggests a revised picture of lower order properties as the ground of both 
higher order property of right and good (reason and value). This retains a 
similarity to the buck-passing view because it agrees that the good is not the 
origin of reasons. It also agrees with my development of Wallace’s revised buck-
36 see Dancy, Should we Pass the Buck, 172-173, whilst Dancy thinks there are attractions to the view I am 
about to spell out, he does not wholeheartedly affirm it, but he prefers it to Scanlon's buck-passing view. For 
this reason, I retain Suikkanen’s locution of the Dancyan account, as it may not be precisely Dancy's view.
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passing argument in that it also denies that right (or being a reason) is the origin of 
reasons. However, the Dancyan account does not include the difference between 
the specific and the general properties of reasons and values that is derived from 
Wallace’s view. This, it seems to me, is a significant difference between the view 
I am offering and the Dancyan account, as Dancy seems to argue that natural 
properties themselves are particular reasons and values.37 This seems an 
unnecessarily strong and controversial naturalism about value. The view I am 
suggesting allows that natural properties are the ground of other specific 
evaluative or normative properties, but suggests that this relationship is one of 
supervenience rather than constitutive identity. But I am sympathetic to the 
Dancyan account’s claim that lower order properties are the origin of both being 
good, and having a reason.
We may explicate my version of this argument with the example of a piece 
of music. A piece of music has certain properties related to, inter alia, form, 
expression, harmony, melody, and rhythm. These properties at once provide 
specific reasons, and require appropriate evaluative responses. We have reason to 
listen to the music carefully, to listen often, to study it and learn about it, to 
promote its qualities to others, and to listen to it instead of inferior pieces of music. 
These are the specific first order reasons, attached to its empirical properties. The 
music will also require certain evaluative responses from us. We will admire it, 
respect it, find it beautiful, and treasure it. These are the specific first order 
evaluations that are attached to its empirical properties. On my revised account, 
the higher order properties of right and good are related coextensively, and the
37 See Dancy, Should We Pass The Buck, 164
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buck is passed from both onto the lower order properties of the object, which are 
specific reasons and evaluations, supervening on natural properties.
It seems to me that further support for this re-characterisation of the buck- 
passing argument follows from consideration of Moore’s open question argument. 
We recall that Scanlon defended his buck-passing account of value primarily in 
terms of the promising response it seemed to offer to G. E. Moore’s open question 
argument. The buck-passing view attempted to avoid the mistake of claiming that 
the good provided a reason. On Scanlon's original formulation, and on our 
revised formulation, this problem is avoided, because we do not claim that the 
quality of good provides any (further) quality that counts in favour of the object 
under consideration. However, on our re-characterisation of the buck-passing 
argument, we have now introduced an extra step by claiming that the normative 
status of being ‘a reason’ is as formal and second order as the evaluative status of 
being ‘of value.* It seems to me equally circular to claim that the fact that there is 
a reason to <p provides a (further) reason to </>. The buck-passing strategy does 
seem to offer a potentially satisfactory response to the problem of the open 
question. But the buck should be passed from the formal to the substantive, and 
not from the evaluative to the normative.
But Crisp argues that ‘...even [the revised buck-passing argument] fails, 
since the very notion of the buck-passing is inappropriate to characterize the 
relation between goodness and reasons. *38
It seems to me that the criticisms made by Crisp and Gaut carry significant 
weight. On Crisp’s view, there is no buck-passing move, as the distinction is not
38 Crisp, Values, Reasons, and the Structure o f Justification, 84
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between reasons and the good, but between more specific and more general 
properties. If we are asked why we did something we could answer in more 
specific or more general terms: we could answer by saying that we ^-ed because 
the beach was pleasant, or because it was good. Both are valid and adequate 
answers, but differ in the level of generality offered. But I believe my revision of 
Scanlon's buck-passing argument is able to respond adequately, on three grounds.
Firstly, we need to introduce another distinction in order to point up a 
problem with Crisp’s characterisation. This distinction is between reasons as 
intentional action related, and values as fitting-attitudes related.39 With the help of 
this distinction, we can see that there is a much more significant difference 
between evaluative and normative properties than simply degrees of generality as 
suggested by Crisp. If I encounter a pleasant beach, I have reason to visit it.40 My 
reasons are based on the properties that make it pleasant, such as being hot, clean, 
and sunny. These reasons require certain actions and intentions from me, such as 
lying on it, and keeping it clean. I may also judge that the pleasant beach is 
beautiful, and admirable. The lower order evaluative properties do not provide 
me with a reason to do anything, but they do require me to have an appropriate 
attitude towards the beach. The evaluative attitudes and the reasons there are, are 
categorially distinct, and not merely different in degree of generality. This 
difference is seen also in the case of promising. Making a promise gives a person 
reasons to keep it, and it may be an act that has a specific evaluative quality, such 
as being worthy of respect. In other words, promise making gives certain reasons
39 see Rabinowicz and Ronnow-Rasmussen, The Strike o f the Demon, for a detailed discussion of the nature 
of fitting-attitudes and value
40 This leaves aside the motivational question of whether I will choose to visit the beach, our discussion is 
limited to the normative question of whether there are reasons and values.
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to promise makers and promisees, and may also be appropriate for specific 
evaluative responses from promise makers and promisees, such as respect for the 
commitments created by promising and admiration for promise keepers. As we 
can see from both these examples, the difference between reasons and values is 
not one of degrees of generality, but one of kind: between intentional action 
oriented reasons and fitting-attitudes related evaluations. Scanlon does not 
endorse the fitting-attitudes view of value explicitly, and Suikkanen suggests that 
Scanlon's view is not a fitting-attitude account.41 But it seems as if Scanlon is 
sympathetic to this view when he says ‘[t]o value something is to take oneself to 
have reasons for holding certain positive attitudes toward it and for acting in 
certain ways in regard to it.’42 This categorial distinction between reasons and 
evaluations maps onto the buck-passing account very easily. It is not the property 
of being good, or having a reason that creates the particular reasons and 
evaluations. It is rather the first order properties of the object that provide the 
grounds for the particular reasons and evaluations, in buck-passing form. The 
buck is still passed from the notion of the good (and the notion of a reason) to 
specific first order properties.
Crisp’s criticism is based on a mistaken conflation of two distinctions. On 
the one hand there is the distinction between higher and lower properties, and on 
the other, there is the categorial distinction, just introduced, between reasons and 
evaluations. It is crucial that we maintain this distinction and apply it 
appropriately in order to avoid the open question problem. The open question 
problem arises in Crisp’s account because on his view, the higher order property
41 See Suikkanen, Reasons and Value, it is suggested that Scanlon's theory is a FA-theory [fitting- 
attitudes theory]. I am sceptical that it is.’, 515n6
42 Scanlon, What We Owe, 95
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of being of value provides in itself a reason to <j>. The buck-passing strategy, 
particularly as augmented in the direction I am suggesting, recognises that there is 
a difference in generality in the answers that we can give to the question of why 
we ^-ed. But general answers cannot contain reason giving properties, otherwise 
they will be susceptible to the open question problem. Also, reasons and 
evaluative attitudes are categorially different, as just described. The relationship 
between goodness and reasons is not one of generality but one of kind. Crisp’s 
suggestion seems to reintroduce the open question problem and confuse the 
difference between reasons and evaluations.
The second and third responses to the criticism of Gaut and Crisp return to 
Scanlon’s two main arguments in favour of the buck-passing account. We recall 
that Scanlon argued from a redundancy argument and a plurality argument in 
favour of the buck-passing view. Crisp argues that the answers ‘that it was 
pleasant* and ‘that it was good’ are equally valid answers to the question, ‘why 
did you </>V But as Scanlon notes, the pleasantness of the hot, clean, sunny beach 
is sufficient to explain what gives a reason to act. There is no need for a further 
property of being good, or with my amendment, or having a reason, in order for us 
to have a particular reason or evaluative attitude. Crisp also owes us an 
explanation of the content and nature of the general property of goodness (and on 
my revised view, rightness), and how it relates to every single instance of a good 
thing (and a reason). Given the plurality of valuable beaches, paintings, 
symphonies, people, pasta, parents, and civilizations, it is reasonable to suppose 
that there is not one single general property of goodness that is common to all,
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other than the higher order, formal property of having first-order particular 
normative, natural, and evaluative properties.
c) The Augmented Buck-Passing Account
In the light of the responses to the various criticisms made of Scanlon's buck- 
passing account, I have drawn on Wallace’s original revision and developed it 
further. I will conclude this section by setting out this augmented account, and 
show that it is compatible with Scanlon's original version.
We recall that the buck-passing account stated that the property of being 
good does not provide reasons. Instead, reasons are provided by lower order 
properties of objects, and the property of goodness is a formal, higher order 
property that is coextensive with having reasons counting in favour of something. 
Wallace pointed out the reasons and evaluations are intimately connected in 
Scanlon's account, and suggested a revision. On this revision, both the property of 
being good, or of value, and of having a reason, or being right, are higher order 
formal properties. The buck is passed from them onto lower order evaluative and 
normative properties. We have now introduced a dual buck-passing account, 
where being right (having reasons) and being good (being of value) are not the 
origin of reasons and values. The origin of reasons and values are the lower order 
specific reasons and values attached to objects. I argued that this view moves 
close to a Dancyan account, where single properties ground reasons and value, 
and reasons and value are related coextensively. Thus Wallace’s dual buck- 
passing account is augmented with the Dancyan view that values and reasons are 
co-extensively related. But I argued against the suggestion in the Dancyan 
account that natural properties are particular reasons and particular values.
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Instead, I argued that lower order evaluative and normative properties supervene 
on natural properties. This view is not included in either Wallace or Scanlon's 
account, but seems to address the problem of the relationship between lower order 
evaluative and normative properties and natural properties. In response to Crisp’s 
criticism, I argued that this augmented buck-passing account requires the addition 
of the categorial distinction between reasons as intentional action related, and 
values as fitting-attitude related. This distinction shows that values and reasons 
are related co-extensively whilst being categorially distinct, and allows us to 
retain the buck-passing move in opposition to Crisp’s suggestion that the 
difference between reasons and values is one of degree of generality. Let’s return 
to our piece of music. The piece of music has certain empirical properties 
including form, harmony, and expression. Certain first order normative reasons 
and evaluations supervene on these properties. These normative reasons and 
evaluations are categorially distinct. I have reasons for action derived from the 
piece of music, such as to listen to it carefully, and it also requires particular 
evaluative attitudes derived from the piece of music, such as admiration. These 
evaluations and reasons are related coextensively, and are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for us having reasons and evaluations. The properties of 
rightness (having reasons) and being good (having value) are higher order formal 
properties that stand in a buck-passing relationship to these lower order 
evaluations and reasons. At the centre of this argument stands the buck-passing 
relationship (which is absent from the Dancyan account), and as such, this is 
harmonious with Scanlon's view. It is also derived from the initial revision 
offered by Wallace, which Scanlon replied that he accepted. But it introduces the
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Dancyan notion of the coextensive relationship between reasons and values, along 
with a supervenience argument for the relationship between natural properties and 
reasons and values, and combines them with the categorical distinction between 
reasons and evaluations. This argument is Scanlonian in style, but augmented to 
meet the challenges put to his original formulation.
4. Conclusion
Scanlon's abstract account of value consists in two parts: an objection to an 
exclusively teleological account of value; and a buck-passing account of the good. 
Both these components are important elements of Scanlon's contractualism, as 
they contribute to an account of the value of right and wrong. We have seen that 
there are good reasons to adopt both these aspects of an account of value, but that 
the buck-passing account needs important revision and augmentation. I have 
presented this augmented view in a manner which it seems should be acceptable 
to Scanlon, given his endorsement of the original step derived from Wallace’s 
argument. This augmentation is important in order to make Scanlon's account of 
value more successful, but as we will see in the next chapter, it is even more 
important in order to defend Scanlon's notion of right and wrong against charges 
of redundancy and circularity. The augmented buck-passing account is a view 
about value and the good, and about right and wrong. The augmented buck- 
passing argument is, I hope to show, central to a constructivist reading of Scanlon. 
The buck-passing account seeks to avoid the notion of independent reason giving 
properties of right and wrong, good and value. It seems to me that it is because 
there are no independently given properties of right and good that we need to seek
168
an alternative constructivist approach to the constitution and determination of 
right, and what we owe to each other.
We have seen that the augmented buck-passing argument is based on the 
view that the substantive first order properties provide reasons which in a higher 
order sense are right or good. We now need to seek Scanlon’s account of these 
properties, and how these constitute the reasons of the morality of right and wrong. 
The augmented buck-passing account is an important part of establishing the 
structure of practical and moral reasons; its importance in our discussion lies, in 
part, in the way it explains how normative reasons could be objective: if the 
original properties are necessary and universal, and if the reasons that relate to 
these properties in a buck-passing fashion are universally ascribable and a priori, 
we will have an account of the objectivity of moral reasons. We must now ask 
how Scanlon provides for the objectivity of normative reasons against wronging 
within the structure of an augmented buck-passing account of the structure of 
right and good. We will now look in more detail at Scanlon's contractualist 
account of the right and wrong of what we owe to each other.
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Chapter Five
THE NORMATIVITY OF CONTRACTUALISM
Introduction
We arrive at Scanlon's view of what we owe to each other. In this chapter we will 
examine Scanlon's arguments for the nature and normativity of right and wrong. I 
will support Scanlon’s arguments for the nature of right and wrong, and criticise 
his account of the normativity of right and wrong.
I will defend Scanlon’s account of what we owe to each other from the 
criticisms of circularity and redundancy. However, whilst I seek to defend 
Scanlon’s understanding of the nature of right and wrong, I believe that this 
defence must employ the augmented buck-passing argument I developed in the 
previous chapter. I will point out that the well-known Euthyphro and redundancy 
criticisms respond to an ambiguity in Scanlon’s argument. Scanlon’s account of 
the nature of wrong is open to a realist or a constructivist interpretation. I will 
argue that the constructivist reading is the most promising. The constructivist 
reading however must be set out in terms of the augmented buck-passing 
argument in order to successfully refute the critics.
Following from my defence of Scanlon’s account of the nature of right and 
wrong, I will explain my criticism of the normativity of contractualism. We will 
see that Scanlon intends to present a view of right and wrong that is able to 
account for the importance and priority of moral reasons in our lives. I will argue 
that Scanlon’s arguments do not provide a satisfactory argument for the
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normativity of right and wrong. The normativity of contractualism is, therefore, 
problematic. I will identify two aspects of the normative problem of 
contractualism. Firstly, I will argue that Scanlon is unable to account for the 
necessary priority of what we owe to each other; and secondly, I will argue that 
Scanlon does not establish the universal and necessary ascription of normative 
reasons. These problems are familiar from our discussion in chapter one. I argue 
that the normative problem of contractualism is derived from a heteronomous 
commitment to live in unity with others on the basis of justification in terms of 
practical personhood. I will argue that the importance and priority of right and 
wrong are both vulnerable to scepticism. I will argue that in order to refute these 
sceptics we need to show that the properties of practical personhood are a priori, 
necessary, and universally ascribable. The argument for the a priori, necessary, 
and universally ascribable properties of practical personhood are not to found 
within contractualism, but may be found in transcendental arguments that seek to 
refute scepticism of the objective properties of personhood. And so in the next 
chapter we turn to a transcendental argument for practical personhood in order to 
ground the normativity of contractualist right and wrong.
1. Contractualism, Wrong, and Reasonable Rejection
Scanlon's concern with morality is limited to the relationships we have with other 
persons. He accepts that there is a much broader sense of morality, which may 
include our relationship with such things as the environment, animals, or the past. 
Scanlon argues that contractualism explains the moral domain of what we owe to 
each other, as practical, reason-guided persons. Scanlon's contractualism offers a 
distinctive account of both the content of what we owe to each other, and the
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normative significance of these obligations. In this section, I will set out the 
overall structure of Scanlon's argument regarding right and wrong. I will then 
look more closely at the notion of reasonable rejection, and its relationship with 
the notion of wrongness.
a) The Contractualist Formula
Contractualism is the view that ‘...an act is wrong if its performance under the
circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general
regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for
informed, unforced general agreement.’1
Scanlon's formula is stated in terms of wrongness, and reasonable rejection.
There is ongoing discussion about whether this negative formulation is adequate.2
Whilst this question is important for the statement of the contractualist formula, it
seems to me that very little of substance hangs on the terminology. Reasonable
rejection and justification are closely related in Scanlon's contractualism.
The flip side of the idea of reasonable rejection in Scanlon's 
system is justification to others. If we do an act that is permitted 
only by a principle that people could reasonably reject, we will not 
be able to justify our act to others on grounds that they could not 
reasonably reject. In Scanlon's system, being able to justify to 
others is just as important as avoiding the reasonable rejection of 
others.3
Indeed, Scanlon characterises the domain of what we owe to each other as 
the domain of the morality of right and wrong. Therefore, it seems that we should
1 Scanlon, What We Owe, 153
2 see for example David McNaughton and Piers Rawling, ‘Can Scanlon Avoid Redundancy by Passing the 
Buck?’ in Analysis, Vol. 63, No. 4, (October 2003), 328-329; Philip Stratton-Lake, ‘Scanlon's Contractualism 
and the Redundancy Objection’ in Analysis, Vol. 63, No. 1, (January 2003) 70-72; Thomas Pogge, ‘What We 
Can Reasonably Reject’ in Philosophical Issues, Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy, Vol. 11 (2001), 
118-120
3 F. M. Kamm, ‘Owing, Justifying, and Rejecting,’ in Mind, Vol. 111, (April 2002), 325
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not let the particular wording of the contractualist formula distract us from 
Scanlon's intention to discuss the role and nature of justification and reasonable 
rejection in the morality of right and wrong.
Scanlon notes that many various moral theories could accept the
contractualist formula when stated so sparely. But for Scanlon, contractualism is
distinguished by its taking justification as the normative basis of contractualism,
and a general description of the content of what we owe to each other.
What is distinctive about my version of contractualism is that it 
takes the idea of justifiability to be basic in two ways: this idea 
provides both the normative basis of the morality of right and 
wrong and the most general characterization of its content.
According to contractualism, when we address our minds to a 
question of right and wrong, what we are trying to decide is, first 
and foremost, whether certain principles are ones that no one, if 
suitably motivated, could reasonably reject.4
Scanlon argues that the notion of justification is central to the authority of 
the morality of right and wrong. The judgment that an act, or principle allowing it, 
is unjustifiable, provides the very sanction and obligatory force that gives our 
duties towards each other their special authority. On this view, to say that a
principle is unjustifiable is to say that it is wrong, which is to say that it is
prohibited. A contractualist does not need to point to another notion, such as self- 
interest, in order to establish the normative demands of a principle. But the notion 
of justification also informs the content of the principles that constitute the 
morality of right and wrong. When we make a moral judgment, we are guided in 
our reasoning by the notion of justification to others who are similarly motivated.
4 Scanlon, What We Owe, 189
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The content of our duties to each other is informed by consideration of the kinds
of reasons that individuals could give in approval or rejection of a given principle.
This conception of the role of justification would rule out utilitarianism, for
example. Utilitarianism, as commonly understood, takes the notion of maximum
utility as the normative basis of right and wrong, and the content of a utilitarian
morality is characterised by views of how maximum utility is to be defined and
pursued. For contractualism, on the other hand, the nature, content, and status of
right and wrong are defined in terms of justification: ‘...there is on this view a
strong continuity between the reasons that lead us to act in the way that the
conclusions of moral thought require and the reasons that shape the process
through which we arrive at these conclusions.’5
One reason why the project has fascinated philosophers is that it 
takes the contractualist way of thinking about moral issues to a 
new level. Scanlon uses the contractualist stance to generate not 
just a distinctive method of moral thinking -  this is how 
contractualism often appears, rightly or wrongly in the work of 
writers like Harsanyi or Gauthier and Rawls -  but an account of 
the very subject matter of morality itself.6
The normative significance and substantive content of our justification to 
others features prominently in many moral theories, including Rawls’s. It is 
instructive to consider the different ways in which Rawls and Scanlon's theories 
take others into consideration. For Rawls, we are concerned with justification to 
others because we might actually be them in some possible world when the veil of 
ignorance is lifted. But for Scanlon, our concern for others is based on the value 
of human rational life. The importance of the standing of individuals is derived
5 ibid., 191
6 Philip Pettit, ‘Doing Unto Others’ in The Times Literary Supplement, June 25 (1999), 7
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from Scanlon's view that our practical capacities and faculties constitute our 
practical individuality. The normative status and substantive content of moral 
reasons are grounded on the appropriate responses to the practical individuality of 
persons.
It is important to see that Scanlon's theory is quite radical in the 
sense that it restructures our view of the subject matter of ethics.
On this view, ethics is not (directly) about familiar subjects such 
as advantage, or rights, or fair distributions. As opposed to 
consequentialist views, the subject matter of morality is not about 
what states of affairs we should promote... It is about an ideal of 
human relations. It is about, in Korsgaardian language, the 
reasons we can share. And it is about these reasons in a 
nonderivative manner. What we can agree about is not a way of 
finding out what is right. It is constitutive of what is right.7
The formula of contractualism is no more than shorthand for the fuller 
moral theory. In itself it says very little because we need to understand the 
grounds of reasonable rejection and justification. The grounds of reasonable 
rejection are the properties that make acts unjustifiable. The properties that make 
acts wrong are the properties that ground the value of human rational life.
b) Practical Personhood and the Value o f Human Rational Life 
Scanlon argues that the fundamental property that provides the terms of 
justification is the nature of human rational life. The property that is of 
importance for what we owe to each other is not solely the existence of human life. 
The property of existence is not the proper object of value and reasons for Scanlon. 
It is not better that there are more people in the world
7 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Contractualism and the Normativity of Principles’ in Ethics, Vol. 112 (April 2002), 473
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Appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of 
seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this 
involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect 
them, and reasons to want them to go well. Many of the most 
powerful of these reasons, however, are matters of respect and 
concern for the person whose life it is rather than of respect for 
human life, or for this instance of human life, in a more abstract 
sense.’8
In previous chapters we have examined Scanlon's view of practical 
reasoning. Our discussion remained at the level of intentional action in general. 
But we can now see that Scanlon regards the capacities of practical reasoning as 
the fundamental properties that provide the terms of justification of principles of 
what we owe to each other. Existence is of course a basic pre-condition for the 
capacities of human rational life. But the capacities of practical reasoning are 
taken as the centrally important features of human life from a contractualist point 
of view. Human rational life is taken to consist in the capacity persons have for 
rational deliberation and decision on the reasons that they act on, combined with 
the pursuit of a meaningful life for themselves. These capacities are the properties 
against which all justification of right and wrong takes place. ‘[W]e are creatures 
who have the capacity to assess reasons and justification... [and] we have the 
capacity to select among the various ways there is reason to want a life to go, and 
therefore to govern and live that life in an active sense.’9 For the purposes of our 
discussion, I will describe these capacities of practical reasoning, the properties of 
human rational life, as practical personhood. Practical personhood is to be reason 
assessing, and self-governing individuals.
8 ibid., 104
9 ibid., 105
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In Scanlon's formulation of the contractualist notion of justification, the
properties of practical personhood are the locus of moral significance. Practical
personhood is the foundation of the substantive reasons and values that comprise
the moral content of contractualism. Scanlon does not, it seems to me, at this
stage of his argument, provide a very clear explanation of the relationship
between the substantive reasons and evaluative attitudes, and the properties of
practical personhood. His argument seems to consist in the claim that the
properties of practical personhood are those that are most important to our identity
as persons, and are the most important properties from the point of view of what
we owe to each other. It is unclear whether Scanlon believes that the properties of
practical personhood are of moral significance because they are central to our
identity as persons. At this stage, I wish only to point to this ambiguity whilst
presenting Scanlon's argument. For the moment, it is clear that Scanlon takes the
properties of practical personhood to be the grounds of the substantive reasons
and values that provide the terms of justification and reasonable rejection.
Contractualism... then, is a characterization of reasoning 
concerning moral principles which set out what persons may 
legitimately expect, and demand, of one another, concerning 
conduct and consideration, as a matter of basic mutual respect for 
one another’s value as rational self-governors.10
In order to explain how the properties of practical personhood provide 
reasons and values beyond the property of existence of human life, Scanlon takes 
the two emotive and controversial examples of euthanasia and suicide. An 
individual in constant and worsening pain who wishes to cease treatment or life
10 Rahul Kumar, ‘Reasonable Reasons in Contractualist Moral Argument’ in Ethics, Vol. 114, (October 
2003), 10
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support may not be failing to respect the value of human life. Contrariwise, 
people who see no purpose in life and are mired in cynicism and turn to suicide 
are failing to respect the reasons to continue their life. These cases are difficult 
and delicate, but Scanlon refers to them to make the point that ‘...while 
appreciating the value of human life involves seeing that there are strong reasons 
for protecting life and not for destroying it, these reasons are restricted by the 
qualification “as long as the person whose life it is has reason to go on living or 
wants to live.”’11 Scanlon is emphasising that the value of right and wrong is, in 
the first instance, based on the particular properties of a critical, reflective, active 
human life, or ‘...our distinctive capacities as reason-assessing, self-governing 
creatures.’ 12 It is always wrong to accept principles that do not respect this 
practical individuality, but it is not always wrong to allow principles that may 
bring someone’s existence to an end on reasonable grounds, or to reject principles 
that allow people to end their own existence on unreasonable grounds. Francis 
Kamm makes a helpful distinction to clarify this notion. Scanlon is concerned 
with the value of practical individuality to a person’s own life, as we just saw in 
the examples of euthanasia and suicide. But he is also concerned with the value 
of a person, as such. The notion of reasonableness includes both these 
perspectives on the value of human life. We can speak of the value of our own 
life to us, and the burdens and obligations that relate to this value. But our 
reasoning about right and wrong, our reasoning about the justifiability of 
principles, is grounded on, informed by, and guided with, the notion of the value 
of practical personhood as such.
11 Scanlon, What We Owe, 104
12 ibid., 106
178
When he discusses respecting the value of human life... he offers 
two interpretations of it. The first concerns the value of life to the 
person who lives it, and this amounts to the reasons it gives him 
for going on living... The second interpretation of how to value 
human life... is in my view, what is crucial as a foundation to his 
moral theory. It is not concerned with the value of life to the 
person but rather with the value of a person (understood as a 
rational being). According to Scanlon (pp. 105-6), appreciating 
the value of the person must involve recognizing and respecting 
her capacities to assess and act on reasons. Now comes the crucial 
point: the way to value the rational and self-governing capacity in 
a person is to treat him in accord with principles that he would not 
[reasonably reject], and this is to treat him according to principles 
of right and wrong according to Scanlon's account of wrongness...
So Scanlon hopes to connect a theory of value and how to value 
with a theory of right and wrong.13
And so the notion of reasonable rejection is brought into sharp focus. The 
notion of reasonableness is central to Scanlon's account of practical reasoning. 
We saw in earlier chapters how this notion was used to characterise the 
constrained nature of practical reasoning, where information and understanding is 
necessarily limited. Scanlon distinguished this general, practical sense of 
reasonableness with rationality. He argued that someone could be unreasonable 
whilst being perfectly rational, as being rational was a very formal condition of 
reasoning. When we examine the more specific practical question of what we 
owe to each other, this general distinction between reasonableness and rationality 
remains. But it is now augmented. When we consider a moral question, that is, a 
question that concerns a principle to govern interaction between agents, someone 
might behave rationally, but unreasonably. In this instance, the charge of
13 Kamm, Owing, Justifying, and Rejecting, 327
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unreasonableness is levelled against a particular kind of reason that they have not
paid attention to. These reasons concern the basic aim of finding principles that
someone could not reject as the basis for agreement from the moral point of view.
We could understand someone reasoning rationally and strategically when they
save all the money that they have earned and give none to help their penniless
neighbour. There is nothing irrational about keeping your own resources for your
own use. But someone who refuses to give a small amount of money to their
impoverished neighbour, an amount of money which would be of little loss to
them but great help to the neighbour, can be accused of being unreasonable. We
could likewise reasonably reject the principle that guides this mean neighbour’s
actions. The grounds of reasonableness include the substantive moral notion of
respect, based on the value of practical individuality. The charge of
unreasonableness is the charge that considerations that bear on the respect
practical persons are owed have been omitted or diminished. Consequently, when
we are considering questions of what we owe to each other, the notion of
reasonableness not only has epistemological qualities, but moral qualities too.
It is not a judgment about what would be most likely to advance 
their interests or to produce agreement in their actual 
circumstances or in any more idealized situation, but rather a 
judgment about the suitability of certain principles to serve as the 
basis of mutual recognition and accommodation. If my analysis is 
correct then the idea of what would be reasonable in this [moral] 
sense is one that underlies and guides our ordinary thinking about 
right and wrong. It is thus an idea with moral content.14
Respect for the practical individuality of persons involves considering the 
burdens that principles impose. The notion of reasonableness in contractualism is
14 Scanlon, What We Owe, 194
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sensitive to the matter of the burdens that are produced if a principle is allowed. It 
is entirely appropriate that individuals consider the effect that allowing a principle 
would have on the conduct of their life. Scanlon describes these as the legitimate 
objections to permission. But whilst these burdens are to be included in our 
deliberation, we must also be aware of the burdens produced by prohibiting a 
principle, or the objects to prohibition. But burdens are not the only consideration 
to be taken into account in our practical deliberation. We recall Scanlon's 
objection to the weighing, pro tanto, model of practical reasoning. Practical 
reasoning includes judging which considerations are to be included and which are 
to be excluded from our deliberations. There is no master value, or unifying 
metric, against which we weigh competing claims and burdens. Moral 
deliberation on contractualist grounds is not restricted to the effect of principles 
on those whom the principle directly affects. Practical reasoning about right and 
wrong should be guided by a concern for the subjects of principles, but also with 
the more general community of those who may not be directly affected, but who 
may have a reasonable rejection.
The clauses of a particular principle may only concern very few people. 
For example, a ban on religious association may only affect a minority of people 
in certain communities. Those individuals affected will have very good grounds 
on which to raise objections, as they bear the direct weight of the effects of the 
principle. But others in the secular majority can contribute to the examination of 
the reasonableness of the principle. Such a ban will have an effect on many future 
decisions and practices that practical individuals might choose to be involved with, 
and so there is a very good reason to include the reasonable objections of those
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not immediately and directly affected, but whose range of practical choices are
potentially affected significantly. If religious belief is practiced respectfully, it is
unreasonable to disallow this practice. The prevention of the respectful
expression of practical personhood is unreasonable. As practical agents we can
see its wrongness regardless of whether the particular form of expression is ours
or not. In this sense, the reasons that are derived from the injunction to respect the
practical individuality of persons are generic. The capacity for the exercise of
individuality is generic, and the reasons apply generically to the exercise of that
capacity, whether concretised in our own lives or not. Therefore, considerations
of reasonableness should proceed in terms of generic rather than particular reasons,
and the question of burdens is relevant to the extent that it relates to the exercise
of the capacity of the practical individuality of persons. Generic reasons are
centrally concerned with the possibility of the pursuit of a reason-guided, self-
governing way of life ‘...my standing as an independent person who can enter
into relations with others as an equal.’15
[Gjeneral prohibitions and permissions have effects on the liberty, 
broadly construed, of both agents and those affected by their 
actions. But the acceptance of principles has other implications 
beyond these effects. Because principles constrain the reasons we 
may, or must, take into account, they can affect our relations with 
others and our view of ourselves in both positive and negative 
ways.16
The respect we owe ourselves and others, is derived from the properties of 
the capacities of the practical individuality of persons. Scanlon notes that the 
value of our practical personhood as reason-assessing, self-governing creatures is
15 ibid., 204
16 ibid.
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integral to our identity. It is not incidental to our identity in the way in which our 
taste in music or food is. All these other aspects of our character are of course 
crucial to our individuality and the experience of our lives, but they are derived 
from, and dependent upon the fundamental power of reflection on reasons and the 
pursuit of those reasons. So for Scanlon, the fundamental importance of our 
powers as reason-assessing, self-governing persons means that our relationships 
with ourselves and others are constituted and informed by respect for our practical 
personhood.
Reasonableness therefore includes a notion of the proper appreciation and
treatment of practical personhood. When we consider the reasonableness of
principles, we are considering whether the principles accommodate, endorse, and
uphold the practical individuality of persons found in ourselves and others.
Scanlon has noted that this robustly moral conception of reasonableness bears
similarity with Kant’s formulation of the Kingdom of Ends, where principles are
regarded as universally, or generically, applicable legislation for an association of
practical persons who are regarded with respect as ends in themselves.
.. .1 believe that the ideal of justifiability that I have just described 
is an important element in the wide appeal of some of Kant’s 
doctrines, such as the formula of humanity and the formula of the 
kingdom of ends. But I depart from Kant in taking the substantive 
appeal of this ideal as the normative foundation of morality rather 
than, for example, linking the moral law to the very idea of 
rational agency. In Kant’s terms my view would be classified as a 
form of heteronomy.17
For Scanlon the respect and reasons that are owed to persons in virtue of 
their practical individuality provides the normative content that guides and
17 ibid., 73
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informs our practical reasoning. The substantive notion of respect for practical
personhood gives content to the notion of reasonableness, and provides us with
the motivation to reflect and act reasonably. Whilst we may compare this notion
of mutual respect to Kant’s doctrine of the Kingdom of Ends and the formula of
humanity, Scanlon also makes a comparison with Mill’s idea of unity. However,
just as with the comparison with Kant’s doctrines, Scanlon notes that the
substantive moral conception of the relationship between persons may be
comparable, but the motivational basis is once again quite different. For Mill, the
moral ideal of a unity between persons was motivated by special sentiment that
was a normal feature of human psychology.
By contrast, on the account I am offering there is no need to 
appeal to a special psychological element to explain how a person 
could be moved to avoid an action by the thought that any 
principle allowing it would be one that others could reasonably 
reject. This is adequately explained by the fact that people have 
reason to want to act in ways that could be justified to others, 
together with the fact that when a rational person recognizes 
something as a reason we do not need a further explanation of how 
he or she could be moved to act on it.18
The notion of reasonableness and justifiability in Scanlon revolves around 
what is owed to practical individuals, in virtue of their nature as reason-assessing, 
self-governing creatures. Reasonableness is a substantive moral notion that is 
grounded on the properties of practical personhood. From the properties of 
practical personhood are derived the moral demands of what we owe to each other.
Scanlon takes care to explain in detail how the notion of reasonable 
rejection works in practical deliberation, and discusses how it effects such notions
18 ibid., 154
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as responsibility, promising, and what Rawls calls the separateness of persons.19 I 
will set aside the issues of the application of Scanlon's contractualist formula. 
Whilst these are very important topics, I believe there is a more fundamental 
question about Scanlon's contractualism. This question addresses the scope and 
grounds of what we owe to each other. I will set out three problems for Scanlon's 
contractualism. The first concerns the related redundancy and Euthyphro 
objections; the second and third asks whether the importance and priority of the 
morality of right and wrong are of the kind that Scanlon seeks. To preview my 
conclusions: I believe that we can defend Scanlon against the redundancy and 
Euthyphro objections, but only if we revise his theory in line with my augmented 
buck-passing account. I will then go on to argue that Scanlon does not establish 
the importance and priority of the morality of right and wrong. The nature of this 
failure will lead me to suggest an alternative grounding for contractualism; one 
that I believe provides Scanlon with the conclusions he seeks.
2. The Euthyphro and Redundancy Objections
The Euthyphro and redundancy objections are distinct criticisms of Scanlon's 
notion or wrongness, although they are, as we will see, related closely.20 The 
Euthyphro objection states that Scanlon's theory misdescribes the relationship 
between reasonable rejection and wrongness: these critics argue that acts are
19 the literature on these and other issues is large and growing, for some lucid discussions see Elizabeth 
Ashford, ‘The Demandingness of Scanlon's Contractualism’ in Ethics, Vol 113, (2003), 273-302; John Deigh, 
‘Promises Under Fire’ in Ethics, Vol. 112 (2002) 507-28; Niko Kolodny and R. Jay Wallace, ‘Promises and 
Practices Revisited’ in Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 31, 118-54; Micheal Otsuka, ‘Scanlon and the
Claims of the Many versus the One’ in Analysis, Vol. 60,288-92
20 some philosophers have taken these as amounting to the same criticism, see for example Brad Hooker (who 
in this quote describes the redundancy objection as the ‘spare wheel objection’: ‘The objection, in other 
words, is that Scanlon's contractualism functions as a spare wheel, a construct that spins but does not actually 
bear any weight or do any work. Or the objection might be put in terms of circularity: Scanlon's 
contractualism doesn’t explain what makes acts wrong but instead presupposes their wrongness.’ Brad 
Hooker, ‘Contractualism, Spare Wheel, Aggregation’ in Scanlon and Contractualism, ed. Matt Matravers, 
(London, Frank Cass, 2003), 57. As I hope to show, the redundancy criticism and the Euthyphro criticisms 
both focus on the problematic nature of wrongness in Scanlon's account, but make different criticisms.
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reasonably rejected because they are wrong, and not wrong because they are 
reasonably rejected. The redundancy objection states that Scanlon regards 
wrongness as a reason providing property that is constituted independently of 
contractualism. If this is true, contractualism is an unnecessary tool for the 
description of right and wrong, and what we owe to each other. Moral reasons 
should proceed from the independent property of wrongness and rightness. These 
criticisms are different, but they both attend to Scanlon's understanding of right 
and wrong. I will set out both criticisms in more detail, and Scanlon's stated 
response to them. I will argue that the Euthyphro objection misses its mark, 
whilst the redundancy objection is far more serious. I will conclude this second 
section by explaining how a revision of Scanlon's argument can meet the 
redundancy criticism.
a) The Euthyphro Objection
In The Euthyphro, Socrates asks if the gods love the holy because 
it is holy, or if it is holy because the gods love it. We may ask in 
parallel manner if certain actions are justifiable because they are 
right, or if they are right because they are justifiable. And when 
we raise this question, we can see the problem that Scanlon faces.
He is forced to hold, in effect, that right actions are right because 
they are justifiable, and not that they are justifiable because they 
are right. And yet we suppose in the very act of trying to justify 
ourselves to others that the opposite is the case. We suppose that 
there is an independent sense of right -  one presumably 
established by the values and disvalues displayed in the different 
options -  such that it is because certain actions are right that they 
are justifiable, and not the other way around.21
21 Pettit, Doing Unto Others, 8
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A concrete example may clarify this criticism. Judith Jarvis Thomson 
provides it.
For my own part, I cannot bring myself to believe that what makes 
it wrong to torture babies to death for fun (for example) is that 
doing this “would be disallowed by any system of rules for the 
general regulation of behaviour which no one could reasonably 
reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.” My 
impression is that explanation goes in the opposite direction -  that 
it is the patent wrongfulness of the conduct that explains why 
there would be general agreement to disallow it.22
The essence of these criticisms is that Scanlon's argument gets things the 
wrong way around. They object to Scanlon defining wrongness in terms of 
reasonable rejection. They propose that Scanlon should operate with an 
independent notion of rightness and wrongness that is not constituted by the 
procedure of contractualist reasoning. It seems to me that the critics who voice 
the Euthyphro objection are not actually claiming that Scanlon's theory is circular; 
they are in fact saying it is wrong. They are claiming that there is an independent 
sense of rightness and wrongness that provides the reasons against being cruel, for 
example. Scanlon's view is rather that the notion of wrongness is derived from, 
and constituted by, substantive moral reasons that relate to the fundamental moral 
property of human rational life. Therefore, I believe that we should read this so- 
called Euthyphro objection not as an internal criticism that Scanlon's theory is 
circular, but rather as a substantive objection to the notion of wrongness that 
Scanlon proposes. Indeed, it seems as though the Euthyphro objection is an 
objection to the wider constructivist understanding of moral reasoning. The aim
22 Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm o f Rights, (London, Harvard University Press, 1990), 30 n.9, quoted in 
Scanlon, What We Owe, 391 n. 21
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of constructivism is precisely to show how wrongness (in Scanlon's case, or 
injustice, or partiality in other constructivist theories) is derived from and 
constituted by the notion of justification. In order to strengthen Scanlon's 
response to the circularity objection, it is worth explaining the constructivist 
reading of Scanlon's contractualism.
Scanlon's view seems to be that contractualism is a way of stating, in a 
higher order form, what is wrong with certain acts. This notion of wrongness 
refers to the actual property that makes the act wrong, and it is this substantive 
property that provides us with a reason to reasonably reject it. But on this reading, 
wrongness is not a substantive property, in itself, on which to reject the principle. 
Scanlon says in reply to Thomson ‘[t]he contractualist formula that Thomson 
quotes is intended as an account of what it is for an act to be wrong. What makes 
an act wrong are the properties that would make any principle that allow it one 
that it would be reasonable to reject (in this case, the needless suffering and death 
of the baby).*23 Scanlon seems to argue that there is no circularity within his 
contractualism because the properties that make acts wrong are substantive 
features of reasons and values. These substantive features are many and various, 
and are constituted by their relation to the fundamental moral property of human 
rational life. In other words, Scanlon's response to Thomson suggests that we can 
reasonably reject any principle that allows cruelty, because the substantive 
properties of cruelty violate the fundamental property of the value of human 
rational life. This violation is the reason why we reject the principle. We do not 
reject the principle because it is wrong, or because it is reasonably rejectable.
23 Scanlon, What We Owe, 391 n.21
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This view rejects the notion that there is in independent property of 
wrongness that we can discern. If such a property existed, moral reasoning would 
be concerned with the perception of this property. Scanlon's constructivism 
consists in the rather different view that moral reasoning begins with a feature of 
human beings that is deemed fundamental from a moral point of view: in this case 
their practical personhood. This feature provides the original moral property. 
Constructivism is concerned to describe a form of reasoning about morality, 
where right and wrong actions are derived from reflection on the implications of 
this fundamental moral property. The idea of agreement is a tool used to identify 
specific principles and their reasons that are approved or prohibited in terms of the 
original moral property. Rightness and wrongness are, on this understanding of 
constructivism, constituted by the particular outcomes of this process of reasoning 
about the fundamental moral property of practical personhood. In this sense, 
moral principles and our understanding of their status are constructed through a 
procedure of reasoning from the original moral property. Constructivists of 
different hues will characterise the fundamental moral property and the process of 
reasoning in different ways. But it is common to a constructivist interpretation of 
morality, that right and wrong are constituted by our reasoning about the 
fundamental moral property. Right and wrong are not independent moral 
properties. If they were there would be no need to understand morality in this 
way: we would not need to identify some other fundamental moral property, 
design a procedure to determine principles and their grounds, and then claim that 
the rightness and wrongness of the principle is constituted by, and derived from, 
this elaborate constructivism. If wrongness were an independent property, it
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would (if discemable) provide a reason in itself. Pettit and Thomson seem to 
argue that Scanlon should not adopt a constructivism in ethics. Rather, he should 
acknowledge that right and wrong are constituted independently, and drop the 
notion of reasonable agreement and justification as constitutive of the notion of 
right and wrong. They seem to urge Scanlon to make his contractualism 
redundant. The redundancy objection is based on the view that Scanlon's 
contractualism is redundant, and that he does in fact operate with an independent 
reason giving notion of right and wrong.
b) The Redundancy Objection
The objection goes roughly as follows. Whenever principles 
allowing an action are reasonably rejectable because that action 
has some feature (or set of features) F, the action is wrong simply 
in virtue of being F and not because its being F makes principles 
allowing it reasonably rejectable. The appeal to reasonable 
rejectability seems otiose when we could apparently understand 
wrongness more directly in terms of the grounds for reasonable 
rejection. Call this the “redundancy objection.”24
John Charvet makes the same substantive point, although in slightly
different terms when he says
.. .if this equality of value and rights is a constraining condition on 
the choice situation, which has to be independently justified, then 
it would be pointless to present the argument for justice in 
contractarian form. For the basic rights of persons would be given 
prior to the contract, and the contract would bear at most on the
24 Michael Ridge, ‘Contractualism and the New and Improved Redundancy Objection’ in Analysis, Vol. 63 
No. 4, (October 2003), 337
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political conditions for realizing rights and not on the rights 
themselves.25
This criticism, perhaps surprisingly, makes the opposite point from the
Euthyphro objection. The redundancy critics argue that Scanlon's contractualism
is not a true constructivism. It is alleged that Scanlon’s notion of right and wrong
is constituted prior to, and independently from, the contractualist notion of
justification. Scanlon is sensitive to this criticism. ‘By basing itself on
reasonableness, it may be charged, a theory builds in moral elements at the start.
This makes it easy to produce a theory which sounds plausible, but such a theory
will tell us very little, since everything we are to get out of it at the end we must
put in at the beginning as part of the moral content of reasonableness.’26 In the
light of the constructivist reading of Scanlon, we might think that his theory is
able to avoid the redundancy objection. However, Scanlon muddies the waters by
offering arguments that seem distinctly non-constructivist, and susceptible to the
redundancy criticism.
I believe that a formal, or “buck-passing” analysis... is correct in 
the case of goodness and value. Goodness is not a single 
substantive property which gives us reason to promote or prefer 
the things that have it. Rather, to call something good is to claim 
that it has other properties (different ones in different cases) which 
provide such reasons. But wrongness seems different. In at least 
a wide range of cases, the fact that an act is wrong seems itself to 
provide us with a reason not to do it, rather than merely indicating 
the presence of other reasons (although it may do that as well).27
25 John Charvet, The Idea o f an Ethical Community, (London, Cornell University Press, 1995), 167; for 
further statements of this objection as applied to Scanlon, see also Simon Blackburn, ‘Am I Right’ in The 
New York Times, 21st February 1999, and Colin McGinn, ‘Reasons and Unreasons’ in The New Republic, 24th 
May 1999,34-38
26 Scanlon, What We Owe, 194
27 ibid., 11
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This view seems somewhat at odds with Scanlon's response to Thomson. 
There he states that what makes acts wrong are the substantive properties and 
their relationship to the fundamental moral property of practical personhood. 
Now Scanlon seems to suggest that wrongness is a distinct property that we can 
refer to in our deliberations about principles. If wrongness exists independently 
of contractualism, contractualism does indeed seem redundant.
We have now, perhaps, an explanation of the origin of the redundancy and 
Euthyphro objection. At the root of these contradictory objections is Scanlon's 
notion of the nature of right and wrong. He seems at once to be committed to 
constructivist interpretation of contractualism, and something more like a realist 
notion of right and wrong. I will argue that there are good reasons to clarify 
Scanlon's theory in the direction of constructivist reading of contractualism. This 
clarification will not satisfy the Euthyphro objectors, but it will offer a coherent 
philosophical alternative to their preferred moral realism. But it will also show 
why the contract is not redundant.
c) Constructivist Contractualism and the Augmented Buck-Passing Account
Philip Stratton-Lake has argued that Scanlon can avoid the redundancy objection
if he drops his notion that wrongness itself is reason providing. Stratton-Lake
emphasises what I have called the constructivist reading of Scanlon's
contractualism. He argues that contractualism involves a distinction between the
grounds of wrongness, and the nature of wrongness.
Scanlon's principle is not supposed to tell us what makes certain 
actions morally wrong. The principle does not, therefore, specify 
the ground of moral wrongness, but the nature of moral
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wrongness. Consequently, it cannot be criticized because it does 
not add to those grounds.28
Interpreting Stratton-Lake’s argument in harmony with my earlier reading
of Scanlon's contractualist formula, we can say that the grounds of wrongness are
defined in terms of the properties of practical personhood, and the substantive
reasons that are derived from them. The nature of wrongness is the property of
being reasonably rejectable on contractualist terms. This avoids the redundancy
objection because wrongness is not an independent reason conferring property. It
is not constituted prior to contractualist reasoning; rather it is constituted by
contractualist reasoning. This reading conforms to the constructivist reading of
Scanlon's contractualism, but as Stratton-Lake acknowledges, it contradicts
Scanlon's view that wrongness is independently reason providing. In order for
this constructivist reading of Scanlon's contractualism to be made coherent within
the theory as a whole, Stratton-Lake suggests that Scanlon must drop the notion
that wrongness is an independent reason giving property that exists independently
from the contract.
All he need do is abandon the view that wrongness is a reason 
providing property... Scanlon would be reluctant to do this as he 
has a very strong intuition that the fact that some act is wrong 
provides us with a distinctive reason not to do this act. But this 
intuition is not central to his contractualist theory, and nothing 
central to his theory depends on its truth.29
28 Stratton-Lake, Scanlon's Contractualism and the Redundancy Objection, 72
29 ibid., 75
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In response to Stratton-Lake’s argument, McNaughton and Rawling have 
described this move as introducing a buck-passing account of wrongness.30 We 
recall from the previous chapter that my augmented buck-passing argument 
included a buck-passing account of right and wrong. I argued that the buck- 
passing argument needed to be reformulated in terms of both right and good as 
higher order formal properties that expressed the lower order properties of 
substantive reasons and values. Substantive reasons and values are coextensive 
and supervene on the basic properties that are of evaluative and normative 
significance. This argument was developed in response to a problem in Scanlon's 
account of value. In that instance a similar problem appeared as is discussed by 
both the Euthyphro and the redundancy objection: the nature and role of the 
substantive and formal properties of wrongness (and rightness). We can now see 
that my augmented buck-passing argument can be employed, along the lines 
suggested by Stratton-Lake, to rebuff the redundancy objection. Stratton-Lake 
seems reluctant to describe this move as a buck-passing account of wrongness, but 
it is clear that this is what it amounts to. He does not describe what such a buck- 
passing account should consist in in much detail, but he does present the outlines 
of a buck-passing account of wrongness. I will set this out in order to show that 
Stratton-Lake’s suggestion of a buck-passing account is not fully acceptable, and 
that my earlier defined augmented buck-passing argument should be preferred. 
Stratton-Lake suggests the following argument:
(1) ‘An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances
would be disallowed by any set of principles for the general
30 ‘Philip Stratton-Lake... argues that Scanlon can evade a redundancy objection against his view of 
wrongness by adopting a buck-passing account of wrongness.’ McNaughton and Rawling, Can Scanlon 
Avoid Redundancy by Passing the Buck?, 328
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regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably reject as a 
basis for informed, unforced general agreement.’
(2) A concern to avoid wrong acts is a concern to act only on 
principles that no one could reasonably reject.
(3) A concern to act only on principles that no one could 
reasonably reject is explained by the fact that “people have reason 
to want to act in ways that could be justified to others...”
(4) A concern to justify ourselves to others on grounds they could 
not reasonably reject is a proper way of valuing rational, self- 
governing agents, and is thus a way of respecting their value as 
rational autonomous agents.
(5) A world in which everyone acts and deliberates on the basis of 
such principles constitutes an ideal of mutual recognition
(6) This ideal is a substantive good, a good we recognize as 
having a distinctive importance in its own right and as 
underpinning other important relations, such as friendship
(7) The value of this ideal explains why we have such a strong 
reason not to <f> when ^-ing is morally wrong.31
Whilst I agree with Stratton-Lake that Scanlon needs a buck-passing 
account of right and wrong, I think there are problems with Stratton-Lake’s 
suggested argument. The version presented by Stratton-Lake is very closely 
attuned to Scanlon's account, but it is not sensitive to the problems of the buck- 
passing account we discussed in chapter four. There, we recall, the buck-passing 
argument was shown to need two additional arguments in order for it to carry 
through. Firstly, following Wallace’s criticism, a criticism that Scanlon explicitly 
endorsed, we made a distinction between first order, substantive evaluative and 
normative properties, and the higher order properties of right and good. In other
31 Philip Stratton-Lake, ‘Scanlon, Permissions, and Redundancy: response to McNaughton and Rawling’ in 
Analysis, Vol. 63, No. 4, (October, 2003), 336
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words, Scanlon accepted that first order substantive reasons and evaluations could 
provide reasons. To augment Wallace’s argument I employed Scanlon's own 
arguments regarding the open question problem to show that there were good 
reasons (simplicity and pluralism) to reject the notion that right and wrong could 
provide reasons, just as Scanlon showed that there were good reasons to reject the 
view that goodness provided reasons. In other words, the open question problem 
applies to right and wrong as much as applies to value and goodness. I therefore 
argued that wrong and good were both higher order properties that related to the 
first order property of having a reason or an evaluation count in favour of 
something. Secondly, and related to this argument, I endorsed a pared down 
version of a Dancyan account of reasons and evaluations that described both 
substantive reasons and substantive evaluations as coextensive on the same 
properties. I also introduced the supervenience argument to explain how these 
substantive evaluative and normative properties relate to the basic properties 
Under consideration. None of these features are present in Stratton-Lake’s 
argument. Consequently some familiar problems remain: on Stratton-Lake’s 
version, reasons are explained by values (step 7), which reintroduces the open 
question problem; the relationship between evaluations and it is unclear given 
their categorical separateness (steps 2 - 3 ,  and steps 6-7 imply reasons yield 
evaluations, and evaluations yield reasons32). In order to avoid both these 
problems, we should adopt both steps derived from Wallace’s criticism and the 
Dancyan account in my augmentation. This would avoid the redundancy 
argument entirely, and explain the relationship between reasons and values as
32 this point refers to the argument of section 3(c) in chapter four.
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coextensive, therefore avoiding all possibility of the open question problem. 
Stratton-Lake makes an excellent contribution by showing how Scanlon can avoid 
the redundancy objection by adopting a buck-passing account of wrongness to 
complement the buck-passing account of goodness. I have argued that this is the 
correct response to the redundancy and Euthyphro objections. However, Stratton- 
Lake seems to accept Scanlon's buck-passing argument as presented, whereas I 
have argued that the buck-passing argument itself needs revision and 
augmentation. If we employ the augmented buck-passing argument I propose in 
chapter four to Stratton-Lake’s suggestion for a buck-passing account of 
wrongness, we will have challenged the redundancy objection’s validity. This 
response comes at some doctrinal cost to Scanlon's contractualism, as we not only 
have a significantly augmented buck-passing argument, but the very role of 
wrongness as reason providing has been rejected. The reconstruction of Scanlon's 
contractualism in an avowedly constructivist direction seems to be the most 
promising prospect for Scanlon to meet his critics. Whether Scanlon would 
attempt to resist such a rejection of the realist reading is uncertain. If this option 
is preferred, the Euthyphro objection is shown to be vindicated, and Scanlon’s 
contractualism is indeed redundant. I hope to have shown why we have good 
grounds to pursue the constructivist reading, and retain the integrity of the 
contractualist dimension of what we owe to each other.
3. The Normativity o f Contractualism
In the previous section I argued that Scanlon is able to see off the Euthyphro and 
redundancy objections by strengthening the constructivist reading of his 
contractualism. I will now argue that this brings along a much more significant
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problem for Scanlon's contractualism. This is the problem of establishing the 
nonnativity of contractualism. The question of the normativity of contractualism 
is an instance of the general problem of the normativity of constructivism in moral 
and political theory. In this section I will set out the nature of this problem as it 
affects Scanlon's theory, and conclude that this problem is structural to 
constructivism. I will argue that we need to look beyond constructivism in 
contractualism in order to establish the normativity of contractualist right and 
wrong. We will look towards a transcendental argument for the properties of 
practical personhood that may be able to secure the objectivity of the normativity 
of the contractualist notion of right and wrong.
a) Contractualist Normativity
In section one of this chapter, we saw that Scanlon’s notion of reasonableness was 
derived from the properties of practical personhood. Reasonableness has 
substantive moral content. In accordance with my augmented buck-passing 
argument, this substantive content consists in reasons and evaluations. The 
generic reasons that we have to respect the practical individuality of persons give 
substance to the notion of right and wrong, and the value of practical personhood 
requires the attitude of respect. Scanlon’s contractualism still *.. .needs to explain 
the reason-giving and motivating force of judgments of right and wrong.’33 Even 
if we have a convincing account of the nature of practical individuality, even if we 
have a powerful argument for the nature of moral wrongness and of the respect 
owed in virtue of practical personhood, we are yet to see why someone should be 
motivated to act on the grounds for contractualism and why the reasons against
33 Scanlon, What We Owe, 147
198
wronging are more than mere taste and fancy. Can Scanlon establish the 
normativity of contractualism?
The question of the normativity of contractualism addresses the problem 
of the scope and authority of what we owe to each other. This problem includes, 
but is not limited to, the problem of moral motivation. ‘.. .1 hold that the question 
of reasons is primary and that once the relevant reasons are understood there is no 
separate problem of motivation.’ 34 Scanlon notes that because of his 
conceptualisation of moral motivation in terms of normative reasons, it is possibly 
misleading to continue referring to the problem of moral motivation, because this 
implies that there is a further problem beyond the identification and cognition of 
the normative reasons. Scanlon regards the question of motivation as part of the 
problem of justification. Therefore, Scanlon argues that moral motivation is 
simply a matter of regarding a principle as justified. The question of the 
normativity of principles is not, on Scanlon's view, a question of motivation. It is 
rather a question of the scope of justification. What is the scope of the 
justification of contractualism? Is it universal, or is it limited to persons with 
particular commitments?
Scanlon states that the purpose of contractualism is not simply a question
of explaining the reasons that we already have, a question of self-understanding
and self-interpretation. He does not assume that his discussion concerns only
those who believe in these reasons already,
.. .what we want to know is not merely what we care about when 
we care about right and wrong but why this is something we must 
care about. This concern is magnified when we turn to consider
34 ibid.,
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others: it seems that an adequate account of the morality of right 
and wrong should explain not merely what those who care about it 
are moved by but also why its importance is something that 
everyone has strong reason to recognize.35
When Scanlon says that the morality of right and wrong gives everyone 
strong reason to recognize it, he seems to mean that these are reasons that 
everyone must recognise as valid. In this sense, it seems clear that Scanlon is 
presenting an argument for the objectivity of moral reasons. This objective 
reading of Scanlon's contractualism corresponds with the notion of moral criticism 
that we encountered in chapter three’s discussion of internal and external reasons. 
We recall that both O’Brien and O’Brien Junior were susceptible to moral 
criticism because the reasons that they had offended against were independent of 
their differing motivations. Alongside the examples of the O’Briens, we recall 
also Scanlon's argument for correctness and validity in practical reasoning. On 
Scanlon's view, practical reasoning is able to produce objectively valid moral 
judgments. In sum, it seems reasonable to say that Scanlon believes that moral 
reasons are objective. Their normativity is derived from this objectivity, as it is a 
moral fact that reasons apply to persons. On this reading, Scanlon's notion of 
normativity is strongly objectivist, that is, the scope of the normative authority of 
moral reasons is universal and indifferent to morally irrelevant features of 
subjectivity.
But alongside this apparently objective account of the normativity of 
contractualism, Scanlon also argues that the explication of the contractualist 
account of the morality of right and wrong is not an attempt to justify this
35 ibid.
200
morality to those who may be inclined differently. The explanation of reasons,
and the moral argument that we engage in to improve our ethical beliefs and
motivations, are not to be understood as the performance of persuasion and
justification. Scanlon says that this understanding of the notion of justification is
wrong in two senses because, firstly, it implies that for those of us with a clear
understanding of the value of the morality of right and wrong and a firm belief in
its priority we also need a further justification in order to embed this
understanding and belief, and secondly, given the lack of a justification on some
other ground, we would abandon our views. Scanlon also remarks that it is
inappropriate to think that we need to address the problem of someone who does
not recognise the importance of morality in their lives, a supposed amoralist, in
terms of providing a justification on some grounds that they could accept from
their amoral point of view, and be led by explanation and argument to an
understanding and belief in the morality of right and wrong.
What we can provide, and what seems to me sufficient to answer 
our reasonable concern, is a fuller explanation of the reasons for 
action that moral conclusions supply. In giving this explanation, 
however, we must address the problem of the moral “must” -  the 
seeming necessity of moral demands -  in two slightly different 
forms.36
When we are asked to explain why the fact that an action is wrong 
provides us with a reason not to do it, Scanlon states that we are faced with a 
dilemma. On the one hand, we could refer to the evident moral properties of the 
action, which would explain why we would judge the action to be wrong, but 
would not in itself explain why we would have reason to act on this principle. On
36 ibid., 148
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the other hand, we could explain why we would want to act on the principle by
referring to some pre- or non-moral motivations or commitments that motivate us
and which we possess that precede the action, for example, we would explain that
we should keep our promises because the cost of being found out as a promise
breaker is far greater than the cost involved in keeping promises. Scanlon takes
the view that neither kind of answer is satisfactory in itself.
So a satisfactory answer to our question must not, on the one hand, 
merely say that the fact that an action is wrong is a reason not to 
do it; but it must, on the other hand, provide an account of the 
reason not to do it that we can see to be intimately connected with 
what it is to be wrong. Answers can thus be arrayed along one 
dimension according to their evident moral content, ranging from 
those that appeal to what seem most obviously to be moral 
considerations (thus running the risk of triviality) to those having 
the least connection with moral notion (thus running the risk of 
seeming to offer implausibly external incentives for being 
moral).37
Scanlon also points out that we can conceive of a second kind of 
difference in our account of the reason giving quality of moral principles and 
values. We can conceive of accounts that seek to explain the normative and 
motivational effectiveness of morality on formal or substantive grounds. These 
formal grounds would be independent of any particular ends or qualities, and 
therefore, in their formality, aspire to a wide, even universal application. Scanlon 
gives the example of Kant, where he understands Kant's theory to take the formal 
quality of rational autonomy to provide the basis for the formulations of the 
categorical imperative that express the content and the effectiveness of the “moral 
must.” The alternative is to explain the “moral must,” the normative reasons and
37 ibid., 150
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their motivating efficacy, in substantive terms. A substantive explanation
specifies a particular value with a substantive content and also explains what kind
of violation we perform when we act wrongly. Examples of a substantive account
might include an Aristotelian notion of the eudaimonia, or utilitarianism. Scanlon
notes that formal accounts appear attractive not least because they directly address
the problem of the priority and importance of morality and attempt to explain this
by showing that the claims of morality follow directly from formal features that
are supposedly necessary conditions of agency or rationality. But Scanlon
suggests that a common problem with such accounts is to specify the nature of the
moral claims in a clear and substantive manner, and also to explain the possibility
of wronging and the kind of failure that wronging is from such formal conditions.
Scanlon states that he prefers the possibilities offered by the substantive account
of moral motivation, whilst acknowledging that such accounts face the difficulty
of explaining the importance and priority of morality satisfactorily.
What we need to do, then, is to explain more clearly how the idea 
that an act is wrong flows from the idea that there is an objection 
of a certain kind to people’s being allowed to perform such 
actions, and we need to do this in a way that makes clear how an 
act’s being wrong in the sense described can provide a reason not 
to do it.38
The dilemma that seems to face the justification of the authority of moral 
reasons is that appeals to other moral terms already involve a commitment to 
morality, and appeals to non-moral phenomena do not seem to connect to moral 
claims meaningfully. Scanlon refers to this as Prichard’s dilemma. This problem
38 ibid., 153
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seems to set severe limits on the scope of justification that is possible within 
contractualism.
Scanlon invokes an unhappy aporia in his account of normativity of 
contractualism. We have, on the one hand, a commitment to the objectivity of 
moral reasons, to the validity of moral judgment, and the authority of what we 
owe to each other. We have also, on the other hand, the view that we cannot 
justify moral contractualism to those not already committed to its values, reasons, 
and properties. I will set out the consequences for this unhappy aporia in terms of 
the importance and priority of the morality of right and wrong.
b) The Priority o f What We Owe to Each Other
For Scanlon, the value of the practical personhood takes first priority in our moral 
reasoning about what we owe to each other. As we saw in section one, it takes 
priority because the many plural expressions of human identity are premised on 
the powers fundamental to practical personhood. In other words, our identity as 
reason assessing, and self-governing persons lies at the origin of our particular 
identities as parents, partners, professionals, and citizens. However, whilst 
Scanlon might claim that there is a logical priority to the powers of practical 
personhood, it is not yet clear that there is a normative priority to these capacities. 
For many of us, what we owe to our friends qua friends takes normative priority 
over what we owe others qua practical individuals. For contractualism though, 
the special bonds and obligations of friendship derive from the logical and 
normative priority of respect for practical personhood as such. Scanlon intends to 
show that the moral reasons of contractualism take priority over other values in 
moral deliberation. On his view, friendship 4.. .involves recognizing the friend as
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a separate person with moral standing -  as someone to whom justification is owed 
in his or her own right, not merely in virtue of being a friend.’39
We recall from chapter one, that the normative priority of the value of 
right and wrong depended on the presence of a special motivating desire. We 
valued our friends first and foremost as practical individuals because we were 
motivated by special desire to do so. Does Scanlon's picture of intentional 
practical agency provide us with a more satisfactory response to the person who 
denies the normative priority of the value of right and wrong? Can contractualism 
explain our motivation to prioritise the value of respect and the obligatory reasons 
derived from practical personhood?
Scanlon takes the example of friendship as emblematic of the general 
problem of the priority of the normativity of contractualism. The priority problem 
occurs when someone does not accept that the moral reasons of respect for 
persons take priority over the demands made by the value of friendship. 
Friendship is merely an example of a problem where different values are seen to 
have logical and normative priority over the more impartialist reasons of 
contractualism.
Scanlon's response to the priority problem consists in three parts. Firstly, 
Scanlon wants to allow that the plural values attached to various ways of life, such 
as friendship, can compliment or harmonise with what we owe to each other. 
Friendship is something that there are good reasons to want to pursue, and so 
reasons derived from the value of friendship can be included in the reasons we 
take into consideration when performing moral deliberation. For example, a
39 ibid., 164
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principle that did not allow the special place of friends in a life could be 
reasonably rejected on grounds that it is incompatible with the respect owed to 
persons in virtue of their practical individuality. ‘Therefore, there will be pressure 
within the morality of right and wrong to make room for these values.’40
The second step Scanlon takes is to argue that whilst the morality of 
mutual recognition and respect allows and includes moral reasons attached to 
special values such as friendship, there are limits that govern the extent to which 
these special values can diverge from what we owe to each other. If such a 
divergence does occur we ‘...have good reason to give priority to the demands of 
right and wrong.*41 These good reasons are in part derived from the ‘...the great 
importance of justifiability to others and to the particular interests that moral 
principles protect...*42 Scanlon implies that the respect owed to practical 
individuality not only generates prohibitions and admonishments against wrong, 
but includes positive benefits and endowments which enhance our lives, ‘...they 
are aspects of the positive value of a way of living with others.’43 Scanlon seems 
to argue that the priority of moral reasons is derived from the ‘...joy or 
pleasure.. .,44 that living in unity with others brings our lives.
Scanlon's third argument for the priority of respect owed to practical 
personhood is that the plurality of values that do contribute to the expression of 
our practical individuality have ‘...a built in sensitivity to the demands of right 
and wrong.’45 That is, the particular values such as friendship will easily
accommodate the demands of respect owed to practical individuality in persons, if 
they are understood correctly. If a value, such as friendship, dramatically 
conflicts with our obligations to persons as practical individuals, Scanlon argues 
that this person is not in fact a true friend.
These three arguments amount to the view that the morality of right and
wrong must accommodate other values; these other values must in turn make
room for the particular constraints of right and wrong; and if the two do collide,
then the importance and attractiveness of the mutual recognition derived from the
respect we owe to each other will assert itself and its priority will be apparent.
Susan Mendus has described this as the Reductivist Response to the question of
the priority of contractualism.
This response argues that, although there may appear to be 
conflict between the reasons of morality and the reasons offered 
by other values (such as friendship), in fact the appearance is 
illusory because the reasons offered by other values are 
themselves grounded in reasons of morality... Scanlon's response 
is reductivist in the sense that it construes reason of friendship as 
compatible with, because grounded in, reasons of morality. And it 
further construes morality as necessary for differentiating between 
real friendship and contingent affection.46
Whilst Scanlon makes an important observation about the positive 
attributes of a life lived in mutual recognition of each other, it is questionable 
whether he has shown adequately why these benefits would take priority over the 
positive benefits of friendship. Scanlon may have shown that the respect for 
practical individuality and the value of friendship are not necessarily
46 Susan Mendus, ‘The Magic in the Pronoun “My”’, in Scanlon and Contractualism, ed. Matt Matravers, 
(London, Frank Cass, 2003), 39 -  40, and also the discussion in Susan Mendus, Impartiality in Moral and 
Political Philosophy, (Oxford University Press, 2002), 66-74
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incompatible, and that we should not see the value of respect as comprised 
burdens and obligations in opposition to the evident pleasures and benefits of 
friendship. But these arguments do not, in themselves, establish the necessary 
normative priority of the respect for persons owed them in virtue of their practical 
personhood. The objector to the priority of contractualism could accept Scanlon’s 
argument that what we owe to each other can harmonise with other values 
attached to a life well lived. They need not maintain that plural values are 
incompatible and incommensurable. But they could equally well maintain that 
there are no grounds on which to establish that one value is to take priority over 
all other values in the domain of what we owe to each other. It is certainly 
plausible that these reasons could take priority, but it is equally plausible that they 
could be in a more relative relation to other values. In fact, is it not more 
plausible that people choose to prioritise those values that attach to their close 
friends, relatives, compatriots, fellow believes, or comrades? Susan Mendus has 
described this helpfully as the \ . .normative problem of the moral.’47
Susan Mendus points out that Scanlon is right to draw attention to the 
moral dimension of friendship. The bonds of affection and attraction do not 
extinguish what we owe to our friends in virtue of their practical personhood. But 
Mendus goes on to argue that Scanlon's description of the nature of friendship and 
the priority of what we owe to each other is neither phenomenologically accurate 
or philosophically satisfactory. ‘The agent may concede that friendship will not 
be genuine unless it acknowledges the claims of impartial morality [what we owe 
to each other], yet still wonder why those claims should matter more than the
47 Susan Mendus, Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy, 61
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claims of friendship.’48 Mendus argues that Scanlon's argument presents an 
unsatisfactory understanding of friendship: for Scanlon a friendship which is not 
constituted by the priority of what we owe to each other is merely contingent 
affection, ‘.. .and not be a case of true friendship at all.’49 This criticism is potent. 
It is neither phenomenologically obvious, nor more importantly, philosophically 
clear from Scanlon's argument, why what we owe to each other must take priority 
over all other personal values and relationships. Scanlon seems to suggest that 
there is never a conflict or dilemma between the obligations we may owe to others 
as friends and others in virtue of their practical personhood. Mendus presents a 
very powerful alternative view, which makes the case that Scanlon's argument is 
back to front. Mendus suggests that our special relationships, as friends and 
family members for example, constitute the possibility of relationships of 
impartiality regarding what we owe to each other. This is phenomenologically 
more plausible than Scanlon's, it seems to me, and does a better job of explaining, 
on philosophical grounds, the normative priority of what we owe to each other. 
The claim is that our special relationships ground the possibility of impartial 
morality. This argument suggests that the relationship between the mother and 
child is constituted by care, love, affection, protection, and strongly partial 
attitudes. Immanent in this relationship between mother and child is a 
relationship between two people who will come to regard each other as moral 
agents due impartial respect.50 Mendus seeks to show, as I understand it, that it is
48 Mendus, The Magic in the Pronoun 'My 45
49 ibid., 46
50 It should be noted that Mendus does not argue that such relationships will necessarily result in impartial 
commitments, rather that impartial morality must have reference to the partial commitments of persons. For 
example ‘...it is no part of my aim to show that caring necessitates morality... Rather, my claim is simply 
that if we are to get morality off the ground, we must make reference to what people care about, but clearly it
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integral to establishing the priority of what we owe to each other that we 
recognise that partial relationships are a legitimate, indeed, necessary element of a 
functional commitment to the morality of right and wrong.
Scanlon seeks to show that there is no reasonable dilemma between the
claims of morality and partial claims, because partial commitments are grounded
on the logical and normative priority of what we owe to each other in virtue of our
practical personhood as such. Mendus, however, seeks to explain how dilemmas
between partial and impartial reasons can be reasonable, and can be reconciled
into a functional moral life which premises the priority of impartial reasons on the
original partial commitments of personal relationships.
If we commit to a form of impartialism which takes our partial 
concerns seriously, then we will be better able to retain that 
commitment in cases where the dictates of morality conflict with 
other concerns... The advantage, then, of an impartialist morality 
grounded in what we care about is that it is more stable because 
less likely to generate moral affections which appear dysfunctional 
from the point of view of the agent, hi short, if offers a way of 
demonstrating the priority of justice [as an instance of 
impartiality].51
Mendus argues that the priority of impartiality must account for a 
relationship between our partial and impartial commitments that is not 
dysfunctional, and which is addressed to agents in first-person terms that appeals 
to their own reasons and motivations. In the course of her argument, Mendus 
makes a striking comparison between the case of Huckleberry Finn and the 
mother of a sick child.
does not follow from this that if we do make reference to what people care about we always will get morality 
off the ground.’ in Mendus, Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy, 104
51 Mendus, Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy, 121
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The mother lives in a society that is committed to the priority of impartial
reasons, and she endorses the priority of these reasons in first person terms too.
Mendus argues that the commitment to such normative reasons is derived from
the bonds of care derived from special relationships. But as noted, these bonds of
care do not lead ineluctably to impartial morality. Whilst the impartial morality is
not necessarily derived from special relationships, Mendus argues that there are
good reasons why it would be. These good reasons are clarified in the case where
the mother has a sick child. The child needs urgent medical care, and there is a
long waiting list of other sick children. The mother has connections in the
hospital, and is able to pull strings to jump the queue. In this instance, Mendus
argues that an account of impartial morality that is grounded on the commitments
and reasons of partial relationships is able to explain this dilemma in a way that
does not produce a dysfunctional aporia. On Mendus’s view, the mother is quite
right to reflect on the reasons there are to jump the queue, and to feel their pull.
But the mother will reflect that the reasons of impartiality are overriding. What
explains this reflection in non-dysfunctional terms is the origin of the motivational
and justificatory reasons in the original commitment to the relationship between
the mother and child.
[The mother’s] predicament arises from the fact that, in this case, 
she is required to marginalize those directly motivating concerns 
which themselves explain the appeal of impartial morality in the 
first place. Ex hypothesi she sees the demands of morality as 
legitimate, but her propensity to do that is traceable to the fact that 
they are demands that take seriously the partial concerns she has 
for others. Of course, in the specific case, she struggles to give 
them allegiance because, in the specific case, they conflict with 
her partial concerns. Nonetheless, we have here a form of
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morality which is not dysfunctional because and insofar as it is 
grounded in partial concerns.52
Compared to this is the case of Huckleberry Finn. Huck lives in a
community in which black people are legally and culturally regarded as property
rather than persons. In this sense the community is different from that in which
the mother of the sick child lives, as it does not endorse a commitment to
impartial reasons of all persons, regardless of colour. Huck helps his friend, Jim,
who is black, to escape from ownership of Miss Watson. As Jim finds freedom
with Huck’s help, Huck reflects on the morality of what he has done. He finds
that the reasons to help Jim escape, which are derived from their special bonds of
affection, conflict dysfunctionally with the social morality where Jim is Miss
Watson’s rightful property.
The crucial contrast between the mother and Huck is therefore 
this: if the mother resolves to help her child, she can continue to 
see her own moral attitudes as appropriate, even if ignored on this 
occasion. And the reason is quite simply that the morality has 
built into it a recognition of the significance of partial concerns, 
including concern for one’s friends and family. By contrast, when 
Huck resolves to help Jim, he thereby resolves to abandon 
morality, and the reason for this is that the morality allows no 
room for the significance of Huck’s concern for Jim. It does, of 
course, allow room for other partial concerns Huck has: his 
concern for Tom Sawyer, or for Miss Watson, for instance.
Concern for Jim, however, lies outside the scope of this morality 
and the morality itself is dysfunctional precisely because it cannot 
accommodate that concern.53
I would suggest that Mendus argument is more successful in establishing 
the priority of what we owe to each other than Scanlon’s is. Mendus argues that
52 ibid., 123
53
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our special relationships and values constitute the possibility of impartial 
morality. This constitutive role partly explains why impartial morality will take 
priority in the appropriate cases, and so Mendus has good grounds to argue that 
what we owe to each other does take priority, but this priority is sensitive and 
potentially compatible with the partial reasons derived from our special 
relationships. Mendus argues that Scanlon's argument fails to even recognise, and 
let alone explain, how partial reasons are to harmonise with our impartial reasons, 
as on his view impartiality consumes all.
Scanlon hopes to show that what we owe each other must take priority in 
every instance of our relationship with others. But if we recall the three basic 
arguments that Scanlon presented, we find nothing that could provide any 
explanation for the necessity of this normative priority. In fact, in place of 
Mendus’s argument which establishes the priority of impartiality, we find a highly 
contingent, heteronomous argument from the attractiveness from living in 
relationships of mutual recognition on the grounds of what we owe to each other, 
but as Mendus has shown in the comparison of Huckleberry Finn and the mother 
of the sick child, without an explanation of how partial reasons are compatible 
with impartial reasons, one is left facing a dysfunctional aporia. In the case of 
Huckleberry Finn, reflection on this dilemma forces Finn to conclude that 
‘...what’s the use you learning to do right, when it’s troublesome to do right and 
ain’t no trouble to do wrong, and the wages is just the same? I was stuck. I 
couldn’t answer that. So I reckoned I wouldn’t bother no more about it, but after 
this always do whichever comes handiest at the time.’54 Pace Scanlon, the role of
54 Mark Twain, The Adventures o f Huckleberry Finn, (London, Dent, 1950), 263 quoted in Mendus, 
Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy, 122
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the attractiveness of impartial morality is a far less secure basis on which to 
establish any kind of normative necessity than the constituting role of partial 
commitments presented by Mendus. We can see more clearly how Scanlon's 
argument depends on a contingent, heteronomous commitment to the 
attractiveness of unity between agents, and as such fails to establish any kind of 
necessary normative priority for what we owe to each other, and leaves the 
relationship between partial and impartial reasons dysfunctional.
Mendus’s argument is more successful than Scanlon's in showing the 
relationship between partial and impartial reasons, and most importantly, how 
impartial reasons take priority. However, it seems to me that there we should not 
adopt Mendus’s argument as it stands. I agree with Mendus that we should seek 
to preserve the distinct quality of partial reasons, and show that they must fit 
harmoniously into what we owe to each other. Yet it seems to me that Mendus’s 
account, whilst more attractive, is insufficient to provide what is lacking in 
Scanlon's argument: at least, what I argue is lacking, namely the quality of 
necessity. We recall that Scanlon seeks to establish the necessary priority of what 
we owe to each other. In the course of presenting Mendus’s arguments, we have 
seen that Scanlon has presented an unsatisfactory account of the relationship 
between partial and impartial reasons. Whilst I have argued that Mendus’s view 
of the relationship between these different kinds of reasons is much more 
convincing, does it provide us with the necessity that we are seeking in Scanlon's 
account? The necessary priority of what we owe to each must depend on 
something that is itself necessary, and I believe that there are two reasons to doubt 
that Mendus’s argument presents the kind of necessity that we seek.
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Firstly, which special relationships are necessarily constitutive of 
impartiality? Is it only familial relationships, or is it wider social and cultural 
relationships, including such features as race, nationality, gender, religion? It 
seems to me that very different kinds of moral obligations could be generated 
from different kinds of constitutive special relationships, not all of which would 
be compatible with the impartialist morality Mendus seeks. Mendus does address 
this question, particularly in the discussion of Isabel Archer from Henry James’s 
Portrait o f a Lady. Isabel Archer pursues relationships that are detrimental to her 
happiness, ambitions, and the ‘.. .investment of self...,55 Mendus argues that our 
response to Archer’s story rests on the essential critical component to 
relationships of care. Mendus argues that there is a difference between those 
relationships and values that are worthy of care and commitment and those that 
are not.
The case of Isabel Archer is fully comprehensible only on the 
assumption that she has invested herself in someone not worthy of 
her care, and that she has come to see that that is what she has 
done. If we deny the critical dimension of care, we cannot 
appreciate the facts which James wishes to draw to our attention... 
we can have the reactions we do have to these cases only on the 
assumption that there is some distinction between what is 
worthwhile and what is worthless, even if the agent does not 
initially see it herself, and even if, when she does see it, she 
endorses values other than the ones we ourselves believe to be 
correct.56
We should note that it is not Mendus’s main purpose to show which 
relationships will lead to impartiality, and neither is it her intention, as I
55 Mendus, Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy, 118
56 ibid., 118-9
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understand it, to provide an account of the necessity of certain relationships and 
their production of impartial reasons. In fact Mendus seems very doubtful that 
such an account of the necessity of appropriately valuable relationships and their 
production of impartial commitments will be possible. I am sympathetic to 
Mendus’s argument that there is a critical element to partial relationships, and also 
that this critical element should be understood in terms of an investment of self. 
However, it seems to me that these arguments do not, in themselves, explain why 
it is necessary to have certain relationships rather than others. This lack of an 
account of the necessary qualities of worthiness of certain relationships and values 
may lead to a similar indeterminacy in the priority of impartiality as we find in 
Scanlon. Mendus’s account is more successful in explaining how what we owe to 
each other will have priority in a certain range of circumstances, but it has not, it 
seems to me, shown that what we owe to each other will have a necessary priority.
Secondly, is it possible for people who have not experienced these 
preferred partial relationships to have and ascribe moral standing? Is a 
relationship between two people who have avoided this constitution exempt from 
the constraints of what we owe to each other? If so the grounds of impartialist 
morality seem dangerously insecure, and vulnerable to pleas of exemption in 
virtue of omission of constitution into proper special and subsequent impartialist 
relationships. As I have mentioned, I am very sympathetic to the space made in 
Mendus’s impartialist theory for the special relationships of family and friends. 
However, as I have tried to show, I am doubtful whether Mendus’s proposals 
would establish the necessary priority of impartiality. In the next chapter I will 
suggest my own argument which I believe may be able to provide the necessary
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priority of what we owe to each other, whilst remaining sensitive to the partial 
demands of our special relationships. I will therefore return to our discussion of 
Mendus, Scanlon, and priority, in the next chapter.
The most important conclusion of this discussion, for my purposes, is that 
we have seen that Scanlon does not establish the necessary priority of what we 
owe to each other. I have argued that the reason for this is Scanlon's view that the 
priority of the morality of right and wrong is derived from the commitment to the 
attractiveness of living in unity with others on terms they could not reasonably 
reject. This contingent and heteronomous foundation is incapable of providing an 
account of the necessary priority of contractualism.
c) TheAmoralist
We recall from chapter one that the problem of the importance of what we owe to 
each other is brought out most starkly by the character of the amoralist. The 
amoralist is a rational person, a person who can even understand the vocabulary 
and meaning of moral reasoning, but who is unmoved by moral reasons. They do 
not recognise the normativity of these moral reasons. The amoralist poses a 
different problem from the person who challenges the priority of right and wrong. 
The challenge to the priority of right and wrong is premised on an acceptance of 
the normativity of what we owe to each other. But, as we have just seen, this 
person challenges the view that the morality of right and wrong has necessary 
normative priority over all other practical considerations and commitments. The 
challenge to the normativity of what we owe to each other in this instance is the 
relationship between the normativity of contractualism and the normativity of 
other reasons and values. The amoralist, on the other hand, questions the very
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normativity of what we owe to each other. This is a challenge to the existence of 
reasons and values derived from contractualism, and their authority in their 
practical personhood. These people need not be immoral in their actions, that is, 
they may not do anything nasty or harmful. But that is merely a matter of 
coincidence, because their reasoning and their actions are not informed and 
constituted by moral reasons and the normative, obligatory, and prohibitive 
character of these reasons. As Bernard Williams says, the amoralist asks ‘Why is 
there anything that I should, ought to do?’57 The amoralist is rational, that is, he or 
she has and responds to reasons. These are people ‘...who can understand the 
difference between right and wrong but do not see, and perhaps even deny, that it 
is anything they have reason to care about.’58
Scanlon’s concern with the amoralist centres on the nature of the rift that 
exists between a morally committed person and the amoralist. He first claims that 
the amoralist cannot merely claim exemption from the normativity of moral 
reasons on the grounds of taste or preference. According to Scanlon, moral 
reasons are different from reasons connected with enjoyment. Matters of personal 
preference and enjoyment are not considered morally relevant by Scanlon, and 
consequently ‘...unless their situation differs from ours in ways that are morally 
relevant, we must say that the moral reasons that apply to us apply to these people 
as well... [Mjorality is not aimed at enjoyment, so the reasons to give it a place in 
one’s life are not conditional in this way.’59
57 Bernard Williams, Morality, (Cambridge University Press, 1993), 3
58 Scanlon, What We Owe, 158, it should be noted that there are many different ways of characterising the 
problem of amoralism, that will of course influence the kind of response offered. I will focus on the 
description given by Scanlon, as his arguments are my main concern.
59 ibid.
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The essence of the problem with amoralists is that they violate the kind of
relationship that is constitutive of the unity of mutual respect in a moral
association: they do not acknowledge the reasons for respect of practical
personhood. The relationship of unity between those committed to the value of
practical personhood stands at the foundation of the values and reasons of what
we owe to each other. Scanlon notes that this relationship is of much wider
significance than other kinds of relationships we may value. If we do not share
recognition of the value of an artist or cuisine, we can still have a moral
relationship with some that may not be aesthetically or gastronomically fulfilling.
The effects of a failure to be moved by considerations of right and 
wrong are not, however, confined in this way. This failure makes 
a more fundamental difference because what is in question is not a 
shared appreciation of some external value but rather the person’s 
attitude toward us -  specifically, a failure to see why the 
justifiability of his or her actions to us should be of any 
importance. Moreover, this attitude includes not only us but 
everyone else as well, since the amoralist does not think that 
anyone is owed the consideration that morality describes just in 
virtue of being a person.60
The basic problem is that the core of the value of right and wrong is being 
ignored, and the core of that value is the practical personhood of individuals. 
They might be gentle, peaceful, and industrious, but they do not acknowledge the 
normativity of what we owe to each other, derived from the properties of practical 
personhood. ‘The amoralist’s failing seems so serious, Scanlon answers, because 
of its implications for his relations with the rest of us. He refuses to accord us 
moral standing, and that must affect our every interaction. That explains the
60 ibid., 159
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depth of the divide between the morally blind compared to the musically 
insensitive.’61
Gerald Dworkin argues that the constructivism of Scanlon's contractualism
provides the normativity of what we owe to each other.
The essence of a hypothetical, contractualist scheme is that correct 
principles are defined as the ones that suitably characterized 
agents would choose or agree upon. Although there must be 
reasons why such agents would choose one principle rather than 
another -  if they chose arbitrarily then we would have no basis for 
claiming a particular principle would be chosen -  the relevant 
reasons (and the facts on which they are based) don’t introduce the 
relevant normativity. That is introduced by the agreement or 
choice. There is a procedure of construction, and what emerges 
from that construction are the principles of [right and wrong].62
Dworkin is sympathetic to the ability of constructivist contractualism to
provide determinate principles of right and wrong. But he is sceptical of the
ability of constructivism to establish the normativity of principles on universally
valid, objective grounds. His argument is that Scanlon's constructivism requires a
particular prior motivational commitment. This is to the conditional commitment
of wanting to live in a relationship of unity on the basis of mutual justification in
terms of the properties of practical personhood. Dworkin asks: what of the
disaffected, who have no commitment to such a unity?
Remember that the reason that the fact that an action is wrong 
provides me with reason not to do it is just the fact that the action 
cannot be justified to others on grounds I could expect them to 
accept. But this is exactly the reason that the disaffected cannot
61 Gary Watson, ‘Contractualism and the Boundaries of Morality’ in Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 28, No. 
2 (April 2002), 237
62 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Contractualism and the Normativity of Principles’, in Ethics, Vol. 112, No. 3, (April 
2002), 476
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see the force of, because they cannot see the value of being in 
unity with their fellow creatures. The very thing which explains 
our motivation to act rightly has no motivational force with them, 
and cannot, given their (defective) appreciation of the value of 
being in a certain relationship with others... If the right is 
constituted by the reasons people have for accepting or rejecting 
principles (when suitably motivated), then the authority of such 
principles for those who do not have such reason is put more 
centrally into doubt.63
It seems to me that Dworkin has identified the most serious flaw in 
Scanlon's contractualism, but somewhat mistated the origin of the problem. 
Dworkin argues that the problem with establishing the normativity of the 
principles of right and wrong derives from a motivational difference between the 
amoralist and the contractualist. But I think that the problem is deeper, and 
somewhat different. We recall from our discussions in chapter two, that Scanlon 
takes an internalist view of motivation, which means that individuals must take a 
reason as a consideration in order to be motivated by it. But whether or nor a 
person takes a reason as a consideration is different from the more philosophical 
question of the basis of the normative authority of moral reasons. The problem is 
not that Scanlon cannot show how people would come to be motivated to act on 
what we owe to each other, but rather that he cannot, by his own admission, 
explain why what we owe to each other has objective normative validity. If the 
problem of normative validity is not derived from a contingent motivational 
commitment, what is its source?
The amoralist is not someone who happens to have a different set of 
motivations from the contractualist. The amoralist is an expression of a
63 ibid., 481-2
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philosophical scepticism regarding contractualism. It seems to me that the 
amoralist, as characterised by Scanlon, is someone who does not accept the 
justification of the foundations of contractualism, and therefore does not accept 
the justifications of the principles derived from contractualist reasoning. In other 
words, the amoralist denies that the morality of right and wrong applies to them. 
It is the view that contractualists may ascribe the origin and conclusions of what 
we owe to each other as they wish, but there is no objectively verifiable reason 
why this ascription applies to them also. In this sense, I think that the problem 
with amoralism is better described as a scepticism about the ascription of moral 
reasons. When understood as a scepticism regarding the ascription of moral 
reasons, the limits of the scope of Scanlon's contractualism are revealed most 
strikingly. On the one hand, Scanlon believes that the normativity of 
contractualist reasons are constituted objectively. This is clear from our earlier 
discussion of internal and external reasons. There Scanlon argued that the 
normativity of moral reasons is not constituted subjectively, that is, subjective 
motivations do not exempt individuals from the ascription of moral reasons. But 
Scanlon also believes that contractualism, or any moral theory it seems, cannot 
justify the ascription of moral reasons to those who do not accept their normative 
validity. I argued in chapter three that the space between the weak externalist 
account and the objectivity of moral reasons allowed for amoralism. In the 
discussion in chapter three I pointed out that this was a structural inconsistency 
because it seemed to invoke two contradictory claims: firstly that moral reasons 
are universal and necessary in scope and ascription; and secondly, that an agent 
could claim exemption from the same moral reasons because they were not
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motivated by them. This structural problem is now revealed strikingly in the case 
of the person who denies that reasons against wronging apply to them, it seems to 
me that the problem of the amoralist is derived from two aspects of Scanlon’s 
theory. Firstly, the formal space allowed for amoralism in the combination of 
objectivism and weak extemalism about normative reasons. Secondly, Scanlon’s 
choice of a heteronomous commitment to a life in unity as the source of the 
normativity of what we owe to each other.
The normativity of contractualism seems to turn on an assertion, rather 
than a justification. The assertion is that practical personhood is the origin of 
moral reasons and evaluations. Scanlon can explain why this rift is of profound 
importance to the kinds of relationships we can have with someone. But he 
cannot explain why the amoralist is mistaken to take the view he or she does. 
Scanlon is aware that this seems to place a limit on the scope of contractualism. 
But it seems as though he regards this limit as a necessary consequence of the 
problem posed by Prichard’s dilemma. The amoralist might accept Scanlon's full 
account of practical reasoning as rational, but still reject the normative 
significance of the moral reasons of what we owe to each other. Contractualism, 
on Scanlon's view, cannot present an explanation of the validity of the universal 
and objective scope of moral reasons. We are not asking Scanlon for an account 
of how everyone actually will come to be motivated to act according to 
contractualism, we are not asking for an account of how contractualism would 
give everydne motivation to be good and act according to right. But we do need 
to resolve the paradox of the claim of the objective, necessary ascription of the 
normative authority of moral reasons, with the apparent inability to provide a
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justification of this foundational ascription. This inconsistency could be resolved 
by taking either side of the paradox to its logical conclusion. We could accept 
either an explicitly limited and constrained in scope contractualism that 
accommodated amoralism, or, a thoroughgoing commitment to the objective 
validity and universal scope of normative reasons that declared claims to 
amoralism as mistaken and invalid. Unfortunately, neither resolution is found in 
Scanlon’s contractualism.
4. Conclusion
Our discussion of Scanlon has come full circle. We began in chapter one by 
making the case against contractualism on the basis of its failure to answer the 
problem of amoralism and relativism. The developments in Scanlon's theory offer 
new and attractive insights into the nature of practical reasoning the nature of 
moral wrongness in particular. But Scanlon has still not found the resources with 
which to attain his explicitly stated aim of establishing the universal scope, the 
objective validity, and the normative necessity of contractualism. Perhaps the 
most general conclusion to be drawn from our survey of his arguments so far is 
that these problems cannot be addressed within the scope of contractualism as 
drawn by Scanlon currently. We have encountered often his reluctance to engage 
in a metaphysical argument in order to refute the forms of scepticism that we find 
in amoralism and value relativism. And this, I would argue strongly, is the 
problem. Scanlon's arguments against implausible metaphysics are entirely valid 
and appropriate. But there seems to me an alternative metaphysical tradition that 
could begin to answer the kinds of scepticism that confound contractualism. The 
explanation of this metaphysical alternative is the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter Six
TRANSCENDENTAL CONTRACTUALISM
Introduction
In the previous chapter we discussed the normative problem in Scanlon's 
contractualism. I argued that Scanlon was unable to establish the necessary 
normative authority, and necessary normative priority, of what we owe to each 
other. Scanlon's contractualism has failed to establish that the properties of 
practical personhood are ascribed objectively and a priori. If we can show that the 
ascription of practical personhood is objective, the amoralist is refuted; if we can 
show that the ascription of practical personhood is a priori, we have shown that 
what we owe to each other must take priority. This is the purpose of our final 
chapter.
1. Strawson and Persons
Scanlon states that his contractualism has the advantage of being able to establish 
objective reasons against wronging whilst avoiding metaphysical questions. I 
have argued that Scanlon has not adequately established the necessary a priori 
objectivity of the reasons against wronging. I will suggest that one possible route 
to establish the required a priori objectivity is to seize the metaphysical nettle. I 
will argue that one of the most promising rebuttals of the kind of scepticism that 
we are confronted with lies in Peter Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics. The 
project begun in Individuals is an attempt to establish that the concept of a person 
is primitive, and that this concept necessarily includes the ascription of
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personhood to self and other selves. I will explain that Strawson attempts to show 
this through transcendental arguments. My central claim is that the method of 
transcendental argument is the most promising means to establish the nature and 
substance of personhood. I will argue that Strawson’s transcendental arguments 
are complementary to the contractualist project, but that they are incomplete for 
our purposes. I will combine Scanlon's arguments for reasons as primitive, with 
Strawson's arguments for persons as primitive. This will be a transcendental 
argument for practical personhood as the necessary condition for the possibility of 
self-consciousness; this will be an argument for the objective normativity of what 
we owe to each other. In order to make the case for the transcendental argument 
for practical personhood, we will step back from the discussion of morality, and 
look at the more basic question of persons.
a) Particulars
Strawson distinguishes two kinds of approach to metaphysics: revisionary and 
descriptive. Revisionary metaphysics aims at revolutionising the structure with 
which we see the world, whereas descriptive metaphysics aims at correctly 
describing the actual structure of our thought and experience. Strawson’s 
approach is descriptive. He is concerned to describe the necessary conditions for 
the possibility of human thought and experience. Individuals ‘aims at establishing 
the central position which material bodies and persons occupy among particulars 
in general. It shows that, in our conceptual scheme as it is, particulars of these 
two categories are the basic or fundamental particulars, that the concepts of other
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types of particulars must be seen as secondary in relation to the concepts of 
these.’1
Our experience of the world consists, at least in part, in the experience of 
particulars. Some of these particulars we conceive of as separate from ourselves. 
Our perception of own lives will contain particular memories and incidents. But 
we also experience other people, objects, and episodes in history, as particulars 
independent from ourselves. Strawson’s concern is to show that the experience 
and identification of particulars is a necessary feature of our experience of the 
world; that the world as we experience it must be composed of particulars. To say 
that the existence of particulars in our conceptual experience of the world is 
necessary is another way of saying that particulars are objective. The task of 
Individuals is to show in what way particulars are objective, and to describe those 
particulars that are most basic and fundamental to our experience and perception. 
We began this thesis by asking if Scanlon's reasons are objective, and I argued 
that they are not shown to be objective. We are now searching for a definition 
and account of the necessary conditions of our experience, an account of the 
nature and content of the objectivity of our experience.
The importance of particulars to our experience of the world is evident 
from an examination of our ordinary speech. If I speak to my friend Jamie about 
our mutual friend Richard, I have referred to Richard as a particular person. If 
Jamie has understood my reference to Richard and understood that I refer to 
Richard rather than another friend Gareth, Jamie has identified the particular in 
question, Richard.
1 P. F. Strawson, Individuals: an essay in descriptive metaphysics, (London, Routledge, 2002), 11
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It is not merely a happy coincidence that we are often able, as 
speakers and hearers, to identify the particulars which enter into 
our discourse. That it should be possible to identify particulars of 
a given type seems a necessary condition of the inclusion of that 
type in our ontology. For what could we mean by claiming to 
acknowledge the existence of a class of particular things and to 
talk to each other about members of this class, if we qualified the 
claim by adding that it was in principles impossible for any one of 
us to make any other of us understand which member, or 
members, of this class he was at any time talking about? The 
qualification would stultify the claim.2
When I refer to Richard he is a particular person in himself of course. But 
there are other particular features that contribute to the particular that is Richard. 
Some of these particulars are more fundamental than others to our identification 
of particulars, and to the constitution of those particulars. The identification 
occurs within a unified framework, which encapsulates every kind of particular. 
This unifying framework is the spatio-temporal structure. The ubiquity and unity 
of the spatio-temporal structure means that every particular will have a 
relationship to every other particular within this structure. ‘It cannot be denied 
that this framework of knowledge supplies a uniquely efficient means of adding 
identified particulars to our stock. This framework we use for this purpose: not 
just occasionally and adventitiously, but always and essentially.’3 Strawson notes 
that if we referred to a particular that did not exist in any distance from this space 
or at any distance from this time, we would have to concede that this particular 
did not really exist. ‘We are here dealing with something that conditions our 
whole way of talking and thinking, and it is for this reason that we feel it to be
2 ibid., 16
3 ibid., 24
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non-contingent.’4 We might be struck with the anxiety that there exists a 
multitude of spatio-temporal frameworks, and that whilst me might concede that 
space and time are necessary to the identification of particulars, we cannot 
establish that there is a unique framework of space and time. But Strawson notes 
that this anxiety neglects the fact that we ourselves exist within the spatio- 
temporal framework, and we know of ourselves uniquely, and therefore we can be 
assured that there exists one spatio-temporal framework that constitutes our 
experience of reality. We can be confident, at least to begin with, that our shared 
identification of particulars within a common spatio-temporal framework affirms 
that we are not each of us existing in a unique private spatio-temporal framework.
A sceptic might suggest that whilst we can establish that a common 
ubiquitous spatio-temporal framework is necessary for the identification of 
particulars, we cannot establish the reidentification of particulars. Each particular 
identification might be unique and discontinuous. This reminds us perhaps of 
Parfit’s arguments about the self in Reasons and Persons where our identification 
of ourselves in the past and future is discontinuous. We do not reidentify 
ourselves; we are identifying different selves.
Strawson responds that this sceptical view of reidentification is 
contradictory: it allows itself something that it means to deny. If experience were 
discontinuous and reidentification impossible, there would be no doubt about the 
reidentification of particulars. The notion of doubt about the reidentification of 
particulars only makes sense is there if the concept of reidentification in which to 
state those doubts. Thus the sceptic needs to invoke the very concept he doubts in
4 ibid., 20
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order to state his case. ‘He pretends to accept a conceptual scheme, but at the 
same time quietly rejects one of the conditions of its employment. Thus his 
doubts are unreal, not simply because they are logically irresoluble doubts, but 
because they amount to the rejection of the whole conceptual scheme within 
which alone such doubts make sense.’5 (Strawson, 1959, p. 35). Thus we can 
establish that the spatio-temporal system is a necessary part of our conceptual 
scheme, and is partly constitutive of the reality that we experience.
Space and time are part of the necessary structure of our conceptual 
framework, and are necessary for the identification and reidentification of 
particulars. But as we saw from the example of the identification of my friend 
Richard, we can ask if there are any particulars which are fundamental and basic 
to the identification of other particulars. If I refer to my friend Richard, does this 
depend on the more basic particular of friend, male person, human animal, and so 
on? The existence of space and time as the basic framework of particular 
identification still leaves us with the question ‘...is there any one distinguishable 
class or category of particulars which must be basic from the point of view of 
particular-identification?’ This question has two aspects: firstly, is there a class or 
category of particular which is fundamental to the identification of all other 
particulars but which can be identified independently of all other kinds and 
categories of particulars; and secondly, can this class or category of particular be 
derived or deduced from the necessary spatio-temporal structure of our conceptual 
framework? Strawson answers affirmatively to both.
5 ibid., 39
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We have seen that identification rests on the location of objects in
particular space and time. Space and time is fundamental to the identification of
particulars. But the notions of space and time can only be given meaning, can
only be conceptualised, in terms of objects with a particular location in space and
time. Space and time are not separate from, or extraneous to, objects with spatio-
temporal qualities. We cannot conceive of objects without spatio-temporal
qualities, and we cannot think of space and time without the concepts of
particulars. If space and time and spatio-temporal objects are interdependent, we
can ask: which, if either, is fundamental and constitutive? Strawson’s answer is
that the framework, as the general scheme, is constituted by those objects. The
most basic kind of object that could serve as the basis for the identification of
other particulars, but could not be identified on the basis of any other kind of
particulars, is a material body.
It seems that we can construct an argument from the premise that 
identification rests ultimately on location in a unitary spatio- 
temporal framework of four dimensions, to the conclusion that a 
certain class of particulars is basic in the sense I have explained.
For that framework is not something extraneous to the objects in 
reality of which we speak. If we ask what constitutes the 
framework, we must look to those objects themselves, or some 
among them. But not every category of particular objects which 
we recognize is competent to constitute such a framework. The 
only objects which can constitute it are those which can confer 
upon it its own fundamental characteristics. That is to say, they 
must be three-dimensional objects with some endurance through 
time... Of the categories of objects which we recognize, only 
those satisfy these requirements which are, or possess, material 
bodies -  in a broad sense of the expression. Material bodies 
constitute the framework. Hence, given a certain general feature
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of the conceptual scheme we possess, and given the character of 
the available major categories, things which are, or possess, 
material bodies must be the basic particulars.6
It is commonly supposed in the history of philosophy that material bodies 
are not the most basic kind or particular. Material bodies, it has been suggested, 
are the agglomeration of the more fundamental particular of the personal 
experience of sense data. Strawson argues that the private experiences of sense 
data are themselves dependent on the material body of a person (or perhaps 
animal) who is the locus of these perceptions. We cannot think of the notion of a 
private experience of a red thing, or a hot thing, without the conceptually prior 
notion of a material body of a person who is able to sense and perceive these 
experiences.
The principles of individuation of such experiences essentially 
turn on the identities of the persons to whose histories they belong.
A twinge of toothache or a private impression of red cannot in 
general be identified in our common language except as the 
twinge which such-and-such an identified person suffered or is 
suffering, the impression which such-and-such an identified 
person had or is having. Identifying references to ‘private 
particulars’ depend on identifying references to particulars of 
another type altogether, namely, persons.7
In summary, Strawson argues that particulars are the basic unit of our 
experience and understanding. The identification of particulars rests on their 
unique occupation of spatio-temporal location. The spatio-temporal framework is 
common and singular. The spatio-temporal framework does not exist 
independently or extraneously from particular objects. In fact, the notion of a
6 ibid.
7 ibid., 41
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spatio-temporal framework is constituted by material bodies. Material bodies can 
be shown to be the most basic kind or category of particular in terms of which 
every other individual particular must be identified. Strawson adds that persons, 
in their most fundamental aspect, are material bodies, and further, intends to show 
that persons are in fact the most basic material bodied particular. The argument 
now proceeds to establish that persons are the basic particulars, and what the 
nature of personhood, that the basic particular is.
We have so far been discussing the notion of the identification of
particulars in speech and thought. We saw that Strawson specified that the
particulars should be publicly available and observable to meet the objection of
privacy in identification. Strawson now asks if we can establish a much stronger
identity for basic particulars, a sense that is independent from the speaker-hearer
relationship. Can we establish the necessary conditions for the possibility of
identification of objective particulars:
...I intend it as a question about the condition of the possibility of 
identifying thought about particulars distinguished by the thinker 
from himself and from his own experiences or states of mind, and 
regarded as actual or possible objects of those experiences. I shall 
henceforth use the phrase, “objective particulars” as an
abbreviation of the entire phrase, “particulars distinguished by the
thinker etc.”8
Strawson’s approach to this question is to ask if material bodies are 
necessary to the identification of objective particulars. Previously, Strawson 
argued that basic particulars as material bodies can be derived from the spatio-
temporal nature of our conceptual framework. If material bodies are not
8 ibid., 61
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necessary to the identification of objective particulars, this could be shown by the 
valid proposition of a world of experience from which a feature of material bodies 
is absent. Can we propose a world of objective particulars by taking away the 
notion of spatial identity to see if objective particulars could be identified without 
material bodies. ‘I suggest that we inquire whether there could be a scheme 
which provided for objective particulars, while dispensing with outer sense and all 
its representations. I suggest that we explore the No-Space world. It will at least 
be a world without bodies.*9
b) Objective Particulars, Solipsism, and Persons
The notion of a No-Space world would be a world of sounds. The notion of a 
spatial location for sound is not intrinsic to its existence. Sounds may be to our 
left, or behind us, but their intrinsic qualities are rather pitch, volume, and timbre. 
We can conceive of an auditory world which has no spatial relations, but we 
cannot conceive of a purely auditory conception of space. Pitch, volume, and 
timbre cannot between them provide for any spatial location. ‘The question we 
are to consider, then, is this: Could a being whose experience was purely auditory 
have a conceptual scheme which provided for objective particulars?’10
The discussion of a purely auditory world of sounds might sound a very 
unlikely route through which to refute the normative sceptic. We recall, however, 
that we are enquiring into the possibility of objective particulars. Our question is: 
are material bodies necessary conditions for the existence of objective particulars? 
The notion of a world of sounds is an attempt to construct a world of objective
9 ibid., 63
10 ibid., 66
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particulars without the existence of material bodies, thereby showing that 
objective particulars are not dependent on material bodies. In the process of 
asking the question, we are in fact raising a more general question about the 
nature and possibility of objectivity. The more general question about the nature 
and possibility of objectivity is raised in two senses. Firstly, we are considering 
the possibility of a kind of particular without material embodiment: the nature of 
objective particulars. Secondly, we are addressing the more general question of 
the existence of a consciousness that has a distinction between him or herself, and 
particulars that are not him or herself. We are enquiring into the possibility of 
objects as the basis of objectivity. If we cannot establish the conditions for 
objective particulars, we have neither established the conditions of possibility for 
objects, nor of a consciousness that could make a difference between him or 
herself and objects that are not him or herself. The discussion of the nature and 
possibility of a world of sounds is one way to begin to answer the problem of 
solipsism.
So I shall provisionally interpret the question, “Can the conditions 
of knowledge of objective particulars be fulfilled for a purely 
auditory experience?” as meaning: “Could a being whose 
experience was purely auditory make use of the distinction 
between himself and his states on the one hand, and something not 
himself, or a state of himself, of which he had experience, on the 
other?” This question, for the sake of a convenient phrase, I shall 
re-express as follows: “Can the conditions of a non-solipsistic 
consciousness be fulfilled for a purely auditory experience?” That 
is to say, I shall mean by a non-solipsistic consciousness, the 
consciousness of a being who has a use for the distinction between 
himself and his states on the one hand, and something not himself 
or a state of himself, of which he has experience, on the other; and
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by a solipsistic consciousness, the consciousness of a “being who 
had no use for this distinction.”11
Strawson's discussion of the sound world is rich and complex. His
conclusions are that it is possible, through extended analogies with the world as it
is, to conceive of the possibilities of the reidentification of particulars, and the
notion of a non-solipsistic consciousness. But even though the possibilities can be
constructed,.it remains unclear if they amount to a certainly affirmative answer to
our two questions. The discussion of the no-space world is not an attempt to
construct an alternative reality, but rather a technique to tease out the necessary
conditions for our experience of the world as it is. Whilst the no-space world can
provide room for the notion of a non-solipsistic consciousness, this consciousness
would be sound itself. Thus there does not seem to be an adequate distinction
between a subject and object in order to provide for the possibility of non-
solipsistic consciousness. One of the main purposes of this discussion is to show
that the no-space world presents a general problem of solipsism, of other minds.
What is the nature of the conscious subject, and what is the nature of the
relationship of consciousness to basic particulars? The question of the non-
solipsistic consciousness in the no-space world forces us to ask whether
.. .to have the idea of himself, must he not have the idea of the 
subject of the experiences, of that which has them? So it might 
begin to look impossible that he should have the idea of himself -  
or at any rate the right idea. For to have the idea at all, it seems 
that it must be an idea of some particular thing of which he has 
experience, and which is set over against or contrasted with other 
things of which he has experience, but which are not himself. But 
if it is just an item within his experience of which he has this idea,
11 ibid., 69
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how can it be the idea of that which has all of his experiences and 
now we seem to have come upon a form of problem which is 
completely general, which applies as much to the ordinary as to 
the auditory world. It must, it seems, be soluble for the ordinary 
world.12
When we refer to ourselves we use many notions such as tall, hot, awake, 
determined, unfit, worried. We ascribe to ourselves properties and qualities which 
we would only ascribe to objects we consider persons. There can often occur 
schisms in conception of self however. Our spirit might be willing but the flesh
weak. We may look at ourselves in the mirror and ask, in what sense is that
object me?
Now there seems nothing needing explanation in the fact that the 
particular height, colouring, physical position which we ascribe to 
ourselves should be ascribed to something or other, for that which 
one calls one’s body is, at least, a body, a material thing. It can be 
picked out from others, identified by ordinary physical criteria and 
described in ordinary physical terms. But, so long as we keep that 
for the present indispensable sense of strangeness, it can and must 
seem to need explanation that one’s states of consciousness, one’s 
thoughts and sensations, are ascribed to the very same thing to 
which these physical characteristics, this physical situation, is 
ascribed. That is, we have not only the question: Why are one’s 
states of consciousness ascribed to anything at all? We have also 
the question: Why are they ascribed to the very same thing as 
certain corporeal characteristics, a certain physical situation,
&c.?13
It would be uncontroversial to assert that material bodies perform a 
crucial role in our sense perception. My vision relies on my eyes, my touch on 
my skin, taste on my mouth. This explains perhaps why persons are particularly
12 ibid., 89
13 ibid., 89-90
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attached to their bodies. But the notion of a person as a locus of particular 
consciousness is not explained by the mere responsiveness to stimuli. The 
existence of a material body does not explain the concept of a self, nor the 
ascription of selfhood to material bodies. ‘They do not explain the concept of a 
person.*14
Strawson's argument for the nature of personhood begins with a rejection 
of a Cartesian and no-ownership view of persons. The Cartesian view suggests 
that the notion of a person consists in two different kinds of substance: corporeal 
and incorporeal. On this view, states of consciousness can be ascribed to one or 
other kind of substance, but not both. The no-ownership view holds that 
consciousness cannot be ascribed to material bodies at all. On this view, the 
material body is the subject of empirical experiences, but there is no self or ego 
that owns or has these experiences, there are only material bodies with 
experiences. We will examine Strawson’s refutation of the no-ownership view 
first, before turning to the question of Cartesian dualism.
It is normal for us to assume that the experiences of particular persons are 
particular to them. In other words, Richard’s toothache is Richard’s toothache, 
and clearly distinguishable from Jamie’s toothache. In this sense, Richard ‘owns’ 
the experience of his toothache. The no-ownership view, on the other hand, 
asserts that items of consciousness, such as toothaches, are only the result of 
causal effects on material bodies. The material body of a person stands in a causal 
relationship with other materials bodies, as cause and effect. The no-ownership 
view reduces the notion of consciousness down to the experiences had by material
14 ibid., 94
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bodies. The particularity is located in the experience and not in the consciousness
of the experience. So, the particular experience of toothache x, could be had by
body a, but the particular experience of toothache x  could, as a matter of empirical
causal effect, be had by body b. The notion of ownership of particular experience
x  by a or b is a fiction derived from the mistaken view that the particularity of the
experience of x is given by particular consciousness of it, rather than its material
and causal particularity. ‘The no-ownership theorist... clams that items of
consciousness are only causally related to the bodies which are persons. They are
independent entities in their own right, which could be the particular items they
are, even if they were causally related to other bodies than they in fact are.’15 In a
famous passage, Strawson says that the no-ownership theorist supposes that
persons as material bodies are the subject of experiences as material causal effects,
and opposes the view that there is something else, an ego or noumenal self, which
is necessary to own those experiences.
Suppose we call the first type of possession, which is really a 
certain kind of causal dependence, “havingi”, and the second type 
of possession “having2”; and call the individual of the first type 
“B” and the supposed individual of the second type “E”. Then the 
difference is that while it is genuinely a contingent matter that all 
my experiences are hadj by B, it appears as a necessary truth that 
all my experiences are had2 by E. But the belief in E and the 
belief in “having2” is an illusion. Only those things whose 
ownership is logically transferable can be owned at all. So 
experiences are not owned by anything except in the dubious 
sense of being causally dependent on the state of a particular 
body; this is at least a genuine relationship to a thing, in that they 
might have stood in it to another thing. Since the whole function
15 Cale John Crowley, Strawson's Theory o f the Person in Individuals, (London, University Microfilms 
International, 1980), 76-77
of E was to own experiences, in a logically non-transferable sense 
of “own”, and since experiences are not owned by anything in this 
sense, for there is no such sense of “own”, E must be eliminated 
from the picture altogether. It only came in because of a 
confusion.16
This position amounts to a scepticism about the self as embodied persons 
to whom states of consciousness can be ascribed. As such, Strawson attempts to 
show that it is incoherent. His initial strike against the no-ownership view is 
similar in nature to the refutation of the sceptic who questioned the 
reidentification of continuous particulars. There, we recall, Strawson pointed out 
that the sceptic relies on the notion of the reidentification of particulars in order to 
state the doubt. In the no-ownership case, the no-ownership theorist relies on the 
notion of a self as owner of states of consciousness in order to state the no­
ownership theory. The no-ownership theorist says that ‘All my experiences are 
hadi by (i.e. uniquely dependent on the state of) body B.*17 But this is an 
ascription of consciousness to a body. It is necessary to ascribe consciousness, or 
ownership, in order to make the sentence sensible, although the my is precisely 
what the no-ownership theorist is attempting to refute. If our theorist did not use 
the notion of my, this would make no sense, as it is clearly not the case that ‘All 
experiences are hadi by body B.’ The no-ownership theorist arrives at this 
predicament because he or she has located the contingent particularity of the 
experience in the body and not the consciousness. The theorist also cannot make 
all particular experiences of a person, x, identical to the experiences of a body, B, 
because this would be an analytical statement that would not succeed in
16 Strawson, Individuals, 96
17 ibid.
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specifying the particularity of the experiences independently of the person who 
has those experiences. The point of the no-ownership theory is to show that 
particularity is not given by the person’s experiences, but by the body’s causal 
state and effect. The statement that all x’s particular experience are experiences of 
body B relates the person and the body through identification, but the no­
ownership view is that there is no such relationship, and that the body’s 
experiences are particular as part of the causal material system, and these 
particular experiences could be had by x  or y  or z equally. The no-ownership 
theorist cannot say that body A, B, and C’s experiences are all identical, as that 
would fail to individuate them as particular causal events. The particularity has to 
be ascribed to a particular experience had by a particular body. But as the causal 
experience is un-individuated unless it happens to a particular body, so too the 
body is un-individuated unless it is the unique bearer of particular experiences. 
And so the particularity of experiences cannot be maintained if they are not 
individuated by being the experience of a particular body and none other. This 
kind of individuating particularity is anathema to the no-ownership theorist as 
they want to maintain that the causal experiences of bodies could be had by any 
other body, thus they are not owned by a particular body exclusively. But as we 
have just seen, the particularity of the causal experience cannot be dependent on 
the connection between the body and the experience. Experience r by body B is 
not equal to experience r by body C. It is either B’s experience, r, or C’s 
experience, r. It cannot be both Br and Cr. That amounts to saying that Richard’s 
toothache is Jamie’s toothache. Toothache might be essentially toothache, but 
Richard’s toothache is his own, and Jamie’s is his and not Richard’s. And so
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Strawson argues that the no-ownership view cannot form a coherent notion of a
particular experience had by a body that is also transferable in identity.
...the theorist cannot consistently argue that ‘all experiences of 
person P* means the same thing as ‘all experiences contingently 
dependent on a certain body B’; for then his proposition would not 
be contingent, as his theory requires, but analytic. He must mean 
to be speaking of some class of experiences of the members of 
which it is in fact contingently true that they are all dependent on 
body B. The defining characteristic of this class is in fact that they 
are “my experiences” or “the experiences of some person”, where 
the idea of possession expressed by “my” and “of’ is the one he 
calls into question... States, or experiences, one might say, owe 
their identity as particulars to the identity of the person whose 
states or experiences they are. From this it follows immediately 
that if they can be identified as particular states of experiences at 
all, they must be possessed or ascribable in just that way which the 
no-ownership theorist ridicules; i.e. in such a way that it is 
logically impossible that a particular state or experience in fact 
possessed by someone should have been possessed by anyone 
else. The requirements of identity rule out logical transferability 
of ownership. So the theorist could maintain his position only by 
denying that we could ever refer to particular states or experiences 
at all; and this position is ridiculous.18
For Strawson, the alternative of Cartesian dualism is equally unattractive. 
The dualist suggests that there are two different substances, say, mind and body, 
and that states of consciousness can only be ascribed to one and not the other. In 
first person terms, I may be aware of my physical existence and its experiences, 
and of my thoughts and cognitions. I might find the two so different in kind that I 
ascribe my consciousness to my thinking self, as it is in thought that I arrive at the 
notion of self in the first place. Strawson objects however that to be able to
18 ibid., 97
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ascribe states of consciousness to oneself, one must be able, in principle to ascribe
them to others. If I want to express an experience to another, I must be able to
ascribe my experience to myself, distinguish it from the other’s, and explain that it
is my experience I am referring to. If I wish to identify an experience of another
person, I must be able to identify that other’s conscious experience as theirs, and
different from mine. If I was unable to do this, I could not be said to be ascribing
states of consciousness at all, as those states would relate to no body, and no self.
The ascription of consciousness to an ego, as self, relies on the identification of
the particular ego and its distinction from other egos. But if we ascribe
consciousness to an ego as a self, how are we to distinguish other egos and selves?
If an ego is incorporeal, how do we distinguish other selves?
If, in identifying the things to which states of consciousness are to 
be ascribed, private experiences are to be all one has to go on, 
then, just for the very same reason as that for which there is, from 
one’s own point of view, no question of telling that a private 
experience is another’s. All private experiences, all states of 
consciousness will be mine, i.e., no one’s. To put it briefly. One 
can ascribe states of consciousness to oneself only if one can 
ascribe them to others. One can ascribe them to others only if one 
can identify other subjects of experience. And one cannot identify 
others if one can identify them only as subjects of experience, 
possessors of states of consciousness.19
The dualist might suggest that there is no problem in ascribing states of 
consciousness to others as we recognise what it is to ascribe states of 
consciousness to ourselves. Why cannot a person say that just as my 
consciousness stands in a special relationship to this body, so does that other ego 
stand in special relationship to that other body? But this gets the argument the
19 ibid., 100
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wrong way around. It uses the very notion of self-ascription that we are trying to 
explain. We may also ask, on what basis do we assume that one ego is only ever 
ascribed to one body?
Strawson’s objection to the no-ownership view and the dualist view of the 
self prepares the ground for his theory of persons. The no-ownership view could 
not establish the particularity necessary to self-consciousness from the mere fact 
of material embodiment. The dualist view on the other hand was unable to 
establish the particularity of embodied selves, as it could not establish why 
consciousness would be ascribed to any particular self. Strawson proposes a 
different conception of the self which is able to avoid the problems of dualism and 
no-ownership. This is the embodied self as basic particular.
c) Embodied Self as Basic Particular
What we have to acknowledge, in order to begin to free ourselves 
from these difficulties, is the primitiveness of the concept of a 
person. What I mean by the concept of a person is the concept of 
a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of 
consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a 
physical situation &c. are equally applicable to a single individual 
of that single type.20
Strawson notes that although it is common to speak of persons as 
composed of a corporeal subject and a conscious subject, this dualism likely ends 
in an incoherent no-ownership view. A person must be a fundamental unity of an 
embodied self-consciousness, fundamental in the sense that it cannot be broken 
down into further notions of ego and body. We can of course make distinctions 
between egos and bodies, but these are secondary distinctions, derived from the
20 ibid., 101-2
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original primitive concept. They depend on the prior notion of an embodied, 
differentiated self, which, as we have seen, is unobtainable from an original 
distinction between egos and bodies. The previous arguments have shown that 
the identification of the self requires the ascription of consciousness to material 
bodies. This premise is required for the concept of a consciousness to have any 
meaning at all. Both arguments inevitably relied on a notion of the self as a 
concept to which predicates ascribing physical characteristics and predicates 
ascribing consciousness are applicable.
Not all material bodies are persons. All material bodies, however, can 
have certain physical characteristics or predicates ascribed to them. Their mass, 
size, location etc. Strawson calls these M-predicates. There are other predicates 
that we ascribe to persons only, such as angry, clever, is suffering. These are P- 
predicates. We can ascribe both M- and P-predicates to persons. P-predicates 
imply consciousness to the object in question. We have seen from the previous 
section’s arguments, that the identification of self-conscious persons relies on the 
ability to ascribe consciousness to oneself, and to other selves. Thus Strawson’s 
notion of the primitive nature of the self must be able to explain how we are to 
identify and ascribe P-predicates to ourselves and other selves. We begin this 
ascription through self-reflection on our experiences and behaviour, and then 
observe the experiences and behaviour of other. But this observation amounts to 
more than speculative deductions from patterns of experience. These ascriptions 
are derived from logically adequate criteria for the ascription of states of 
consciousness. For if they were not logically adequate criteria for ascriptions of
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states of consciousness, then we would be in the same dilemma as that faced by 
the dualist.
There is no sense in the idea of ascribing states of consciousness 
to oneself, or at all, unless the ascriber already knows how to 
ascribe at least some states of consciousness to others. So he 
cannot argue in general “from his own case” to conclusions about 
how to do this; for unless he already knows how to do this, he has 
no conception of his own case, or any case, i.e. any subject of 
experiences. Instead, he just has evidence that pain &c. may be 
expected when a certain body is affected in certain ways and not 
when others are. If he speculated to the contrary, his speculations 
would be immediately falsified.21
Thus the ascription of P-predicates is derived from the primitive notion of 
the self as a concept to which corporeal and consciousness predicates can be 
ascribed. The self is once again shown to be an essential condition for the 
possibility of ascription of consciousness to oneself, and to other selves.
The necessity of self-and other ascription of P-predicates on the basis of 
logically adequate criteria, is part of Strawson’s answer to the problem of other 
minds. The other minds sceptic suggests that we may be able to ascribe states of 
consciousness to ourselves, but that we are unable to ascribe them correctly to 
others. Strawson has been at pains to show that it must be possible to ascribe P- 
predicates to both ourselves and to others. The other minds sceptic suggests that 
there is logical gap between the criteria we use to ascribe P-predicates and the 
actual state referred to in the P-predicate. In other words, the other minds sceptic 
says that there is a divide between the criteria we have forjudging that someone is 
depressed, and the actual state of being depressed itself. The sceptic would assert
21 ibid., 106
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that the outward behaviour of being depressed is merely a sign of anger. But if 
there is doubt about the relationship between the ascribed P-predicate and the 
behaviour in others, why is there any greater confidence in its ascription to the 
self? This could only be if the sceptic was using a special insight into their own 
consciousness that invoked the use of self. We have seen from the no-ownership 
argument that this cannot be sustained without the notion of self and other 
ascription. The other minds sceptic is in an even more incoherent position than 
the no-ownership theorist, who at least did not privilege their own states of 
consciousness.
.. .if this logical gap is allowed to open, then it swallows not only 
his depression, but our depression as well. For if the logical gap 
exists, then depressed behaviour, however much there is of it, is 
no more than a sign of depression. But it can only become a sign 
of depression because of an observed correlation between it and 
depression. But whose depression? Only mine, one is tempted to 
say. But if only mine, then not mine at all. The sceptical position 
customarily represents the crossing of the logical gap as at best 
shaky inference. But the point is that not even the syntax of the 
premises of the inference exists, if the gap exists.22
The methods of application of the logically adequate criteria are different, 
in that we ascribe P-predicates to ourselves on a non-observational basis. That is, 
we do not need to observe the behaviour of depression in ourselves in order to 
ascribe the predicate of ‘is depressed’ to ourselves. But our ascription to others is 
done on the basis of logically adequate criteria applied through observation. This 
does not imply that there are two different kinds of P-predicates that are applied to 
self and others. It is rather that the P-predicate of ‘is depressed’ is applied on
22 ibid., 109
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different grounds, both of which are logically adequate and are derived from the 
necessity of self and other ascription of P-predicates.
We recall that Strawson raised two questions with regard to the nature of 
persons: why are states of consciousness ascribed at all, ascribed to anything; and 
why are they ascribed to the very same thing as certain corporeal characteristics? 
Strawson’s discussion so far has aimed at showing that states of consciousness are 
ascribed because of the primitiveness of the concept of a person, and the unique 
nature of P-predicates. But this is not a fully adequate description of the concept 
of a person. Strawson says that the remainder left by these two argument amounts 
to the question: ‘How is the concept of a person possible?’23
Strawson’s answer is not fully comprehensive. But he does make three 
arguments that help us ground the notion of an individual person as a basic 
particular: ‘...it is easier to understand how we can see each other, and ourselves, 
as persons, if we think first of the fact that we act, and act on each other, and act 
in accordance with a common human nature.’24 Persons, as particulars to which 
M- and P-predicates can be ascribed, have the capacity for intentional physical 
action, whether coiling a rope, or dancing a jig. When we notice others coiling a 
rope or dancing a jig, the expression of intentional human bodily movement is 
distinctive, according to Strawson, and helps us ground the concept of a person. 
The concept of a person for Strawson intrinsically includes the notion of 
intentional action. Our interaction with others proceeds on the basis that we 
ascribe to them the notion of personhood, of practical persons.
23 ibid., 110
24 ibid., 112
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It is important that we should understand such movements, for 
they bear on and condition our own; and in fact we understand 
them, we interpret them, only by seeing diem as elements in just 
such plans or schemes of action as those of which we know the 
present course of future development without observation of the 
relevant present movements. But this is to say that we see such 
movements as actions, that we interpret them in terms of intention, 
that we see them as movements of individuals of a type to which 
also belongs that individual whose present and future movements 
we know about without observation; it is to say that we see others 
as self-ascribers, not on the basis of observation, of what we 
ascribe to them on this basis.25
And so we have an account of the nature of persons. In summary, 
Strawson argues that there are certain necessary conditions, and necessary 
structures to our understanding of persons. Firstly, they are material bodies 
located in time and space. Secondly, these material bodies can be shown to be a 
basic particular in our conception of the world. Persons are a primitive concept. 
The nature of the primitive concept is that it is a material body to which we can 
ascribe both material predicates and predicates of consciousness. The dual notion 
of mind and body are derived from this prior primitive concept of the self as a 
materially embodied person. Solipsism can be refuted as we could not conceive 
of a world in which there is no distinction between self, other selves, and world. 
Our concept of a person includes the notion of practical intentional agency, which 
is given in our personal actions, our interactions with other persons, and our 
recognition of a shared human nature.
My intention in turning to Strawson’s argument about persons was to help 
us refute the normative sceptic. This work is yet to be done. But before these
25 ibid.
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arguments can be successfully employed against the normative sceptic, I will 
discuss Strawson's argument further. I will first discuss Strawson's argument as a 
transcendental argument. I will then examine the content of Strawson's argument, 
and ask if it is sufficient for our purposes. I will first examine some well known 
objections to transcendental arguments before looking at the application of 
Strawson's argument to contractualism and the refutation of normative scepticism.
2, The Validity o f Transcendental Arguments
Although Strawson uses the term only in passing, many of the arguments in 
Individuals are transcendental in structure. Transcendental arguments are perhaps 
most famously associated with Kant’s critical philosophy. Strawson has of course 
written about Kant’s transcendental idealism, and argued that certain 
transcendental arguments can be split off from Kant’s idealism. It is not my 
intention to discuss Kant's transcendental idealism. The question of Strawson’s 
interpretation of Kant's idealism does not directly concern the argument for the 
nature of persons in Individuals. The question of the relationship between 
Strawson's transcendental arguments for persons as primitive and Kant’s notion of 
the self and personhood is important and fascinating, but I will leave it to one side. 
I will instead focus on the arguments as we find them in Individuals, and ask if 
they work in their own terms.
Whilst it is now quite common to speak of transcendental arguments, there 
is wide controversy and disagreement about their nature, status, and employment. 
We may begin with a very broad generalisation that transcendental arguments are 
meant to show that certain conclusions are necessarily connected with certain 
premises. Such arguments are often phrased in terms of: P, i f  P then Q, therefore
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Q, where Q is said to be a necessary condition for the possibility of P. The point 
of this approach is to show anyone who accepts P  that they must accept Q as a 
necessary condition for the possibility of P, therefore P  and Q are necessarily 
entailing. Scepticism of P must include scepticism of Q, and so no-one can 
employ Q in order to sceptically doubt P. These kinds of arguments are 
frequently found in discussions of epistemology, and the refutation of the sceptic 
about the external world. The sceptic might want to deny the necessity of 
causality whilst affirming the reality of the natural world, whereas the 
transcendental philosopher would try to show that causality is a necessary 
condition for the possibility of the experience of the natural world. This outlines 
the basic epistemological structure of transcendental arguments. But 
transcendental arguments can be employed with a more overtly metaphysical 
intention. Their aim is not solely to explain what is the case by entailment or 
induction. Their aim is to establish objective, necessary, features of the world and 
our cognition of it, a priori. This aim is derived from the challenge that all 
knowledge of the world is a posteriori, and the further extension of this claim that 
we cannot establish any objective features of the world. The transcendental 
ambition is to show, through reasoning, that the structure of apprehension and 
understanding takes a determinate and necessary form, and that the world as we 
experience it is imbued with certain objective and necessary features. 
Transcendental arguments state that knowledge of the world is not constituted 
solely by experience of the world; rather, experience of the world is constituted, in 
part, by our prior, a priori, categories, concepts, categories, and faculties. These 
in turn have a necessary structure and application. The distinctive feature of
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transcendental arguments is therefore that the object of analysis is dissected for its 
necessary, a priori features. The validity of the arguments depends on their ability 
to show that all kinds of thought and experience of the world are constituted by 
certain features and imbued with a determinate structure. The hope is, that by a 
forensic examination of these necessary, a priori structures, these objects 
(conceptual schemes, features of the world) are shown to have an inescapable 
essential nature. It is in this sense that transcendental arguments hope to establish 
the necessary, objective, a priori nature of their objects.
It should be of no surprise that such arguments are controversial. Barry
Stroud has raised perhaps the most famous contemporary objection to the
employment of transcendental arguments. He suggests that transcendental
arguments can only provide a contingent and even hypothetical conclusion: the
most they can prove is that a belief, that Q, is a necessary condition for the
possibility of P.
An examination of some recent attempts to argue in analogous 
fashion suggests that, without invoking a verification principle 
which automatically renders superfluous any indirect argument, 
the most that could be proved by a consideration of the necessary 
conditions of language is that, for example, we must believe that 
there are material objects and other minds if we are to be able to 
speak meaningfully at all.26
They can show that Q is a necessary condition for the possibility of P, but 
they can say nothing about the reality, nature, or status of either P  or Q. The 
supposed necessity of the conclusions of the transcendental arguments is in fact 
nothing more than a contingent conclusion. This objection does seem to have
26 Barry Stroud, ‘Transcendental Arguments’ in Understanding Human Knowledge, (Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 25
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great force when applied to questions of empirical reality.27 Does Stroud’s 
objection hold for transcendental arguments in their entirety, and therefore to 
Strawson's arguments for persons?
We can identify several different kinds of transcendental arguments.28 The 
kind that we have just described in the example of the external world may be 
described as world-directed transcendental arguments (these are sometimes 
described as truth-directed, but I think world-directed is more accurate). They 
aim to deduce the necessary conditions of our true experiences of the world, 
thereby establishing the true nature of the world itself. But transcendental 
arguments may begin with a different kind of premise, and may be oriented 
towards our selves. Self-directed arguments concern both our experiences and the 
conditions necessary for those experiences. Self-directed transcendental
arguments can be directed at our experiences, our beliefs, and our conceptual 
scheme. It should be noted that self-directed transcendental arguments do not 
necessarily aim to show the actual beliefs, experiences, or conceptual schemes of 
people. Individuals may have any kind of confusion, misapprehension, 
idiosyncrasy, or disorder, but self-directed transcendental arguments are aimed at 
the philosophical necessity and validity of our notion of persons. In this sense, 
self-directed transcendental arguments have the possibility of avoiding Stroud’s 
objection. They can aim at objectivity in the form of a priori universality and 
necessity in the conditions of personhood. And here we return to Strawson's 
arguments regarding persons. Without rehearsing the details of the arguments, it
27 It should be noted in passing that Kant’s transcendental idealism might be more resilient to Stroud’s 
criticism, as there is an inherent contingency derived from the ineffability of the noumenal.
28 This taxonomy is derived, in revised form, from that offered in Robert Stem, Transcendental Arguments 
and Scepticism, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2000), 6-9, and Quassim Cassam, ‘Self-Directed Transcendental 
Arguments’ in Robert Stem ed., Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects, (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1999), 83
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should be clear that Strawson is providing a self-directed transcendental argument 
about our experience, beliefs, and concepts of individuals and persons. The world 
directed transcendental argument occurs first, when Strawson argues that space 
and time are the necessary conditions for the identification of particulars. He then 
proceeds to argue that space and time cannot be experienced or conceptualised 
prior to, or independently from, material objects. Material objects are therefore 
the most basic kind of particular, and constitute the concepts of space and time. 
Identification and reidentification are therefore shown to be dependent upon the 
prior existence of material objects as basic particulars. It is instructive to note that 
Strawson employs different techniques in the process of making his 
transcendental arguments. Christian lilies has noted that transcendental 
arguments can have exploratory and retorsive characteristics.29 Exploratory 
transcendental arguments are found when Strawson uses alternative worlds to 
tease out the necessary conditions; retorsive arguments are use to refute the 
sceptical challenges by showing that the sceptic relies on a condition in order to 
state the doubt of the condition. Used in tandem in this manner, we can see that 
Strawson's arguments for the nature of personhood are self-directed 
transcendental arguments of an exploratory and retorsive kind. It seems to me 
that Strawson's premises are so bare and uncontroversial, that Stroud's objection 
would not hold. Strawson does assume the identification of particulars, and does 
assume consciousness (he does not assume self-consciousness as his argument is 
from material bodies to the primitive concept of the person as self-conscious 
material body). No doubt we could conceive of a special scepticism which
29 Christian lilies, The Grounds o f Ethical Judgment: New Transcendental Arguments in Moral Philosophy, 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2003), 30
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doubted the identification of individuals and the existence of any consciousness, 
but this is besides our point. We approached Strawson's argument in order to 
address the problem of normative scepticism. Can Strawson's self-directed 
transcendental argument for the primitive concept of a person be employed 
against the normative sceptic?
3, The Objectivity of Practical Personhood
The arguments for the basic particulars of material bodies were an integral part of 
the arguments for persons as material bodies. Strawson argued that the concept of 
a person is primitive, and that it is a concept which entails the ascription of M- 
and P-predicates. This ascription necessarily includes the notion of the self and 
other selves. Thus individual self-conscious personhood, mutual recognition of 
self-conscious personhood, and non-solipsistic self-consciousness, are necessary 
conditions for the possibility of experience. Does Strawson's argument amount to 
a refutation of the normative sceptic? It seems to me that as offered by Strawson, 
the argument does not yet refute the sceptic.
*
We recall that the normative sceptic expresses two objections to Scanlon's 
contractualism. The first questions the necessary priority of the morality of right 
and wrong; the second questions the objectivity of normative reasons. I 
characterised both these objections as scepticism regarding the ascription of the 
properties of practical personhood, and the subsequent contractualist 
characterisation of what we owe to each other. In the light of our discussion of 
Strawson’s arguments regarding persons, we can say a little more about these 
sceptical objections. The priority problem is an objection to the a priori status of 
the properties of practical personhood. The priority sceptic argues that other
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properties, perhaps those associated with being a parent, or friend, have either or 
both logical and normative priority. Scepticism regarding the objectivity of 
normative reasons is a doubt about the necessary and universal status of the 
properties of practical personhood. The objective reasons sceptic rejects the claim 
that the arguments that ascribe normative reasons to some persons apply to them, 
and that they are not in a relationship of mutual ascription of the properties of 
practical personhood that ground the morality of right and wrong. We can now, 
hopefully, be more precise about the arguments we need to provide in order to 
refute this normative scepticism. We need to establish that the properties of 
practical personhood are a priori, and necessary and universal; that is, we need to 
establish that the properties of practical personhood are objective.
a) Strawson’s Individuals and Practical Personhood
In section one, we set out Strawson’s arguments for the concept of a person as 
primitive. It seems to me that Strawson’s description of the person is importantly 
incomplete. At the very end of our discussion we encountered Strawson’s 
argument that practical intentionality is included in the concept of person. 
Practical intentionality is a physical expression of the primitive concept of a 
person as a material object to which physical experiences and self-consciousness 
can be ascribed. Intentional action is an expression of the unity of the concept of 
a person as a self-conscious material body. Strawson's discussion of practical 
personhood is very fleeting.
Peter Hacker points out that, in answer to the question, ‘how is a concept 
of a person possible*, Strawson ‘...invites us to give a central position to a sub­
class of P-predicates which has barely been mentioned hitherto, namely predicates
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of conscious and intentional action... We see them as actions, interpret them in 
terms of intentions...’30 It is clear that Strawson regards the characteristics of 
persons as intentional actors as central to the notion of common human nature. 
Persons are material bodies in motion. The ascription of M-predicates explains 
the physical properties of this motion, and Strawson argues that the ascription of 
P-predicates requires us to ascribe intentionality to this movement. Therefore, 
part of Strawson’s argument for the necessary features of the primitive concept of 
a person is that the ascription of P-predicates entails the ascription of intentional 
action. But he does not provide detailed arguments for the nature of this 
intentional action. Strawson’s transcendental argument omits a detailed account 
of the nature of intentional action; that is, Strawson omits a detailed account of the 
practical dimension of the concept of a person. Whilst this omission is significant, 
it is of the greatest importance to our thesis that Strawson nevertheless argues that 
the practical dimension of personhood is a necessary feature of the primitive 
concept of a person. Strawson’s argument therefore includes a transcendental 
argument for practical personhood.
Strawson’s analysis of the contours of intentional agency may be spare, 
but Scanlon's is detailed. We have examined the various arguments that Scanlon 
presents as a description of the necessary features of intentional action and their 
role in the constitution of moral reasons. These were the constructivist, 
contractualist arguments for the nature of right and wrong derived from the 
properties of practical personhood. What we discovered that Scanlon lacked 
however, was the ability to explain the a priori and objective ascription of these
30 Peter Hacker, ‘Strawson’s Concept of a Person’ Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society, Vol. 102, No. 1, 
(September 2001), 27
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properties. The notion of a transcendental contractualism is the view that the 
combination of Strawson's transcendental argument for the concept of a person as 
primitive should be combined with Scanlon's argument for the necessary features 
of intentional action and the constructivist contractualist understanding of the 
nature of right and wrong. I will now say a little more about how this synthesis 
provides a response to the normative sceptic.
b) The a priori Priority o f Practical Personhood
We recall from chapter five that the normative sceptic challenges the priority of 
what we owe to each other. This challenge does not involve a scepticism of the 
existence of contractualist moral reasons, but it does involve a scepticism that 
these reason have a necessary priority over other practical commitments. I argued 
that Scanlon is unable to show that the reasons of right and wrong must always 
and necessarily take priority over other practical reasons. We found that the cause 
of this failure was Scanlon's argument that the priority of right and wrong is based 
on a contingent and heteronomous commitment to the attractiveness of living with 
others in a unity of justification on contractualist grounds. In order to establish 
the necessary priority of what we owe to each other, we would have to establish 
that the properties that ground the morality of right and wrong are a priori. We 
also need to show, following our examination of Susan Mendus’s arguments, how 
partial and impartial reasons can be related harmoniously. Transcendental 
contractualism, as a synthesis of Strawson and Scanlon, aims to establish just that.
Strawson argued that the concept of a person is primitive. It is primitive in 
the sense that we cannot describe persons in any more basic terms (for example as 
a Cartesian duality of body and mind). It is also primitive in the sense that it is
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the repository of the necessary, mutual ascription of both M- and P-predicates. To 
provide any other predicates is to specify and draw upon this a priori concept of a 
person. In other words, the (re)identification of a person as a boy, or a parent, or a 
loved one, is an application of the a priori concept of a person. This application 
should not be interpreted simply as a logical priority (although it is that too). It is, 
more importantly, an ontological priority. To be a boy, or to be a parent, or to be 
a loved one, is to be a person in a special and determinate way, a way that 
depends on and is constituted by the properties of practical personhood.
We recall from chapter five that I disagreed with both Scanlon and 
Mendus’s account of the priority of right and wrong. I agreed with Mendus’s 
complaint against Scanlon that he does not present an adequate understanding of 
the nature and role of special relationships and the partial reasons that may derive 
from them. Scanlon's contractualism, as an instance of impartialist morality, 
seems deaf and blind to the filaments and textures of special relationships such as 
friendship; Scanlon conceived them as contingent affection suitably moralised. I 
also argued that Scanlon’s grounds for the priority of right and wrong are 
insufficient, as based on a contingent, heteronomous commitment to the value of 
right and wrong. I also argued that whilst Mendus has a more attractive and 
coherent account of the relationship between partial and impartial reasons and 
values, Mendus’s account does not explain sufficiently the necessity of the basis 
on which we adjudicate between worthy and unworthy partial relationships; 
neither does it ground the necessity of these relationships as constitutive 
conditions of impartial morality, nor the necessary derivation of impartial 
morality from them. The transcendental argument for the a priori status of
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practical personhood can, I suggest, accommodate Mendus’s important insights, 
whilst providing an account of the necessary priority of what we owe to each 
other.
My argument for transcendental contractualism takes Strawson's notion of 
the concept of the person as primitive, and combines it with Scanlon's arguments 
for practical personhood. The transcendental argument for practical personhood is 
meant to show that the conditions of practical personhood are a priori. However, 
the transcendental argument for practical personhood is not an argument for the 
existence of a personhood that is independent from the expressions of that 
personhood in particular relationships. It is not an argument for the existence of a 
self that is prior to the practice of personhood in thick substantive relationships. 
The argument seeks to identify the necessary a priori conditions of personhood, 
but it does not assert that there is a chronological priority to a self that is 
independent from the practice of partial relationships. My argument is that the 
conditions of practical personhood are only expressed in substantive relationships. 
It may help to clarify this point by making an analogy with Kant’s argument for 
the transcendental deduction of the categories. Kant presents a transcendental 
argument for the a priori necessity and universality of the categories of the 
understanding. These categories are a priori in the sense that they do not depend 
for their existence on experience. The categories structure the possibility of our 
perceptual experience. But we do not perceive the world primarily in terms of the 
categories, the categories are understanding’s contribution to the constitution of 
experience. Experience is also constituted by intuition. Together, understanding 
and intuition provide experience. This experience is united in our empirical
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categories, or concepts. Concepts are not a priori in themselves, they are 
constituted in terms of the categories, together with the content of intuition. 
Whilst transcendental arguments aim to establish the necessary conditions for the 
possibility of experience, experience is not constituted solely by these conditions. 
Substantive experience is simultaneously a combination of the conditions and 
their embodiment in the world. In terms of the act of perception a table is 
simultaneously and object with categorial and empirical qualities.
My argument for transcendental contractualism aims to show that what we 
owe to each other, that is our impartial reasons, are derived from the necessary 
conditions of practical personhood. As Scanlon argues, the terms of justification 
are set in accordance with our nature as reason guided self-governing creatures. 
The arguments from Peter Strawson placed Scanlon’s understanding of intentional 
agency within a picture of the necessary conditions of mutual ascription of self- 
conscious persons. The transcendental argument for practical personhood aims to 
show that the properties of practical personhood are the original moral properties 
of an augmented buck-passing argument which provides the structure and 
substance of contractualist moral reasons. But this argument does not propose 
that persons are self-conscious mutual ascribers of practical personhood only. 
Practical personhood is the necessary condition for the expression of our 
personhood. There are no pure persons, devoid of empirical properties, just as 
there are no pure concepts, devoid of empirical properties. There are the 
necessary conditions for the possibility of concepts and persons, and there are the 
actual concepts and persons as the embodiment of these conditions in practice. 
Practical personhood is the condition of the possibility of moral experience, but it
261
is not yet moral experience. Moral experience is the combination of its conditions 
in substantive practice. This means that our partial, particular relationships are the 
very embodiments of our experience. They are not independent from the 
conditions of practical personhood, although they are dependent on them. But just 
as substantive moral experience is dependent on the conditions of practical 
personhood, so the conditions of practical personhood are dependent upon 
substantive practice in order to constitute experience. Practical personhood is the 
condition for the possibility of moral experience, but it is in a relationship of 
mutual dependence with practice in order to constitute moral experience. I 
believe that this allows us to preserve the important insights of Mendus’s 
arguments whilst meeting the criticisms I made of both Scanlon and Mendus’s 
accounts.
Mendus criticised Scanlon’s reductive account of special relationships as 
based on contingent affection suitably moralised. I agreed with this criticism. In 
my account special relationships are not reduced to contingent affection suitably 
moralised, they are instead understood as the embodiment of the conditions of 
practical personhood. As such they contain the necessary conditions of practical 
personhood as the original moral properties that are the basis of what we owe to 
each other. But the conditions of practical personhood are not sufficient to 
constitute the experience of personhood. Practical personhood is experienced 
empirically in the particular relationships we have. Therefore friendship is a 
distinctive embodiment of the experience of practical personhood that will have 
its own reasons and require particular evaluative attitudes. Parenthood, 
neighbourliness, and other special relationships will be similarly distinctive. On
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this view, these relationships are not mere contingent occurrences; particular 
substantive relationships are the necessary contribution of practice to the 
experience of practical personhood. There is no experience of personhood 
independent from the practical embodiments in empirical relationships. I believe 
that this retains the moral specificity of these relationships that Mendus advocated. 
They are at once constituted by the original moral properties that are the basis of 
what we owe to each other; and simultaneously and mutually interdependently 
constituted by the particular empirical practices of these relationships, thus 
yielding particular partial reasons alongside the impartial. Just as in Mendus’s 
argument, I would wish this account to explain the reality of the feelings of 
conflict that may arise between partial and impartial reasons, whilst reconciling 
them within a harmonious picture of practical relationships and moral reasons. To 
be a practical person is, on the my view of transcendental contractualism, to have 
particular partial relationships and reasons and values necessarily. However, 
these are based on the condition of practical personhood, and therefore are in a 
necessarily dependent relationship with the impartial reasons of what we owe to 
each other.
Whilst I hope that this argument for the necessary interdependence of 
empirical practice and the conditions of practical personhood allows us to 
improve on Scanlon’s reductive argument, and retain Mendus’s insights into the 
relationship between partial and impartial reasons, I also hope that it addresses the 
two problems I raised in Mendus’s account. We recall that I argued that Mendus 
does not show which relationships are worthy of self expression, and why they
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would necessarily lead to impartial reasons and commitment to what we owe to 
each other. I will take each in turn.
Transcendental contractualism is intended to explain the necessary and a 
priori -nature of the conditions of practical personhood. The transcendental 
argument provides a quite formal, but nevertheless necessary and a priori, account 
of the nature of personhood. Whilst personhood may be embodied and expressed 
variously, according to the contractualist construal of the moral significance of 
these properties, only certain kinds of embodiment and practice will be 
compatible with the necessary conditions of practical personhood. These formal 
properties of practical personhood relate primarily to the embodiment of persons 
as objects to which we can ascribe M- and P- predicates. This ascription is 
necessarily mutual. The properties of embodiment and intentionality which 
constitute practical personhood therefore provide a limit on what is allowed in the 
treatment of selves. Physical integrity and the promotion and protection of 
intentional embodied agency are two basic features of the appropriate treatment of 
practical persons.31 The argument for the necessary conditions of practical 
personhood provide grounds for the discrimination of worthy expressions of self 
in particular practical relationships. However, these conditions are quite formal 
and would allow for the experience of practical personhood in a plurality of 
appropriate ways. This is the argument for the necessary conditions of practical 
personhood providing terms of adjudication of partial relationships.
31 I should point out here that this is one of the many ways that my argument for transcendental 
contractualism differs from classically Kantian views which, it seems to me, are concerned with rationality, 
and practical personhood as embodiments of reason. On my view of transcendental contractualism, it is 
persons as embodied intentional actors that is the original ontological and moral property. This view included 
capacities of reflection, but is not based on an argument for persons as embodiments of reason.
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The second objection was that Mendus does not provide an account of the 
necessary development of the commitment to partial reasons and values to 
impartial reasons and values. In my response to Scanlon’s reduction of special 
relationships to contingent affection suitably moralised, I argued that moral 
experience was constituted by the combination of the practice and conditions of 
practical personhood. I argued that Scanlon is mistaken to imply that moral 
reasons can exist independently of partial reasons. Whilst the former are 
necessary conditions, they are dependent on practice in order to instantiate 
practical personhood. Likewise, it seems to me that we can argue that particular 
relationships and their reasons and values are dependent for their possibility on 
the conditions of practical personhood. Being a son, or a father, is possible 
because of the conditions of practical personhood. Being a son is, inter alia, 
being a person with all the moral reasons and values that this provides. Mendus 
seemed to argue that it was possible for particular relationships and their partial 
reasons to exist independently of impartial reasons and values. The 
transcendental argument for practical personhood includes the argument that the 
practice of particular relationships and the conditions of practical personhood are 
mutually interdependent and constitutive of moral experience. There is, therefore, 
a necessary connection between the partial and impartial reasons that together 
combine moral experience. However, within this moral experience, the 
transcendental argument for practical personhood states that there is a necessary 
priority of what we owe to each other. This is derived from the a priori nature of 
the conditions of practical personhood which are the original moral properties of
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the augmented buck-passing argument within the contractualist account of the 
morality of right and wrong.
The transcendental argument for practical personhood, as a component of 
the wider argument for the morality of right and wrong of transcendental 
contractualism, aims to show that what we owe to each other has necessary 
priority. The transcendental ambition of establishing the necessary a priori nature 
of the conditions of practical personhood seeks to establish what is most valuable 
in both Scanlon and Mendus’s arguments. The conditions of practical personhood 
are necessary and a priori. This provides their necessary priority over partial 
reasons and values. The constitution of moral experience is, necessarily, a 
combination of practice and the conditions of practical personhood.32 Therefore, 
there is a mutual interdependence of the practice of personhood on the conditions 
of practical personhood. This interdependence constitutes the particular 
relationships as simultaneously discrete and distinct, and yet grounded on the a 
priori common conditions of the possibility of practical personhood.
c) The Necessary and Universal Ascription o f Practical Personhood 
The case of the person who challenges the priority of what we owe to each other 
is an instance of normative scepticism. But this normative scepticism concerns 
the relationship between our various moral reasons and commitments. The 
amoralist questions the very existence of those reasons, at least as they apply to 
him or her. The amoralist is of course a metaphor for the sceptical objection to
32 The sense of necessary is somewhat different here. It is of course possible for the conditions to exist 
independently of practice, and for their validity to persist in a world with no practice of personhood. 
However, such a world would not have morality, as there would be no contribution of empirical practice of 
practical personhood. This is analogous to the possibility of there being the categories of the understanding 
and no empirical experience. The categories of the understanding could exist independently, but there would 
be no experience. This is a possibility, but one that should not concern us, as we are reflecting on the nature 
of moral experience, just as Kant was reflecting on the nature of empirical (and practical) experience.
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the objective ascription of normative reasons, that is, the necessary and universal 
ascription of normative reasons.
The notion of the amoralist is meant to capture the view that the ascription 
of moral reasons is not objective; that is, that there is a reasonable objection to the 
ascription of the normativity of what we owe to each other. We recall that 
Scanlon endorsed the notion of the objective normativity of moral reasons, but 
also believed that amoralism was possible as there were no grounds on which to 
justify contractualism to those who are not committed to its key principles. I 
believe that the arguments of transcendental contractualism are able to provide 
good grounds on which to show that the amoralist is in fact in error, and that the 
ascription of what we owe to each other is objective.
The objection we are considering is that a self-conscious rational person 
could reasonably object to the ascription of the normativity of right and wrong. 
Scanlon seems to argue that the ascription of the normativity of right and wrong is 
derived from a commitment to the components of contractualism. But in fact, the 
ascription of right and wrong has no subjective dimension at all. As we argued in 
the previous chapter, this is not a question of motivation (at this stage), it is a 
question of the explanation of the grounds and scope of contractualism. Personal 
endorsement is necessary to establish a motivational effect, but we are not so 
much concerned with the motivational problem in the first instance, as with the 
justification of contractualism (quid juris and not quid facti as it were). We will 
address the question of the relationship between the moral reasons and motivation 
in a moment.
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Our response to the amoralist begins with pointing out two axioms which
the amoralist must accept in order to make the objection: the first is that there are
particulars; the second is that there is consciousness. These feature in the
assertion of amoralism because the amoralist identifies themselves and others, and
distinguishes between the validity of ascription between the two; consciousness is
assumed in order to make the objection. Therefore, to anyone who accepts that
there are particulars, and that there is consciousness, we apply Strawson's
transcendental argument for the concept of a person as primitive. A key element
of Strawson's argument was that the ascription of consciousness requires that
consciousness be ascribed to others. This is not merely a view of logical
entailment, it is a transcendental argument that a necessary condition of self-
consciousness is the ascription of consciousness to other persons. The ascription
of P-predicates to one self is an act of being able to identify the kind of object to
which M- and P-predicates are ascribable. It is a condition for the possibility of
being able to ascribe P-predicates, it is a condition for the possibility of being self-
conscious, that one has and employs the concept of a person to all objects (on pain
of error) that are persons.
...it is essential to the character of these predicates that they are 
both self-ascribable otherwise than on the basis of observation of 
the behaviour of the subject of them, and other-ascribable on the 
basis of behaviour criteria. To leam their use is to learn both 
aspects of their use. In order to have this type of concept, one 
must be both a self-ascriber and an other-ascriber of such 
predicates, and must see every other as a self-ascriber. hi order to 
understand this type of concept, one must acknowledge that there 
is a kind of predicate which is unambiguously and adequately 
ascribable both on the basis of observation of the subject of the 
predicate and not on this basis, i.e. independently of observation
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of the subject: the second case is the case where the ascriber is 
also the subject. If there were no concepts answering to the 
characterization I have just given, we should indeed have no 
philosophical problem about the soul; but equally we should not 
have our concept of a person.33
From the initial premises of the identification of particulars and the 
existence of self-consciousness, Strawson's transcendental argument aims to show 
that personhood is a mutual state, and not one of pure, solipsistic individualism. 
The very nature of personhood, on this view, is to be in a relationship of self- and 
other-ascription of the properties of personhood. The amoralist cannot, if using 
the notion of a person, state that the properties of practical personhood cannot be 
ascribed to them. The mutual ascription of properties of practical personhood is 
objective. We recall that we identified two features of objectivity in the ascription 
of the properties of practical personhood: necessity and universality. The 
properties of practical personhood are universal in the sense that it is a necessary 
condition of the possibility of self-consciousness; self-consciousness cannot be 
ascribed to objects ad hoc. This argument establishes the universality and 
necessity, that is, the objectivity, of these properties and their ascription.
The consequence of this view is that amoralism is regarded as an error. It 
is not an error in logic. It is an error in conception of personhood and the 
ascription of the properties of personhood to self and others. One of the strengths 
and benefits of a transcendental argument against amoralism is that it begins with 
commitments explicitly endorsed by the amoralist. It does not attempt to ground 
an argument for the importance of morality in anything that is external to the 
amoralist him or herself. This, it seems to me, avoids the problems of addressing
33 Strawson, Individuals, 108
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the amoralist that Scanlon raises. He seems to suggest that the commitments of 
the amoralist are separate from the commitments of moralists and contractualists. 
Given this separation we cannot begin to provide them with reasons to endorse 
what we owe to each other. This view was expressed, as we saw in chapter three, 
in Scanlon’s weak extemalism about normative reasons. I argued in chapter three, 
and again in chapter five, that Scanlon’s commitment to both weak extemalism 
and the objectivity of normative reasons is problematic. It allows for a structural 
conflict between the objectivity of a reason and the possibility of amoralism. 
Weak extemalism allows for rational exemption.
At the end of chapter three I asked if we could combine a commitment to 
the objectivity of reasons and weak intemalism. Williams offered a weak 
intemalism along with a non-objective view of normative reasons. It seems to me 
that transcendental contractualism offers the possibility of combining objectivity 
and weak intemalism in normative reasons.
Transcendental contractualism aims to establish the necessary conditions 
for the possibility of practical personhood. The claim of this argument is that 
these conditions are necessary, universal, and a priori. This is the nature of the 
transcendental claim to objectivity. The combination of the revised contractualist 
arguments for the nature of what we owe to each other with the transcendental 
argument for practical personhood, presents a view of normative reasons which is 
at once objective and internalist.
We recall the conditions of weak intemalism. Weak intemalism is the 
view that normative reasons exist only if there is a sound deliberative route from 
the agent’s existing motivations to the actual recognition of the normative reasons.
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Weak intemalism denies the possibility, contained within weak extemalism, that 
one could recognise a reason, and yet fail to be moved by it because one lacks the 
appropriate motivation. This is the view of the amoralist. On Scanlon’s weak 
externalist view, the amoralist is not irrational, and yet can deny that the 
normative reasons of contractualism apply to them. Scanlon claims that the 
normative reasons of contractualism are still objective, and yet the amoralist 
rationally exempts him or herself from them. The weak intemalism of the 
transcendental contractualist view I am offering agrees with Williams that reasons 
only exist if the agent is motivated appropriately. But it takes a quite different 
view of motivation from Williams.
On the argument for transcendental contractualism that I am offering, the 
conditions of practical personhood are the conditions of motivation, that is, 
motivation is defined in terms of practical personhood. Practical personhood is a 
condition of being motivated in the terms set out by the combination of arguments 
from Scanlon and Strawson. The transcendental arguments explain what the 
necessary conception of a person is, and the necessary terms of intentional action. 
Indeed, a sound deliberative route is partly constituted by the transcendental 
argument for practical personhood. In order to strengthen this conception of 
motivation, we recall Scanlon’s arguments from chapter two regarding motivation. 
There, motivation was not regarded as a subjective state that was the combination 
of belief and desire, or the subjective state of believing. Motivation was the 
recognition of a reason as a consideration in favour of something. The 
transcendental argument begins from two basic premises. Firstly, that there are 
particulars, and secondly that there is consciousness. These basic assumptions of
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transcendental contractualism are the basic features of any subject’s motivations, 
in the sense that they are reasons that count in favour of them having any kind of 
conception of objects, including themselves. The sound deliberation of 
transcendental contractualism aims to show that the reasons of contractualism are 
necessary, universal, and a priori. Consequently, reasons are connected 
necessarily to motivation, and objective. Amoralism is an error because it must 
be based on an incorrect understanding of the nature of motivation. Being 
motivated, on the view of transcendental contractualism that I am suggesting, is 
being in the condition of recognising the reasons that count in favour of practical 
personhood. The transcendental argument aims to establish that there is a 
necessary and universal condition of practical personhood, and there are 
consequently necessary and universal reasons that count in favour of the 
recognition of the understanding of practical personhood. In other words, there is 
a necessary motivation. The claims of objectivity of Scanlon’s contractualism are 
combined with Williams’s claims of the necessity of a connection between 
motivation and normative reasons, and these are reconciled within an argument 
for the necessity of a certain motivation based on the transcendental argument for 
the objective, necessary, and a priori reasons that count in favour of practical 
personhood.
Transcendental arguments are, in their very nature, internalist.34 They do 
not refer to anything beyond or independent from personhood. However, they 
combine this intemalism with a claim to the objective validity of the necessary, 
universal, and a priori conditions of practical personhood. This combination of
34 self-directed transcendental arguments at least.
272
objectivity of normative reasons together with a weak intemalism rejects the 
possibility of rational and reasonable amoralism.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented an argument which it is hoped will address the 
problems of normativity in contractualism. The approach suggested is to take a 
transcendental argument for the nature of personhood, and combine it with 
Scanlon's account of intentional action and the nature of wrongness. This is 
described as a transcendental argument for practical personhood. The intention of 
this argument is to show that amoralism and scepticism about the priority of right 
and wrong are based on a misconception about the nature of our personhood. The 
transcendental argument is meant to provide an account of objectivity that is not 
metaphysically queer, but is robust enough to justify the necessary universality 
and a priority of the properties of practical personhood.
The transcendental argument for practical personhood does not provide all 
that we need though: we also need a convincing account of the nature of right and 
wrong. I believe that we have such an account in Scanlon's contractualism. I 
argue, therefore, that to make the response to the normative sceptic complete, we 
need to combine the transcendental argument for practical personhood with (a 
somewhat revised account of) Scanlon's contractualism. This particular 
combination of arguments drawn from Strawson and Scanlon may be described as 
transcendental contractualism.
The ambition of transcendental contractualism is to show that the 
conditions of practical personhood are necessary, universal, and a priori. These 
conditions provide the original properties of the moral arguments within
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contractualism. By combining and adapting Scanlon’s contractualism and 
Strawson’s transcendental arguments for persons, we are, I hope, able to show 
that the problems we encountered first in Contractualism and Utilitarianism, and 
again later in What We Owe to Each Other, are surmountable. These problems 
related to the necessity, universality, and a priori nature of the grounds of what we 
owe to each other. I have tried to show that the necessity, universality, and a 
priori nature of the grounds of what we owe to each other, that is, the objectivity 
of right and wrong, can be best established through a transcendental argument for 
the nature of persons as necessary mutual ascribers of practical personhood.
274
Conclusion
In the introduction to this thesis, I described my argument as an attempt to 
respond to the problem of scepticism regarding the normativity of what we owe to 
each other. I have attempted to show that the appropriate response to the 
fundamental question of the sources of normativity lies in a combination of 
transcendental arguments derived from Strawson, and contractualist arguments 
derived from Scanlon.
I hope that my admiration and commitment to Scanlon's contractualism 
has been apparent throughout my discussion. I believe that many of the 
commentators are correct in their judgment that What We Owe to Each Other is a 
remarkable work that will enrich the practice of moral theory. Whilst I believe 
that Scanlon's arguments for the nature of right and wrong are potent and 
important, it seems to me that there remains a pressing problem of the normativity 
of right and wrong. Rather than concluding that we should seek altogether 
different grounds to explain the nature of right and wrong, I have argued for an 
extension to Scanlon's theory, an extension that I believe is harmonious.
It seems to me that the prospects of combining transcendental arguments 
with contractualism are very good. I have argued that Scanlon and Strawson have 
similar views about the nature of personhood. Strawson seeks to explain the 
objectivity and necessity of the mutual recognition of persons, whilst Scanlon 
seeks to explain the right and wrong of our duty to live in a unity of mutual 
recognition. I suspect that Scanlon himself would reject my extension of his 
project on the grounds that transcendental arguments are unnecessary and
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inappropriate to an account of right and wrong. Scanlon seems very confident 
that people do regard each other in terms of right and wrong that he has described. 
In fact, I am no less confident. The difference between us seems to turn on the 
terms on which we would explain the objectivity of what we owe to each other. It 
would be the greatest pleasure to believe that the objectivity of what we owe to 
each other was certain. However, I believe that this certainty is questionable, at 
least as presented in What We Owe to Each Other. My hope is that transcendental 
contractualism provides more reasons for us to believe that our moral 
relationships are not a matter of a special taste or preference. They are instead a 
necessary and universal feature of our nature as mutually regarding persons.
It has been a central claim of this thesis that transcendental arguments 
provide a promising, and hitherto unexplored, possibility for grounding the 
objectivity of constructivist moral reasons. I would like to conclude by making 
two comments on the relationship between transcendental arguments and 
constructivism. Firstly, I will argue that whilst varieties of constructivism may be 
compatible with varieties of transcendental arguments, the augmented buck- 
passing argument is integral to any combination; the second comment relates to 
the application of transcendental contractualism to questions beyond right and 
wrong, and towards topics in contemporary political theory in particular.
It seems to me that any combination of constructivist and transcendental 
arguments must include a version of the buck-passing argument, perhaps along 
the lines of the augmented version that I have presented here. The buck-passing 
argument is necessary both to constructivism, and to the application of 
transcendental arguments in moral theory.
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The augmented buck-passing argument is integral to constructivism 
because, as we saw in chapter five, constructivism is vulnerable to the charges of 
redundancy and circularity unless it denies that both the right and the good are not 
independent substantive first order properties. If the right and the good were such 
properties, it would seem that constructivism is little more than a procedure for 
clarifying and discerning moral reasons, rather than, as constructivists must surely 
claim, of constituting moral reasons. Therefore, constructivism must include a 
version of the buck-passing argument in order to avoid the charges of redundancy 
and circularity. As I argued in chapter four, this buck-passing argument must 
include an account of the coextensive relationship between the right and the good, 
as the buck must not be passed from the good to the right, or vice versa. The first 
order substantive properties must ground both the higher order properties of the 
right and the good. Buck-passing is, therefore, essential to constructivism. It 
provides an account of the nature of the normative properties of the right and good 
in constructivism. But the augmented buck-passing argument also provides an 
appropriate framework for the application of transcendental arguments to moral 
theory. The augmented buck-passing argument suggests that there are first order 
substantive properties that ground the higher order, abstract properties of the right 
and the good. This buck-passing move provides the substantive first order 
properties that serve as original premises in the transcendental argument. 
Transcendental arguments begin with a premise and seek the necessary condition 
for the possibility of that premise. The structure of the buck-passing argument 
means that our original premise in the argument for transcendental contractualism 
is a first order substantive property (in our case the properties of practical
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personhood). The transcendental argument does not begin with a normative 
property: it is not a transcendental deduction of right and wrong. The 
transcendental argument applies to the substantive properties of personal identity, 
and not directly to the normative properties themselves. I would argue that this is 
a more promising premise from which to begin a transcendental argument, as it 
does not presuppose the properties of right or good as a premises in the argument. 
Instead it seeks to ground the objectivity of the first order substantive properties. 
The discussion of the nature of the normative properties is left to the constructivist 
part of the argument. In this sense, the buck-passing argument allows for the 
successful combination of transcendental arguments and constructivist arguments: 
constructivism needs a buck-passing argument to avoid problems of redundancy 
and circularity; whilst the transcendental argument requires the buck-passing 
argument to provide the original non-normative properties that are the premise for 
the transcendental argument for necessary conditions. In combination, we have a
normative and a metaphysical argument that together hinge on the first order
\
substantive properties of the particular buck-passing argument proposed.
In this thesis, the original properties are those of practical personhood. 
The properties of practical personhood are taken by contractualism to have 
normative significance; and by a Strawson inspired transcendental argument to 
have objective, universal, necessary, and a priori conditions. Variations of 
transcendental constructivism may be derived from alternative original properties 
in the buck-passing argument: we could imagine a more classically Kantian 
version that begins with the properties of rational cognitive experience (rather 
than my embodied mutually recognising practical personhood), or even a more
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Humean version that begins with motivations to pursue desires and interests. 
Given further reflection on the various self-directed transcendental arguments 
available and the varieties of moral constructivisms, I would readily accept the 
prospect of revisions of the particular arguments used within, what seems to me, 
the promising general framework of a buck-passing transcendental constructivism. 
I have sought to develop and defend the combination of arguments from Strawson 
and Scanlon as a distinctive transcendental contractualism, but combinations of 
arguments from Cassam and O’Neil, or Grayling and McKinnon may provide 
more successful variants of transcendental constructivism.1
I turn now, finally, to the question of the scope of transcendental 
contractualism. This thesis is concerned with the objectivity of reasons against 
wronging. My concern with these questions was arrived at through a 
consideration of the question of justification in contemporary liberal political 
theory. I have argued that the constructivist notion of justification as constitution 
needs augmentation to avoid the possibility of amoralism and scepticism. The 
turn to transcendental arguments derived from consideration of their original 
employment as a response to scepticism. The goal of transcendental arguments is 
at once to refute the sceptic and to establish the necessary, universal, and a priori 
conditions for the possibility of their objects. It seems to me that many of the 
problems facing advocates of the importance and priority of liberal reasons, are in 
fact forms of scepticism. Our discussion of amoralism and the scepticism 
regarding the priority of reasons against wronging have their counterparts in
1 See for example, Quassim Cassam, Self and World, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997), Onora O’Neill, 
Towards Justice and Virtue, (Cambridge University Press, 1996), A. C. Grayling, The Refutation o f 
Scepticism (London, Duckworth, 1985), and Catriona McKinnon, Liberalism and the Defence o f  Political 
Constructivism, (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).
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political discussions. In future work on transcendental contractualism as political 
theory, I would like to seek out objections to liberal reasons, and attempt to refute 
these scepticisms along the lines that I have presented here. This thesis has 
sought to present arguments for the objectivity of reasons against wronging; does 
the framework of transcendental contractualism allow us to present arguments for 
the objectivity of reasons against injustice? My ambition is that transcendental 
contractualism can be developed as a political theory, and provide new arguments 
from which the traditional liberal concerns for the necessary and universal moral 
equality of persons may be established. I would seek to pursue this ambition in 
future work on transcendental contractualism.
The goal of my argument for transcendental contractualism has been to 
draw on the work of two philosophers who are concerned with our identity as 
individuals, and our relationship with other persons. Transcendental 
contractualism is a metaphysical argument, and a normative argument. It is an 
argument for the necessity, universality, and a priori conditions of the mutual 
recognition of each other as practical persons due respect as individuals of equal 
moral standing. Transcendental contractualism is an argument for the objectivity 
of the reasons against wronging.
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